Behind
The Barrier
B'Tselem Report
21 April, 2003
Introduction
In June 2002, the government
of Israel decided to erect a separation barrier near the Green Line,
to prevent the uncontrolled entry of Palestinians from the West Bank
into Israel. The decision was made following the unprecedented increase
in the number of Palestinian attacks against Israelis since the outbreak
of the al-Aqsa intifada, particularly during the first half of 2002.
The government decided that the barrier will be built around the entire
West Bank To date, however, the government has directed the construction
of only some 190 kilometers. According to the Ministry of Defense, the
first 145 kilometers (Stage 1) are to be operational by July 2003.
Most of the barrier's route
does not run along the Green Line, but passes through the West Bank.
In the sections that run along the Green Line, Israel plans on building
a secondary barrier a few kilometers east of the main barrier. In several
areas, the winding route creates a loop that surrounds Palestinian villages
on all sides. The barrier will separate many Palestinian villages and
turn some of them into isolated enclaves. In numerous locations, the
barrier will separate villages from farmland belonging to their residents.
B'Tselem estimates that the barrier will likely cause direct harm to
at least 210,000 Palestinians residing in sixty-seven villages, towns,
and cities.
This position paper analyzes
the repercussions of the proposed barrier on the Palestinian population
and the human cost entailed in erecting it along the planned route.
We shall also examine the legality of the barrier, as currently planned,
in terms of international law. The goal of this paper is to warn of
the violations of human rights and of international law inherent in
setting the barriers route inside the West Bank. As construction
of the first section of the barrier has not yet been completed, and
work on the other sections has not yet begun, it is still possible to
prevent these violations.
Factual Background - Formulating
the barrier plan
The idea of erecting a barrier
to physically separate the West Bank from Israel in order to limit unmonitored
entry of Palestinians into Israel has been around in various forms for
years. The barrier was supposed to be erected in what is referred to
as the "seam area," a strip of land extending along the two
sides of the Green Line.
In March 1996, the government
decided to establish checkpoints along the seam area (similar to the
Erez checkpoint, in the Gaza Strip), through which Palestinians would
enter Israel. Alternative access routes were to be blocked. Following
this decision, the Ministry of Public Security decided, in 1997, to
assign special Border Police units to operate along the seam area. The
task of these units was to prevent the infiltration of Palestinians
into Israel. These decisions were only partially implemented. Following
the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada, in late September 2000, the government
made a number of decisions that ultimately led to the current separation-barrier
plan.
In November 2000, the then
prime minister, Ehud Barak, approved a plan to establish a barrier
to prevent the passage of motor vehicles from the northwest end
of the West Bank to the Latrun area. Many months passed before implementation
of the plan began. In June 2001, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon established
a steering committee, headed by National Security Council director Uzi
Dayan, to formulate a set of measures to prevent Palestinians from infiltrating
into Israel across the seam area. On 18 July 2001, the Ministerial Committee
for Security Matters (hereafter: the Cabinet) approved the steering
committees recommendations.
According to the Cabinets
decision, the IDF is responsible for protecting the eastern side of
the seam area through a task command that will coordinate
the activity, while the Border Police is responsible for the western
side. The two bodies are to coordinate their efforts fully and the number
of forces in the seam area is to be significantly increased. The Cabinet
also decided to implement the November 2000 decision regarding the barrier
against motor vehicles and to erect a barrier to prevent the passage
of people on foot in selected sections that are deemed high-risk areas.
Erection of the barrier to
prevent the passage of motor vehicles began following the decision of
June 2001. To date, the Department of Public Works and the Construction
Department of the Defense Ministry have completed a metal security railing
along the selected section, which runs from the northwest edge of the
West Bank to the Latrun area. As of April 2002, some nine months after
the Cabinets decision, the government has taken almost no action
to implement its decision on the barrier to prevent pedestrians from
entering Israel.
On 14 April 2002, the Cabinet
again discussed the matter. This time, it decided to establish a permanent
barrier in the seam area to improve and reinforce the readiness
and operational capability in coping with terrorism. The decision
further directed that a ministerial committee headed by the prime minister
monitor implementation of the decision. The Cabinet also decided to
begin immediate construction of a temporary barrier in three sectors:
east of Umm el-Fahm, around Tulkarm, and in Jerusalem. To implement
this decision, the Seam Area Administration, headed by the director
general of the Ministry of Defense, was established.
A few days later, the IDF
took control of Palestinian-owned land in several locations in the northwest
West Bank for the purpose of erecting the temporary barrier, and began
to uproot trees and level the earth along the planned route. However,
the decision to erect the temporary barrier was not implemented. In
the sector south of Tulkarm, work stopped after the land was leveled
and the trees uprooted, and some of the expropriation orders were nullified.
Within a few weeks after that, the IDF took control of other land and
began work on erecting the permanent barrier along a different route.
In early June 2002, the Seam
Area Administration finished formulating the plan to build the first
section of the permanent barrier, which was to run from the northwest
edge of the West Bank, near the Israeli village of Sallem, to the Israeli
settlement of Elqana in the south. In addition, a plan was devised to
build a barrier around Jerusalem (hereafter: the Jerusalem envelope).
The plan included a concrete proposal to construct sections north and
south of the city.
On 23 June 2002, the government
approved the plan in principle. The decision stated that, The
precise and final route will be determined by the prime minister and
the minister of defense. The government also stated that, in the
event of a dispute over the route, the Cabinet would resolve the matter.
The Cabinet convened on 14
August 2002 to discuss the route proposed by the Seam Area Administration.
At the meeting, the Cabinet approved the final route for Stage 1 of
the barrier, which would span 116 kilometers, including ninety-six kilometers
from Sallem to Elqana and twenty kilometers for the Jerusalem envelope
(in the northern and southern sections only). The length of the route
in Stage 1 has increased since the Cabinets decision, for various
reasons (see Part 3), and is now approximately 145 kilometers.
Infrastructure and construction
work along most of the approved route has begun, but only a ten-kilometer
stretch of the barrier near Umm el-Fahm has been completed . The Ministry
of Defense estimates that Stage 1 of the barrier will be completed by
July 2003. In January 2003, the Ministry of Defense began infrastructure
work along an additional forty-five kilometer stretch of the barrier,
from Sallem eastward to Faqua, that was not included in the Cabinets
decision of August 2002.
Components of the barrier
The main component of the
barrier is an electronic fence that will give warning of every attempt
to cross it. Along the east side of the fence is a service road
bordered by a barbed-wire fence. East of the service road is a trench
or other means intended to prevent motor vehicles from crashing into
and through the fence. The plan calls for three paths to the west
of the fence: a trace road, intended to reveal the footprints
of a person who crossed the fence, a patrol road, and an armored vehicles
road. Another barbed-wire fence will be constructed along this
path.
The average width of the
barrier complex is sixty meters. Due to topographic constraints, a narrower
barrier will be erected in some areas and will not include all of the
elements that support the electronic fence. However, as the state indicated
to the High Court of Justice, in certain cases, the barrier will
reach a width of one hundred meters due to the topographic conditions.
In the sections that run
along the Green Line, and in a few other areas, the plan calls for an
additional barrier to the east, referred to as the depth barrier.
According to the states response to the High Court of Justice,
it is a barrier without a fence, intended to direct movement in
these areas to a number of security control points. The primary
component of the depth barrier is a deep trench with a barbed-wire fence
alongside it.
In some areas, the main barrier
will be joined by a wall to protect against gunfire or another kind
of impeding wall. A few years ago, the IDF erected gunfire-protection
walls between two communities within Israel, Bat Hefer and Matan, and
the Palestinian villages that are near them, Shweikeh and Habla respectively.
The company that is paving Highway No. 6 (Trans-Israel Highway)
placed a gunfire-protection wall along the section of the highway near
Qalqiliya and plans to erect a similar wall near Tulkarm. In the Jerusalem
envelope area, two walls have already been erected: one alongside Road
45 (the Begin-North Road) along the section near Beit Hanina el-Balad,
and Bir Nabala, and another near Abu Dis on the eastern side of Jerusalems
border.
Another wall is planned near
Rachels tomb, in the southern portion of the Jerusalem envelope.
The plan for the barrier
calls for several gates to enable passage of people and goods. One of
the maps that the state submitted to the High Court of Justice contains
five main gates along the barrier route in Stage 1 (not including the
Jerusalem envelope). The map also includes twenty-six agricultural
gates (see below), five of which are placed along the depth barrier.
According to estimates made
in June 2002 by the Seam Area Administration, the total cost for Stage
1 of the barrier, which stretches, according to the original route,
116 kilometers, is NIS 942 million, i.e., NIS 8.1 million a kilometer.
However, the director general of the Ministry of Defense, Amos Yaron,
recently estimated the per-kilometer cost of the barrier at about NIS
10 million.
The barriers route
and placement vis-a-vis towns and villages in the area
BTselem asked the Ministry
of Defense for a copy of the map of the route of the separation barrier.
The request was rejected. The spokesperson of the Ministry of Defense
responded that that, Publication of the map has not been authorized.
In his reply to BTselem, the Defense Ministry official in charge
of implementation of the Freedom of Information Act stated that, Information
cannot be provided other than what has appeared in the media.
The lack of transparency regarding the path of the route flagrantly
violates the rules of proper administration and hampers informed public
debate on a project of long-term, far-reaching significance at a cost
of hundreds of millions of shekels. The refusal of the state to provide
the map is especially surprising because the infrastructure and construction
work along most of the approved sections of the route have already begun,
and once construction work begins, the barriers location becomes
evident immediately.
Because the state has refused
to provide the map, the barriers route marked on the attached
map is based on the land-seizure orders given to Palestinians, maps
that the State Attorneys Office submitted to the High Court of
Justice, and physical observations made in the areas in which the barrier
is under construction.
The map does not include
the route of the Jerusalem envelope because, other than two relatively
small sections near Kafr Aqeb north of the city and near Rachels
tomb to the south, land-seizure orders have not been issued to Palestinians.
Regarding the barriers route in the eastern and northwestern part
of the Jerusalem envelope, it is unclear whether a decision has been
reached. The implications of the route along the Jerusalem envelope
are liable to be far reaching, both because of the size of the Palestinian
population in the area and its great dependence on East Jerusalem, from
which it will be severed after the barrier is erected.
The map also does not include
the route of the northern section, which spans forty-five kilometers
from Sallem to Faqua, because the government has refused to provide
any information about it. Physical observations made by BTselem
of the work in this area indicate that the route passes very close to
the Green Line. As a result, it appears that the barrier in that area
will not leave many Palestinians, or much of their farmland, north of
the barrier.
The barriers route
passes within the West Bank, in some areas to a depth of six to seven
kilometers. The size of the area between the main barrier and the Green
Line along the route between Sallem and Elqana is 96,500 dunam, of which
7,200 dunam are the built-up area of ten settlements. The area of the
five enclaves situated east of the barrier (see below) contains another
65,200 dunam. The barrier will affect 161,700 dunam, which is 2.9 percent
of the land area of the West Bank.
The barriers winding
route, together with the depth barrier, creates enclaves of Palestinian
communities in some areas, and in other areas severs Palestinian residents
from their lands. BTselem estimates that the barrier will directly
harm at least 210,000 Palestinians who live in sixty-seven villages,
towns, and cities.
Palestinian enclaves west
of the barrier
The barriers route
creates five enclaves of Palestinian communities that lie between the
main barrier and the Green Line. These enclaves, presented here from
north to south, will be separated from the rest of the West Bank and
from each other. Thirteen communities, home to 11,700 people, are included
in this category.
The first enclave, located
west of Jenin, includes Bartaa a-Sharqiya (3,200), Umm a-Rihan
(400), Khirbat Abdallah al-Yunis (100), Khirbat a-Sheikh Saad
(200), and Khirbat Dhaher al-Malah (200), a total of 4,100 residents.
The second enclave, east
of the Arab-Israeli village Baqa al-Gharbiya, includes Nazlat Issa
(2,300), Baqa a-Sharqiya (3,700), and Nazlat Abu Nar (200), 6,200 residents
in all.
Khirbet Jubara, south of
Tulkarm, which is , home to 300 people, constitutes the third enclave.
The fourth enclave, near
the settlement Alfe Menashe, south of Qalqiliya, includes Ras a-Tira
(300), Khirbet a-Daba (200), and Arab a-Ramadeen al-Janubi (200),
a total of 700 residents.
The fifth enclave contains
the northern neighborhood of Bethlehem (400), near Rachels tomb.
Palestinian enclaves east
of the barrier
The winding route of the
separation barrier, together with the closure of areas as a result of
the depth barrier, will create five enclaves to the east of the main
barrier. Like the case of enclaves to the west of the barrier, the barrier
will separate these enclaves from the rest of the West Bank and from
each other. There are nineteen communities in this category, in which
128,500 residents live.
Two enclaves will be created
between the main barrier and the trenches of the depth barrier. The
first, in Jenin District, includes Rummana (3,000), A-Tayba (2,100),
and Anin (3,300), comprising a total of 8,400 residents.
The second and more significant
enclave in terms of size includes Shweikeh and Tulkarm (41,000), the
Tulkarm refugee camp (12,100), Iktaba (1,800), Dennabeh (7,600), Nur
Shams refugee camp (7,000), Khirbet a-Tayyah (300), Kafa (300), Izbat
Shufa (900), and Farun (2,900), a total of 73,900 residents.
The third enclave will be
created by hermetically closing Qalqiliya (38,200).
The fourth enclave, south
of Qalqiliya, will be surrounded by the main barrier on three sides.
This enclave includes Habla (5,300), Ras Atiya (1,400), and Izbat
Jalud (100), and has a total of 6,800 people.
The fifth enclave, a few
kilometers further south, includes Azzun Atma (1,500) (see
the discussion on this village below).
Communities separated
from their farmland
Residents of dozens of Palestinian
communities east of the main barrier or the depth barrier will be separated
from a substantial portion of their farmland, which will remain to the
west of the barrier. This separation will harm these residents, who
have already lost land that was seized on which the barrier itself will
be erected. The number of residents who will be directly affected by
being separated from their land due to the placement of the barrier
depends of the number of Palestinians who own land on the other side
of the barrier. This category contains thirty-six communities, in which
72,200 people reside.
In Jenin District, the communities
are Zabda (800), Araqa (2,000), al-Khuljan (400), Nazlat a-Sheik
Saaeed (700), Tura a-Gharbiya ((1000), Tura a-Sharqiya (200),
Khirbet Masud ((5), Khirbet Mentar (50), Umm Dar (500), and Dhaher
al-Abed (300), comprising a total of 6,000 residents.
The communities in Tulkarm
District are Akkaba (200), Qaffin (8,000), Nazlat al-Wusta (400),
Nazlat a-Sharqiya (1,500), Nazlat al-Gharbiya (800), Zeita (2,800),
Attil (9,400), Deir al-Ghusun (8,500), al-Jarushiya (800), al-Maskoofi
(200), Shufa (1,100), a-Ras (500), Kafr Sur (1,100), and Kafr Jammal
(2,300), a total of 37,600 residents.
In Qalqiliya District, the
communities are Falamya (600), Jayyus (2,800), Nabi Elyas (1,000), Isla
(600), al-Mudawwar (200), Izbat al-Ashqar (400), Beit Amin (12,000),
Sanniriya (2,600), Izbat Salman (600), and Mas-ha (1,800), a total
of 11,600 residents.
In Jerusalem District, at this stage, we are able to identify two communities
that clearly fall within this category: Rafat (1,800), and Kafr Aqeb
(15,000) (see the discussion below), a total of 16,800 residents.
Israeli settlements
Ten settlements, containing
a total of 19,000 residents, will be located on the western side of
the barrier. These settlements are, from north to south, Shaqed (500),
Hinnanit (600), Rehan (100), Salit (400), Zufin (900), Alfe Menashe
(5,000), Oranit (5,200), Shaare Tiqwa (3,500), Ez Efrayim (600),
and Elqana (3,000).
In East Jerusalem, a total
of thirteen settlements in which 173,000 people reside will be included
within the Jerusalem envelope: Neve Yaakov (20,300), Pisgat Zeev
(36,500), French Hill (8,200), Ramat Eshkol (5,800), Maalot Dafna
(3,600), Sanhedria Murchevet (5,000), Ramot Alon (38,000), Shuafat Ridge
(11,300), the Jewish Quarter in the Old City (2,300), East Talpiot (12,800),
Givat Hamatos (800), Har Homa (figures not available), and Gilo (27,600).
Infringement of human rights
Erection of the barrier within
the West Bank is liable to infringe a range of human rights of hundreds
of thousands of Palestinians, from the right to property to the right
to receive medical treatment.
Most of the infringements
are derived from the anticipated impact on the residents right
to freedom of movement. Therefore, the severity of the infringements
depends on the crossing arrangements that Israel will employ between
the two sides of the barrier. An infringement that is not derived from
the restrictions on freedom of movement has already occurred, or is
liable to occur soon: the violation of the property rights of the owners
of land along which the barrier is to run.
Infringement of the right
to freedom of movement
Everyone has the right to
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 13 (1)Everyone lawfully
within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 12 (1)
The strip of land between
the barrier and the Green Line, and apparently between the barrier and
the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem as well, will be declared a Closed
Military Area. According to the states response to the High Court
of Justice, this declaration will not apply to the local residents.
Based on this statement, residents of the enclaves west of the barrier
will not be required to obtain a special permit to cross the barrier.
However, Civil Administration officials have announced on several occasions
that permanent crossing permits will be issued to residents of the enclaves.
Other residents of the West Bank will generally not be allowed to enter
these enclaves for any purpose, unless they obtain a special permit.
The state indicated that
Palestinians who live east of the barrier and own land to the west of
it will pass through farmers gates upon showing the special
permits that will be issued to them. The state promised that,
reasonable crossing arrangements will be made, taking into account
the need to enable laborers and suitable equipment to cross, and to
enable the produce grown on the farmland to cross to land east of the
barrier. However, except for this general commitment, the state
has not provided other details regarding arrangements .
The state has not yet discussed
the arrangements that will apply to the movement of residents of the
enclaves east of the main barrier or of West Bank residents who want
to visit these enclaves. It is, therefore, unclear if they will need
special movement permits. It is clear that movement from the enclaves
to other areas of the West Bank, and back again, will be allowed only
through the specially established crossing points and checkpoints.
The state indicated to the High Court that, in erecting Stage 1 of the
barrier, not including the Jerusalem envelope, it will erect five main
crossings and twenty-six agricultural crossings. Stage 1 is scheduled
for completion by July 2003. According to the head of the Seam Area
Administration, Nezach Mashiach, the 2003 budget does not allocate sufficient
funds to erect the five main crossings.
Whatever the crossing arrangements
will be, it is clear that hundreds of thousands of Palestinians will
be dependent on Israel security system when they want to cross
the barrier from either side. This dependence will increase the existing
difficulties Palestinians face in going from one place to another in
the West Bank.
Since the beginning of the
al-Aqsa intifada, IDF restrictions have brought Palestinian movement
to almost a complete halt. In some places, the army has set up checkpoints,
concrete blocks, dirt piles, and trenches that block most of the roads
in the West Bank, and Palestinians are not allowed to drive on many
roads. In addition, the army imposes curfew on hundreds of thousands
of residents. These restrictions, which affect all aspects of life of
the Palestinian population, lead to numerous human rights violations,
including the right to earn a living, the right to an education, and
the right to obtain medical treatment.
Past experience indicates
that the restriction on movement of Palestinians is an integral part
of Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories. These restrictions are
not only imposed for security reasons. They are also used to accomplish
objectives that are forbidden by international law and are based on
extraneous considerations. For instance, Israel has often imposed collective
restrictions on movement to punish the population in a particular location
for an attack against Israeli civilians or soldiers that is attributed
to a resident or residents of that community. Israel also routinely
restricts the movement of Palestinians, in part because it is the easiest
and cheapest means available at times such as Israeli holidays and election
day. This experience raises the fear that the crossing points along
the barrier will be closed for prolonged periods and the passage of
Palestinians may be completely prohibited.
Establishing checkpoints
along the barrier is liable to raise problems. Currently, crossing checkpoints
depends on the goodwill of the soldiers, who do not operate according
to clear rules known to the Palestinians. Soldiers have forced Palestinians
to wait many hours before allowing them to cross, confiscated identity
cards, car keys, and even vehicles. In many cases, soldiers degrade
the Palestinians and have, at times, beaten them.
Some, and maybe all, of the
Palestinian residents of these areas will need to obtain a special
permit from the Israeli authorities to enable them to cross the
barrier. In the past, Israel has taken advantage of the requirement
that Palestinians obtain permits, and conditioned granting of entry
permits or permits to go abroad on collaboration with the General Security
Service. The process for obtaining permits entails repeated harassment
of the residents and is based on arbitrary criteria. Palestinians have
often been refused permits without being given a reason for the denial.
More than once, Palestinians received a permit after intervention by
human rights organizations or other entities, indicating the arbitrary
manner in which Israel denies the requests.
It is clear, therefore, that
the states promise to build crossing points and agricultural
gates along the barrier is insufficient to prevent harm to the
Palestinians. Israels policy on the movement of Palestinians makes
it very uncertain whether Palestinians will indeed be allowed to cross
the barrier.
The barrier will create a
situation for the residents of the enclaves rather similar to that of
residents of al-Mawasi, Gaza Strip. Al-Mawasi is a Palestinian enclave
containing 5,000 residents situated west of the Gush Qatif settlements.
Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada, the IDF has placed severe
restriction on the residents, making their lives unbearable. Most of
the movement to and from other areas of the Gaza Strip is through the
Tufakh checkpoint, near Khan Yunis. Generally, entry into al-Mawasi
is forbidden to non-residents of the community, unless they have a special
IDF permit.
The checkpoint is open only
eight hours a day, and only individuals who received a number and magnetic
card from the army may pass through. Males under forty years old are
absolutely forbidden to enter the area. Individuals wanting to cross
have to wait in long lines and undergo strict checks by the soldiers.
At times, the checkpoint is closed for prolonged periods without warning.
In such cases, residents who left homes in the morning are unable to
return home and must stay in Khan Yunis and rely of the kindness of
others until the checkpoint is reopened.
Infringement of the right
to work and to an adequate standard of living
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work,
which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his
living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate
steps to safeguard this right.International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Article 6
(1)The States Parties to
the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food,
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 11 (1)
The planned barrier is expected to separate tens of thousands of Palestinians
from their workplace. Even if the barrier does not create total isolation,
it will clearly reduce the ability of many residents to work and earn
sufficient income to ensure a minimum standard of living.
The farmland of residents
of the enclaves created west of the barrier will remain for the most
part also west of the barrier. Although the barrier is not expected
to harm their access to these lands, the ability of these farmers to
market their produce elsewhere in the West Bank will be affected. Even
assuming that the agricultural crossings will be operational, the crossing
process will likely increase transportation costs and reduce profits
(see the discussion on Azzun Atma below). Farm production
will likely be harmed due to the irregular supply of inputs and materials
(such as, seeds, fertilizer, machines, and spare parts), because Palestinians
from other areas of the West Bank will generally not be allowed to enter
these enclaves.
Thousands of Palestinians
living east of the barrier will be separated from their land on the
western side. For example, residents of Qaffin, which lies north of
Tulkarm, will be separated from 6,000 dunam of land [1,500 acres], which
constitute sixty percent of their farmland. The land contains thousands
of productive olive trees. Residents of a-Ras and Kafr Sur, south of
Tulkarm, will be separated from seventy-five percent and fifty percent
of their farmland respectively, on which olive trees and field crops
are planted.
Farming is a major source
of income in the communities that will be affected by the barrier. The
areas involved are among the most productive in the West Bank and have
a bountiful supply of fresh water. Harm to the farming sector in this
area will have grave consequence on the local population. The Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics does not publish data on individual communities,
so it is difficult to quantify the importance of farming on the livelihoods
of the residents of these communities. However, an indication of its
importance can be attained by comparing the data relating to the three
districts in which these communities lie Jenin, Tulkarm, and
Qalqiliya with the rest of the West Bank.
The percentage of land used
for agriculture in these districts is the highest in the West Bank:
fifty-nine percent in Tulkarm, fifty percent in Jenin, and forty-six
percent in Qalqiliya, compared to an average of 24.5% in the West Bank.
The amount of farmland under cultivation in the three districts is 950
square meters per person, compared with 625 square meters per person
in the whole of the West Bank. Regarding productivity, the farmland
in the three districts averages $442 a dunam a year, compared with $350
per dunam in the West Bank.
Regarding employment, an
average of twenty-five percent of the workforce in these three districts
was employed in farming in 2001, compared with twelve percent in the
West Bank as a whole. Although the three districts comprise twenty-five
percent of the population of the West Bank, they supply forty-three
percent of jobs in the agricultural sector. If the Gaza Strip is included,
the three districts comprise fifteen percent of the population of the
Occupied Territories, but contributed twenty-eight percent of the value
of the agricultural production in the Occupied Territories during the
period 2000-2001.
The restrictions on movement
are also expected to harm people who work in sectors other than farming,
whose workplace lies outside their community. The barrier will turn
Tulkarm and Qalqiliya into enclaves that are detached from nearby villages
that relied on these centers for services on a daily basis. Most of
those affected will be residents who work for the Palestinian Authority
in the district offices and live in outlying villages, or, conversely,
live in Tulkarm or Qalqiliya and work in one of the villages. Even if
the Palestinian Authority takes their situation into account and continues
to pay their salaries, as it has done in such cases since the beginning
of the al-Aqsa intifada, their right to work, as distinct from their
right to an adequate standard of living, is liable to be severely impaired.
This problem is especially
grave in villages near the Jerusalem envelope (if a contiguous barrier
is indeed constructed) because, unlike in the north, most of the residents
are not engaged in farming and are dependent, directly or indirectly,
on work in East Jerusalem.
The harm to the ability of
tens of thousands of Palestinians to work and earn a living is especially
grave in light of the increased economic hardship suffered by Palestinians
since the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada. In the first half of 2002,
real unemployment (which includes individuals who have given up looking
for work) in the West Bank reached fifty percent of the workforce. In
recent years, unemployment in the three northern districts (Jenin, Tulkarm,
Qalqiliya) has been significantly higher than the average in the entire
West Bank. The percentage of people living in poverty (defined as per
capita consumption of less than two dollars a day) reached fifty-five
percent . Reduction of sources of employment and income following erection
of the barrier is liable to force additional thousands of Palestinian
families into poverty.
Other detrimental effects
on living conditions
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health.International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Article 12 (1)The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right of everyone to education. They agree that education shall
be directed to the full development of the human personality and the
sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms.International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Article 13 (1)
The separation barrier is
liable to harm, to one degree or another, the living conditions of residents
in nearby communities. The residents most likely to be affected are
those living in enclaves west of the barrier. However, many residents
of villages on the eastern side who depend on services from one of the
three main cities (Tulkarm, Qalqiliya, and East Jerusalem), which will
be isolated from the rest of the West Bank, will also be affected.
Particularly problematic
is the anticipated decline in the level of health services provided
to the residents. Nine of the villages that will become enclaves west
of the barrier do not have a medical clinic (Umm a-Rihan, Khirbat Abdallah
al-Yunis, Khirbat a-Sheikh Saad, Khirbat Dhaher al-Malah, Nazlat
Abu Nar, Khirbet Jubara, Ras a-Tira, Khirbet a-Daba, and Arab
a-Ramadeen al-Janubi). Other communities provide basic and preventive
medical care, but rely on the medical services available in hospitals
in the three cities.
The barrier will also have
a detrimental effect on education. Many teachers who live in Tulkarm
and Qalqiliya teach in schools in neighboring villages and are liable
to face problems in reaching their schools. Since the second year of
the al-Aqsa intifada, the Palestinian Ministry of Education has assigned
teachers to work in schools according to their place of residence, and
the ministry may do the same after the barrier is erected. In addition,
the restrictions on movement affect the students at the colleges and
universities in East Jerusalem, Qalqiliya, and Tulkarm, which serve
the entire region.
The difficulties in moving
from one place to another that will result from the barrier are also
expected to impair the social and family life of hundreds of thousands
of residents. In an attempt to justify the creation of one of the enclaves
west of the barrier, the state argued before the High Court of Justice
that it is prevented from setting the route along the Green Line between
Nazlat Issa, which lies in the West Bank, and Baqa al-Gharbiya,
which is situated within the Green Line, because it would break
the social fabric between the two communities. Without going into
the specific details of the case before the court, the states
declaration indicates that it is well aware of the harm that the barrier
will cause to the relations between the residents living on opposite
sides of the barrier.
Infringement of the right
to property
Everyone has the right to
own property alone as well as in association with others.Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, Article 17Private property cannot be confiscated.Regulations
Attached to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land of 1907, Article 46, Paragraph 2
To erect the barrier, Israel
took control of extensive areas along the planned route. Insofar as
the average width of the barrier is sixty meters, the IDF took control
of 11,400 dunam to erect the first 190 kilometers of the barrier. Most
of this land is under private Palestinian ownership and contains orchards,
field crops, and greenhouses.
The legal tool chosen in
order to take control of the land is through requisition for military
needs orders. Most of these orders are in effect until the end
of 2005, but they may legally be extended indefinitely. Residents who
claim ownership of seized land can demand compensation from the IDF
for the use of their property. Most of the landowners whose land has
been taken have refused to accept any compensation, at the recommendation
of the Palestinian Authority, so as not to legitimize Israels
actions in any way.
After receiving the seizure
order, the residents may appeal to the legal advisor for Judea and Samaria.
If the appeal is rejected, the landowner may petition the High Court
of Justice. To date, Palestinians have filed dozens of such appeals
and petitions to the High Court of Justice. All of them have been rejected.
By law, the seizure orders
do not transfer ownership of the land to Israel. However, the indefinite
duration of the requisition, and the vast amount of resources being
invested by Israel in erecting the barrier, leads to the conclusion
that the action is a disguised expropriation of property. In the past,
Israel has used requisition for military needs orders as
a means to take control of Palestinian land to establish settlements.
These lands were never returned to their owners. It is now clear that
Israel did not intend to seize the land for a temporary period, but
to expropriate it permanently.
In addition to the absolute
violation of the property rights of the landowners along whose property
the barrier will be erected, the property rights of owners of tens of
thousands of dunam located west of the barrier will be harmed to some
degree, depending on the severity of the restrictions on their movement.
Because of the difficulty in reaching their land, owners may cease or
reduce cultivation of the land. In such instances, the infringement
of their right to property would become absolute for the following reason:
since the beginning of the 1980s, Israel has declared land in the West
Bank state land if it is not registered in the lands registry
and is not cultivated for three consecutive years; in such an instance,
Israel can take the land from its owner. The fact that most of the land
lying west of the barrier is not registered increases the concern that
Israel will take control of the land at some time in the future.
The infringement of the right
to property committed by Israel is not restricted to denying the owners
possession of the land. After taking control, the contractors level
the land by uprooting the crops, including field crops, greenhouses,
and, primarily, olive trees. The State Attorneys Office informed
the High Court that, Regarding trees, the contractor [doing the
infrastructure work] is directed to move objects from one place to another
where feasible (this is routinely done with olive trees). This requires
preparation work, such as pruning the tree before moving it. The tree
is then moved to a location that is agreed-upon to the extent
possible with the landowner. In reality, however, the matter
is often handled very differently.
BTselem took testimonies
from several Palestinian residents of Qaffin and Farun whose land
containing olive groves was taken to erect the barrier. According to
the testimonies, the contractors have not contacted the residents and
the soldiers guarding the work site have not allowed the residents access
to take away the trees that were cut down. In some cases, Palestinians
went onto their land after the soldiers and laborers left and found
that their cut-down olive trees had been stolen.
The theft of olive trees
by the contractors doing the infrastructure work was also documented
by Yediot Aharonot. In researching the article, the journalists contacted
one of the contractors and said they were interested in buying trees
that had been cut down. The companys CEO offered the journalists
as many trees as they wanted at around NIS 1,000 a
tree.
The journalists met with
the work supervisor and agreed on purchase of the trees. The article
also indicated that the relevant Civil Administration official is aware
of, and cooperates in, the sale of the trees. The official provided
the journalists with the permit needed to bring the trees into Israel.
In response to BTselems query on the Ministry of Defenses
policy on the theft of olive trees, the ministrys spokesperson
replied on 2 January 2003, that the Ministry of Defense is investigating
the matter, but the investigation has not yet been completed.
Case study: Azzun
Atma
Azzun Atma is
a Palestinian village situated ten kilometers southeast of Qalqiliya.
The village has 1,500 residents. Adjacent to the village to the east
lies the settlement Shaare-Tiqwa, which stretches for a distance
of 2.5 kilometers and severs the territorial contiguity between Azzun
Atma and two neighboring villages, Beit Amin and Sanniriya. With
the decision to place Shaare Tiqwa west of the barrier, Azzun
Atma will be surrounded by the barrier on all sides and become
an enclave. Furthermore, some of the houses in the village, in which
seventy people reside, are situated south of Road No. 505 (the old Trans-Israel
road). Because the defense establishment does not want to impair the
main traffic artery to Israel used by settlers in Shaare Tiqwa,
the barrier will pass north of the road, thereby severing those residents
from the other residents of the village.
Some of the residents of
Azzun Atma previously worked in Israel, but following the
outbreak of the current intifada, most of the residents make a living
from farming. Azzun Atma is known as one of the largest
vegetable producers in the West Bank. Ten trucks of produce leave the
village daily for market, one to Israel and nine to markets in the West
Bank.
West of the village lie more
than 4,000 dunam of farmland owned by residents of Azzun Atma,
Beit Amin and Sanniriya. A few hundred dunam of this land (south of
Road No. 505) will remain west of the barrier. Villagers from Azzun
Atma own about 1,000 dunam of land east of the village that will
be located east of the barrier. Most of these lands contain greenhouses
in which the residents grow vegetables (including tomatoes, cucumbers,
cabbage, cauliflower, eggplant, and beans). The separation barrier is
liable to severely hamper the ability of the residents of these three
villages to work their land and market their produce in the West Bank.
The villages two schools
will also likely be harmed as a result of the barrier. In the elementary
school, which has 325 pupils, only two of the eighteen teachers are
residents of the village. The other teachers reside in nearby villages
and in Qalqiliya. In the other school, which is a middle and high school,
there are 250 pupils, half of whom are from Beit Amin. These pupils
will have to cross the barrier daily to reach school. Of the sixteen
teachers in the school, only three live in the village. The others live
in villages in the area.
Azzun Atma has
a medical clinic operated by the Palestinian Authority that provides
basic medical treatment. The clinics staff is comprised of a nurse
who comes from Qalqiliya three times a week, and a physician who comes
from Habla once a week. The clinic also serves residents of Beit Amin,
Izbat Salman, al Mudawwar, and Izbat Jalud, villages in
which no medical treatment is available and which will remain on the
other side of the barrier. For medical services other than the few provided
by the clinic, residents of Azzun Atma rely on the hospital
in Qalqiliya. Since the outbreak of the intifada, access to Qalqiliya
has been problematic, so residents also use hospitals in Nablus.
Once the barrier is erected,
Qalqiliya will become an enclave, which will make movement between Azzun
Atma and Qalqiliya particularly difficult. Palestinians wanting
to travel from Azzun Atma to Qalqiliya and vice versa will
have to cross the barrier four times, twice in each direction.
Case study: Kafr Aqeb
Kafr Aqeb is a Palestinian
community located north of the Atarot airport, which lies in North Jerusalem.
The municipal border of Jerusalem that was set following annexation
of West Bank land in 1967 crosses between houses in the community. As
a result, part of Kafr Aqeb lies within Jerusalems area
of jurisdiction. We shall discuss the effects of the barrier on the
Jerusalem part of the community. According to the Jerusalem Statistical
Yearbook, Kafr Aqeb had 10,500 residents at the end of 2000.
The residents of Kafr Aqeb,
like other residents of East Jerusalem, hold the status of permanent
resident in Israel and carry Israeli identity cards. They pay property
taxes to the Jerusalem Municipality and other taxes (such as income
tax, V.A.T., and health insurance), but receive almost no services from
the public authorities. The village has no welfare services, no health-fund
clinic and mail is not delivered to the homes. Only the main street
has lights. The houses are not connected to the municipal water system,
but rather are connected to the Ramallah water system, which is unable
to supply water on a daily basis.
In August 2002, the Cabinet
approved Stage 1 of the barrier, which also included the northern section
of the Jerusalem envelope. The route passes south of Kafr Aqeb,
several meters from the last houses in the village, and stretches from
the Ofer army base, west of the village, to the Qalandiya checkpoint
on the east, for a distance of 3.8 kilometers. Unlike the barrier in
the northern section of the West Bank, the barrier in this area will
range from twenty-five to sixty meters across. According to the State
Attorneys Offices statement to the High Court of Justice,
Israel plans to erect a depth barrier between Kafr Aqeb and Ramallah,
but BTselem does not have information on the precise route. The
main barrier, along the route decided by the Cabinet, is liable to cause
grave violations of the human rights of the villages residents.
The most significant violation
stems from the planned severance of the area from the other parts of
Jerusalem. Because of their status as permanent residents of Israel,
the residents of Kafr Aqeb are not subject to the restrictions
on movement imposed on residents of the Occupied Territories. They can
move about within Israel and cross through checkpoints. Regarding this
point, the State Attorneys Office stated, It should be understood
that the Jerusalem envelope is solely a security barrier, and it does
not alter the status, rights, and/or obligations as they currently exist.
The State Attorneys Office added that, The local population
will be issued special permits to enable them free movement to and from
Jerusalem, subject to security arrangements. However, despite
the states promises, the residents experience over the past
two years regarding freedom of movement raises major concern that the
states promises will not be kept.
The Qalandiya checkpoint
is located south of the village, three kilometers inside Jerusalems
jurisdictional area, and residents have to cross it every time they
want to enter the city or return home. The vast majority of its residents
work in other areas of Jerusalem and have to cross the checkpoint to
reach their workplace. Residents of Kafr Aqeb also go into Jerusalem
to receive medical treatment or other services. The existence of the
checkpoint delays, and sometimes prevents, the passage of residents
of Kafr Aqeb to and from Jerusalem. Whenever the IDF imposes a
hermetic closure, whether because of a specific warning of a planned
attack against Israelis, an IDF invasion into Ramallah, or Knesset elections,
the checkpoint is closed, making it impossible for residents to reach
other parts of Jerusalem.
When the checkpoint is not
closed, it is open from 6:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. Recently, it has remained
open until 9:00 P.M. When it closes, residents of Kafr Aqeb are
cut off from Jerusalem, except in cases of emergency. Shortly before
the opening and closing of the checkpoint, long lines of pedestrians
form and the wait is an hour or more. Residents in vehicles have an
even longer wait because the checkpoint lies on the main road north
to Ramallah, which is used by dozens of trucks daily. Residents of Kafr
Aqeb complain that the body checks are, at times, excessive and
degrading.
After crossing the Qalandiya
checkpoint, the residents of Kafr Aqeb then have to cross the
a-Ram checkpoint, which is located on the main road in Beit Hanina.
This checkpoint remains open even when a comprehensive closure is imposed
on the Occupied Territories, but the residents have to wait in long
lines before they can cross. Recently, following the construction of
Road No. 45 (North Begin Road), the residents have an alternative to
crossing the a-Ram checkpoint. Along this road, too, there is a checkpoint
that delays entry into the city.
Due to the difficulties in
crossing the checkpoint, many of the villages residents who worked
in Jerusalem were fired because they did not show up for work or were
frequently late. The few merchants in the village have suffered because
of the decreased demand resulting from the poor economic condition and
the irregular delivery of merchandise.
Erection of the barrier south
of the village will almost certainly make the current situation permanent
or even make the situation worse. Residents are now required to show
an identity card when they reach the checkpoint, but when the barrier
is in place, they will have to receive a special permit
to enable them to cross into Jerusalem.
Residents of the village
who decide to move to another location in the Occupied Territories to
live or work due to the problems resulting from the barrier, risk losing
their status as permanent residents, including the right to return to
live in the village. This is because of Israels policy, which
was applied most extensively in 1996-1999, to revoke the status of residents
of East Jerusalem who , according to Israeli officials, moved their
center of life to an area outside the city.
Further harm to the residents
of Kafr Aqeb results from Israels taking control of land
to build the barrier and from the separation between the residents and
their fields. In this regard, the situation of Kafr Aqeb is similar
to that of villages in the northern West Bank. Given that the average
width of the barrier in the Kafr Aqeb area is forty meters, the
Ministry of Defense took control of 150 dunam. Most of the area is privately
owned by forty-six families living in the village, and some by residents
of the nearby village Rafat. The barrier will separate residents from
105 parcels of land located southwest of the barrier that are owned
by eighty-five families. About half of these lands are cultivated and
used for growing vegetables. For some of the families, marketing their
produce is their sole source of income.
In addition, according to
the opinion of the NGO Bimkom, the route chosen will impair the urban
development of the village, as appears from two outline plans that the
Jerusalem Municipality is promoting for the village. The principal land
reserves of Kafr Aqeb for building lie southwest of the village,
which will remain on the other side of the barrier. As a result, the
possibility of development will be diminished and the community will
not be able to meet the residents future housing, commercial,
and social needs.
The present route may also
endanger the lives of the residents living near the barriers route.
The military patrols along the patrol road are liable to be a target
of attack by armed Palestinians, who will use residents homes,
with or without consent, to fire at IDF patrols. Occupants of the houses
will pay the price if the IDF returns fire, and their homes are likely
to be destroyed.
In one of hearings on the
appeal filed by residents of Kafr Aqeb against seizure of their
land, Colonel Dani Tirzah, who is in charge of planning the route of
the barrier for the Seam Area Administration, was asked whether he thought
construction of the barrier so close to houses risks the lives of the
residents, and if this consideration had been taken into account. He
responded:
The situation is similar
to what occurred at Kibbutz Metzer. Terror strikes everywhere, regardless
of whether it exists in a Palestinian vicinity
If a terrorist
fires from your office, dont expect that they wont fire
back at him
The consideration of risk to human life is taken in
the context of the discussions taking place now regarding the patrols
that will operate along the fence; that is where these considerations
should be taken into account, rather than the consideration about the
route.
Another risk to the lives
of Palestinians living near the barriers route stems from the
proximity of the IDF patrols to houses in the village. The open-fire
regulations allow lethal fire also in cases in which soldiers
lives are not in jeopardy. Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada,
hundreds of innocent Palestinians have been killed or wounded by IDF
gunfire. The movement of civilians near IDF patrols along the barrier,
primarily at night, is liable to lead to additional injuries to innocent
people. The degree of this danger largely depends on the open-fire directives
given to the soldiers.
Demolition of houses in the enclavesWith the start of construction of
the barrier, the Civil Administration began to issue demolition orders
and demolish homes in Palestinian communities near the barriers
route. The official pretext for this policy is the lack of a building
permit. The Civil Administration has issued about 280 demolition orders
in these communities.Most of the orders relate to buildings in enclaves
west of the barriers route. In Nazlat Issa (2,300 residents),
170 demolition orders (eleven residential dwellings and the remainder
commercial buildings) were issued. On 21 January 2003, the Civil Administration
demolished sixty structures in the market near the Arab-Israeli village
Baqa a-Gharbiya. In Barta a-Sharqiya (3,200 residents), in Jenin
District, the Civil Administration issued seventy-two demolition orders
in recent months (twelve residential dwellings, fifty-six shops, three
sewing workshops, and one other workshop). In December 2002, residents
in Azzun Atma (1,500 residents) received twenty demolition orders,
eighteen of them residential dwellings and two structures that served
as bathrooms for the villages high school. In Umm a-Rihan and
Dhaher al-Malah, Jenin District (total of 600 residents), nine demolition
orders were issued (eight residential dwellings and a school). Orders
were also received in communities that are scheduled to become enclaves
east of the barrier. In Izbat Jalud, Qalqiliya District (100 residents),
demolition orders were issued for three structures (two residential
dwellings and one mosque). In a-Taybeh, Jenin District (2,100), orders
were issued to demolish three residential dwellings. One of these dwellings
was recently demolished. The ostensibly illegal building throughout
the West Bank results from Israels age-old policy of refusing
to issue Palestinians building permits outside the built-up area of
the towns and villages. The refusal is based on the outdated outline
plans from the time of the British Mandate, which classified most of
the territory of the West Bank as agricultural areas. The policy has
remained in effect as regards Area C (which constitutes about sixty
percent of the West Bank) even after the Oslo Accords. To meet the population-growth
needs and to earn a living , the residents in certain areas have no
choice but to build without a permit. The current wave of demolition
orders constitutes another form of pressure and hardship that the Israeli
authorities currently impose, and will continue to impose on Palestinians
living near the barriers route.
Infringement of human
rights violation of international law.
At the beginning of the al-Aqsa
intifada, Israel defined the situation in the Occupied Territories as
an armed conflict short of war, and that the relevant provisions
of international law are thus the laws of warfare. The Supreme Court
recently sanctioned this position. Israel uses this position to justify
the violations of human rights of Palestinians resulting from building
the separation barrier, as it has since the outbreak of the current
intifada.
Many organizations and jurists
in Israel and abroad, including BTselem, do not accept Israels
categorization of the present situation. Even after transfer of part
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority, Israel
remains the occupier in these areas. The combat actions now taking place
in the Occupied Territories do not justify the sweeping definition of
events there as war, and do not allow Israel to ignore its duties as
the occupier. These duties require Israel to protect the civilian population
and ensure their safety and welfare. The International Committee of
the Red Cross, which is charged with implementation of the Geneva Conventions,
held that, even in the present violence, Israel remains
the occupying power in the Occupied Territories and therefore must comply
with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and other rules
relating to occupation.
The application of the laws
of occupation do not nullify international human rights law, which remain
binding on Israel in its actions in the Occupied Territories. The UN
committees in charge of implementing this law have categorically stated
that Israel must comply with the provisions of the human rights conventions
in all the territories under its control, including the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, and that this obligation applies also in the circumstances
that have been created following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada.
International law does not
provide absolute protection for all human rights. There are circumstances
in which infringement of certain human rights is lawful, whether because
the situation is defined as armed conflict short of war
or as occupation. However, violations of human rights are lawful only
where certain conditions are met as laid out in international law.
Thus, even accepting Israels
definition of the situation prevailing in the Occupied Territories,
Israel is not entitled to do whatever it wishes and without limitation.
Even in war, as harsh as war can be, states are required to act in accordance
with international law. For some time, jurists and international courts
have rejected the contention that military needs prevail over every
other consideration in wartime. All actions must be carried out in accordance
with law, and the parties involved in the armed conflict are not free
to select any method or means of warfare that comes to mind.
The duty to examine alternatives
The infringement of human
rights is not justified if other courses of action are available to
achieve the same objective without causing such infringement. This principle
is firmly enshrined in international humanitarian law, which deals with
war and occupation, in international human rights law, and in decisions
of Israels Supreme Court.
In one of its responses to
the High Court of Justice regarding erection of the barrier, the state
mentioned that, This is a process that was taken because there
was no option and only after various other measures did not succeed
in curbing the wave of terror. However, the state did not describe
in that response, or its other statements to the High Court on this
matter, those other measures and why they failed.
An examination conducted
by the State Comptroller indicates that there are at least two means
that are suitable alternatives to the separation barrier. The state
did not investigate the efficacy of these options, even though they
would result in less extensive violations of Palestinian human rights
than that caused by the erection of the barrier.
Efficacy of checkpoints
on the Green Line
The decision to erect a barrier
separating Israel from the West Bank to prevent attacks within Israel
is based on the assumption that the perpetrators of the attacks enter
Israel through the open areas between the checkpoints and not through
the checkpoints, which ostensibly check the people who cross into Israel.
According to the State Comptrollers report on the seam area, which
was published in July 2002, that assumption is imprecise.
Thirty-two checkpoints exist
along the Green Line, through which entry into Israel is possible. Thirty
of these checkpoints are run by the IDF, and the Israel Police Force
is in charge of the other two. Regarding attacks committed in Israel
since the beginning of the current Intifada, the State Comptroller found
that, IDF documents indicate that most of the suicide terrorists
and the car bombs crossed the seam area into Israel through the checkpoints,
where they underwent faulty and even shoddy checks.
The State Comptrollers
report pointed out the significant defects at the checkpoints. The report
stated that, The checkpoints do not have a specific command or
a task file from brigade headquarters that classifies the assignments
at the checkpoint and coordinates the procedures for its operation,
and that the checkpoints do not have proper equipment and infrastructure
to conduct security checks of vehicles, individuals, and merchandise.
In his conclusions, the State Comptroller discussed an army document
on checkpoints, finding that, The existing checkpoints in the
seam area are not organized to properly check vehicles, freight, and
people, and there is an urgent need to improve inspections at checkpoints
by having permanent and skilled personnel check vehicles, using technological
means, and institutionalizing the crossing points. .
The findings of the State
Comptroller were published in July 2002, while the governments
decision to erect the barrier was reached a month earlier. The decision
was not changed following publication of the State Comptrollers
findings, and it appears that no meaningful changes were made to address
even some of the problems mentioned by the State Comptroller. Rather,
the state preferred a more extreme alternative that entails numerous
human rights violations. In deciding to choose to erect a barrier, Israel
violated its legal duty to implement optional means before adopting
a means that will lead to especially grave human rights violations.
Furthermore, erection of
the barrier will increase the number of checkpoints between Israel and
the West Bank. According to a document that the State Attorneys
Office submitted to the High Court, five checkpoints and twenty-six
agricultural gates are to be built along the barrier in Stage 1 alone.
If the state does not improve the effectiveness of the checkpoints,
a paradoxical situation will arise in which the barrier will increase
the danger of attacks within Israel. If the defense establishment plans
to rectify the flaws at the checkpoints as part of the barrier project,
by adding sophisticated inspection mechanisms and skilled personnel,
these improvements could be carried out immediately irrespective of
the barrier project. The lack of connection between the problem and
the proposed solution may be what Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was alluding
to when he said, The idea [to build the barrier] is populist and
intended to serve political objectives.
Guarding the seam area
The State Comptroller also
examined IDF deployment along the seam area to prevent Palestinians
without permits from entering Israel through the open areas, as the
Cabinet ordered in its decision of July 2001. Changes in the manner
of deployment, like improvement of the faulty operations at the checkpoints,
is an alternative that would cause a lesser degree of human rights violations
than a separation barrier.
According to the State Comptrollers
report, the IDF formulated a new concept for action in the
Occupied Territories, which the chief-of-staff approved in January 2002.
As a result, the IDF forewent special deployment in the seam area and
disbanded the task command that was set up in July 2001
to coordinate IDF activity in the seam area. Responsibility for guarding
the seam area was divided among the brigade commanders in each sector.
The main efforts and means encompassed within the new model were directed
to other objectives:
The IDFs new concept
[for action] in Judea and Samaria led to shifting the responsibility
of most of the forces active in the seam area to the task of guarding
roads on which Israeli vehicles travel, on-going security activity near
Israeli communities in Judea and Samaria; and thwarting hostile terrorist
activity within Judea and Samara, primarily in the Palestinian cities.
The IDF forces operations did not focus on preventing movement
of individuals and vehicles from Judea and Samaria into Israel in areas
other than the designated crossing points. This trend was reflected
in the orders given by the relevant forces in the seam area, and in
operational directives of the brigades operating in the area. IDF documents
reveal that combat deep inside the territory of the Palestinian Authority
is given top priority, and not the seam area
Implementation of the IDFs
new concept in the seam area both directly and indirectly affected the
ability to implement the seam area plan. Among these effects were the
significant reduction in activity to prevent Palestinians from crossing
from Judea and Samaria into Israel; reduction in the IDF presence in
unpopulated territories along the seam area; and a decline in coordination
and cooperation between IDF forces and the Israel Police Force
At the time that the audit
was conducted, observation posts had not been set up to cover a great
part of the seam area. The IDF lacked technological means to locate
infiltrators; IDF patrols in the seam area did not reach relevant points
within a short span of time; communication between the IDF and the Israel
Police Force were limited, which prevented efficient use of the forces.
These comments indicate many
means that jointly could provide a proper response to the entry of Palestinians
into Israel through the open areas. These means include a substantial
presence of security forces, patrols, observation points, and close
coordination between IDF and Police forces. However, the IDF decided
not to examine these options because of its new policy, which gave low
priority to protecting the seam area. Rather, the IDF preferred to invest
in other efforts, such as attacking persons suspected of committing
actions against Israel, attacking the infrastructure of the Palestinian
Authority and protecting settlers.
The fact that the IDFs
new policy creates a shortage of soldiers to guard the seam area does
not release Israel from its duty to implement options that violate human
rights to a lesser degree. If blocking the entry of Palestinians into
Israel is indeed urgent, as the state contends, the urgency should be
reflected in allocation of the necessary resources. If, alternatively,
the defense establishment does not give this task top priority, the
state cannot to justify the grave human rights violations it entails.
Determining the route:
legitimate considerations versus extraneous considerations
Even if we accept Israels
contention that the separation barrier is the only way to prevent Palestinians
from entering Israel to commit attacks, Israel has the duty to plan
the route of the barrier such that it harms human rights to the least
extent possible. An examination of the considerations that Israeli policy-makers
took into account in determining the route of Stage 1 of the barrier
indicates that the human rights component was not a decisive factor.
Other reasons, which are entirely unrelated to human rights, were ultimately
the basis for determining the route of the barrier.
General declarations about
the reasons underlying the determination of the barriers route
are insufficient. Israel must provide justifications separately for
each section of the route that results in human rights violations.
In its response to the High
Court, Israel stated that, Operational considerations were the
main consideration in selecting the barriers route. These
considerations include three principal components:
Topography According
to Israel, The selection of the topographic route of the barrier
was derived from security reasons. The barrier must pass through, to
the greatest extent possible, areas from which the surrounding territory
can be controlled, in order to prevent harm to forces operating along
the route, and to enable the forces to operate observation points that
overlook both sides of the fence.
Security area The
fear is that the barrier will not prevent every penetration, and that
security forces will not be able to arrive in time to thwart the crossing
of potential attackers. A geographic security area is necessary to enable
the combat forces to chase the terrorists within Judea and Samaria before
they are able to cross into Israel and disappear within the population.
Inclusion of as many settlements
as possible west of the barrier - The fear is that erection of
the barrier will channel the attacks to these communities, so it was
decided to have the fence pass east of these settlements in order to
provide protection for them and for the access roads that reach them.
At first glance the first
two components seem legitimate. However, BTselem does not have
the tools necessary to determine the degree to which they were factored
into the determination regarding the barriers route. It is clear
that including settlements west of the barrier is not an imperative
military need justifying grave violations of human rights. This consideration
and other illegitimate considerations (see below) led to selection of
a route that severely violates human rights without any justification
based on security needs, in violation of international law.
Perpetuation of the settlements
Pursuant to international
humanitarian law, the settlements that Israel established in the Occupied
Territories are illegal. The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits an occupying
state from transferring a population from its territory into the occupied
territory, and the Hague Regulations forbid making permanent changes
in the occupied territory. Breaches of these prohibitions resulted in
increasing violations of the human rights of the residents in the Occupied
Territories, primarily to protect the settlers from Palestinian attacks.
Because the very existence
of the settlements violates international law, Israel must dismantle
them. Clearly, moving the settlers to areas within Israel will supply
them with comparable if not better protection than including
them west of the barrier. This solution would also prevent additional
violations of the Palestinians human rights.
Even if Israel does not dismantle
the settlements, the contention that the only option to defend the settlements
is to situate them west of the barrier is baseless. Most of the settlements
will remain east of the barrier. With the objective of protecting these
settlements, the Ministry of Defense decided to erect a new protection
system that includes an electronic fence to provide warning [of infiltration],
and a staffed central-control room, and to set up special
security areas surrounding the settlements, where protection would
be greater. These same measures can be taken for the settlements that,
according to the current plan, will lie west of the barrier. Such action
would provide a reasonable solution to the security threat they face
and significantly reduce the infringement of the rights of the Palestinians
that will occur if the barrier is erected on land within the West Bank.
The existence of these two
alternatives, which Israel chose to ignore, raises concern that the
real reason for the Cabinets decision on the barriers route
was not to provide maximum protection of the settlers. Rather, the underlying
reason was to establish facts on the ground that would perpetuate the
existence of settlements and facilitate their future annexation into
Israel.
Political-party considerations
The idea to establish a barrier
that runs along the entire seam area was met with substantial
opposition, in particular from right-wing politicians and settlement
officials. Their main argument was that such a barrier would likely
soon become the political border between Israel and the Palestinian
state to be established. In addition, it was claimed that construction
of a barrier of such size on a route that follows the Green Line would
be a political achievement for the Palestinians, as it would recognize
the Green Line as a relevant starting point for discussions on the border
between Israel and the West Bank. In the words of Israel Harel, a Haaretz
columnist and former head of the YESHA Council:
About two months after the
IDF restored a significant portion of its deterrence capability in the
battles of Operation Defensive Shield, the Israeli government, headed
by Ariel Sharon, gave the strategic victory to Arafat. Exactly thirty-five
years after the Six Day War, and after two years of a brutal and unceasing
war of terror, Israels government has decided that it is not meeting
the feeble pressure of the public and of past and present senior
defense establishment officials to establish a security separation
line, that will essentially coincide with the cease-fire lines of 1949.
In response to these objections
and criticism, government ministers, and the Minister of Defense in
particular, repeatedly stated that the barrier that would be constructed
is purely for security reasons, and in no way constitutes a political
border. One of the means that the government apparently uses to convey
to opponents of the project that the course is not a political border
is by setting the route in a manner that does not coincide with the
Green Line.
For example, an article in
Haaretz reported that, [Minister of Defense] Ben Eliezer
instructed the Seam Area Administration that the separation fence will
be built on a course that is not to be construed as a political border,
but as a barrier intended to increase security. Minister of Education
Limor Livnat stated at a cabinet meeting that one of the principles
that should guide construction of the fence is that it will be a security
fence and not be viewed as a political border. In a document that
Minister of the Interior Eli Yishai submitted to the Prime Minister,
Yishai suggested that the fences route not coincide with
the Green Line, but that it be as far away as possible so that it will
indeed be a security, and not a political, separation fence.
These statements further
substantiate the concern that the decision on the placement of the barrier
was not determined solely on the basis of purely military-security considerations,
but that it was tainted by political considerations. It may be that
in several areas, a barrier that runs along the Green Line or even within
Israeli territory would be of no less security value than if it ran
along the route selected, but such a route was rejected due to the political
cost involved.
Quality of life of residents
of Israel
The barriers route
on Stage 1, as approved by the Cabinet in August 2002, turns Qalqiliya,
Habla, and Ras Atiya into enclaves (see map). The route was chosen
so that the Alfe Menashe settlement would be west of the barrier. However,
this leaves Route No. 55, which joins Alfe Menashe with Israel, east
of the barrier. To ensure that residents of the settlement have access
to Israel, the defense establishment decided to build a new road that
will link Alfe Menashe to Israel. The road will pass through Matan,
a town within Israel.
Residents of Matan (2,500)
strongly opposed this route. They contended that it gravely affected
their quality of life. Their main concern was that the new road would
create traffic congestion in the middle of town and harm some of its
green areas. In addition, according to town representatives, the route
will connect Habla and Qalqiliya, thus creating a security threat for
nearby Israeli communities. To effect a change in the planned route,
the residents set up a staff to lead the struggle, which organized demonstrations
and conducted guided tours of the area for army and political officials.
The pressure succeeded. The
authorities altered the route. Road No. 55 will continue to serve as
the traffic artery for Alfe Menashe and nearby settlements (Qarne Shomron,
Maale Shomron, and Immanuel). As a result of this change,
Habla and Ras Atiya (6,700) will become enclaves isolated from
Qalqiliya, where the residents of the two communities receive services.
Habla is only two hundred meters from Qalqiliya. After the barrier is
constructed, the residents will have to travel twenty kilometers to
travel from one to the other, assuming that they are allowed to drive
along the road.
In deciding on actions to
be taken in occupied territory, the quality of life of Israeli residents
is not a relevant consideration under international law. It certainly
cannot justify violation of the human rights of thousands of Palestinians.
Safeguarding antiquities
State officials admitted
that the desire to protect underground antiquities was taken into account
in determining the barriers route. For example:
Col. Dani Tirzah, Seam Administration
official in charge of planning the route, testified in court that several
factors may require changes in the precise location of the barrier,
among them archeological factors.
Press reports indicate that,
following determination of the route, the Seam Area Administration learned
about the existence of approximately ten archeological sites under the
proposed route. To prevent harm to the antiquities, the Administration
took different measures in accordance with the particular features of
each site. Changing the barriers route was one of these measures.
In one of its responses to
the High Court, the State Attorneys Office stated that the decision
was made to move the barriers route in an area north of Shweikeh,
Tulkarm District, a few kilometers to the east to protect antiquities.
Members of Kibbutz Metzer
requested that the Ministry of Defense shift the route in the area of
the kibbutz so that it runs along the Green Line, and thereby not harm
access of residents of Qaffin, a neighboring town, to their fields,
which under the original plan would be located west of the barrier.
Col. Tirzah visited the area and said he was willing to grant the request.
However, a few days later, he informed the kibbutz that the route could
not be changed because the area contains antiquities and there was insufficient
time to execute the requisite excavations.
As occupier, Israel is required
to safeguard cultural and historic sites in the occupied territory.
However, this reason does not justify the violation of human rights
that would result from moving the route a few more kilometers within
the West Bank. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the
failure to change the route would not destroy the antiquities, but would
merely delay construction work on the barrier until completion of the
excavation work to protect the antiquities.
Access to religious sites
The determination of the
barriers route in the southern part of the Jerusalem envelope
was part of the Cabinets decision of August 2002. A month later,
the matter was again discussed in the Cabinet following political pressure
of ministers from Shas and the National Religious Party and from Jerusalems
mayor who sought, in opposition to the opinion of the minister of defense,
to move the route a few hundred meters south, which would de facto annex
Rachels tomb into Jerusalem. The Cabinet approved the change.
Rachels tomb lies at
the northern tip of Bethlehem, five hundred meters south of the checkpoint
separating Bethlehem from the jurisdictional boundary of Jerusalem (Checkpoint
300). Although Bethlehem is included within Area A according to the
Interim Agreement, the area between Rachels tomb and the checkpoint
is defined as Area C and thus remains under complete Israeli control.
Rachels tomb is a sacred site in Judaism and many Jews go there
to pray. Since the outbreak of the intifada, the site has frequently
been closed to visitors because of Palestinian attacks against Israeli
civilians and soldiers stationed at the site.
Along with the route change,
it was decided to erect an eight-meter-high wall south of Rachels
tomb that would stretch a few hundred meters to the west. If this is
done, thirty-five multi-story houses, in which four hundred Palestinians
live, and dozens of shops would be left north of the wall, isolating
them from Bethlehem. Similar to the case of the residents of the enclaves
lying west of the barrier in the northern portion of the West Bank,
residents of this Bethlehem neighborhood are not expected to receive
Israeli resident status, and they will not be allowed to enter Jerusalem.
Under international law,
the entry of Israelis into the Occupied Territories to worship and guaranteeing
their freedom of movement are not legitimate considerations in determining
Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories. This is true even more so
if it results in grave human rights violations against hundreds of local
residents.
Illegal expropriation
of land
Taking control of Palestinian
land to erect the separation barrier is another illegal element involved
in constructing the barrier. To justify taking control of their private
land, Israel relies on Article 23(g) of the Regulations Attached to
the Hague Convention Regarding the Laws and Customs of War on Land of
1907, which appears in Part 2 of the convention under the heading Hostilities.
Reliance on an article from this part of the regulations is based on
Israels perception of the current situation in the Occupied Territories
as armed conflict, as if the occupation had ended. According
to Article 23(g), an army is prohibited from seizing or destroying private
property unless the action is absolutely necessary for military needs.
The state argues that seizure of the land is indeed necessary for that
purpose, and that the action is therefore legal.
The State Attorneys
Office made sure to mention in its response to the High Court of Justice
that Israel is only taking control of this land temporarily. The seizure
orders that were issued to enable construction of the barrier indeed
stated that they were valid only until the end of 2005. However, the
military legislation does not prevent indefinite extension of the orders,
and Israel has extended such orders indefinitely in cases of land taken
to establish new settlements and bypass roads.
In the states response
to the appeal filed by residents of Kafr Aqeb against the taking
of their land to build the barrier (see above), the State Attorneys
Office admitted that the temporary seizure orders were also used to
erect permanent structures and that they may be extended indefinitely:
The state is not prevented
from seizing land by means of temporary seizure orders even for the
purpose of erecting structures that are not necessarily temporary in
nature. By way of illustration: in Judea and Samaria, temporary seizure
orders have been used to erect permanent structures of many kinds, such
as bypass roads and Israeli communities
Also within the State of
Israel, temporary seizure orders (issued pursuant to the Requisition
of Land Arrangement (Emergency Order), 5715 1955) were used to
establish the Sde Dov airport, which all can agree is a permanent facility.
This temporary seizure continued by lawful expropriation of land in
accordance with the Lands Ordinance (Acquisition for Public Purpose),
of 1943.
The permanent nature of the
barrier, together with past experience with Israels temporary
seizures of land, leads to the conclusion that taking control
of land is in fact expropriation. Article 46 of the Hague Regulations,
which is located in the part that deals with occupied territory, unequivocally
states that, it is prohibited to expropriate private property,
even for military needs. The expropriation of the land is also illegal
if we accept Israels argument that construction of the barrier
along the proposed route is the only way to prevent Palestinians from
entering Israel to commit attacks.
Conclusions
The public debate taking
place in Israel today on the separation barrier focuses primarily on
the delays in the barriers construction and the defense establishments
faulty planning for its construction The implications of the project
on the Palestinian population and the grave harm they will suffer as
a result of the barrier are ignored.
Most of the violations of
Palestinian rights have not yet occurred, so it is not possible at this
time to determine the magnitude of the harm. However, it is clear that
erection of the barrier will increase the fragmentation of the West
Bank that has resulted from Israels policy in the Occupied Territories
since the beginning of the current Intifada. For the past two and a
half years, the IDF has prevented almost all movement of Palestinians
in the West Bank. To accomplish this, the IDF has used prolonged curfews,
staffed checkpoints, concrete blocks, dirt piles, and trenches. This
policy has greatly disrupted every aspect of life of the local population
the heath and education systems have difficulty operating, the
economy has never been worse, and social and family relations have been
severed.
Erection of Stage 1 of the
barrier within the West Bank will increase these disruptions and cause
further harm to more than 200,000 Palestinians. The barrier will isolate
Palestinian communities from other areas in the West Bank and turn them
into enclaves between the barrier and the Green Line. Other communities
will become enclaves east of the barrier, some due to the winding route
of the barrier and some because they will be imprisoned between it and
the secondary barrier that will be erected east of them. Some residents
will become detached from their farmland that remains west of the barrier.
The restrictions on movement of the residents will violate their right
to work and earn a living, and families are liable to fall into poverty.
The barrier will also lead to the violations of other rights: the right
to medical treatment, the right to education, and the ability of the
population to carry on with their normal lives, including maintaining
a family and social life.
Israel, as the occupying
force, is obliged to safeguard the human rights of the Palestinians
under its control. Israels duty to protect the life of its citizens
does not release it from its obligation to protect the Palestinians
human rights. In erecting the separation barrier, Israel completely
disregards this obligation, and in doing so breaches international law.
First, erecting the barrier
to prevent attacks in Israel is the most extreme solution and causes
the most severe harm to the Palestinian residents. Israel preferred
this solution to alternative methods that would cause a lesser degree
of harm. Although most of the Palestinians who perpetrated attacks in
Israel entered the country through the checkpoints situated along the
Green Line, and not through the open areas between the checkpoints,
Israel decided to erect the barrier before it solved the problems that
were found in the operation of checkpoints. Also, the IDF did not take
any meaningful action in the seam area that could prevent Palestinians
from entering Israel, and gave low priority to this objective as compared
with other objectives, such as attacking institutions of the Palestinian
Authority and protecting the settlements.
Second, even if we accept
Israels claim that it has no choice and must erect a separation
barrier, Israel is required to select the route that results in the
fewest human rights violations possible. It has not done this. Rather,
it has selected a route that, in at least some cases, ignores human
rights considerations and is based on extraneous considerations, such
as perpetuation of some of the settlements, the desire to transmit a
political message that erection of the barrier is not a permanent political
border, the quality of life of Israeli residents, preservation of antiquities,
and access of Israeli citizens to a religious site. These considerations
led to the choice of a route that gravely violates human rights, without
any security justification whatsoever.
Third, the decision to erect
a permanent barrier in the West Bank at a cost of hundreds of millions
of shekels breaches the Hague Convention, which prohibits expropriation
of land in occupied territory.
The overall features of the
separation-barrier project give the impression that Israel is once again
relying on security arguments to establish, unilaterally, facts on the
ground that will affect any future arrangement between Israel and the
Palestinians. In the past, Israel used imperative military needs
to justify expropriation of land to establish settlements and argued
that the action was temporary. The settlements have for some time been
facts on the ground. In the peace talks with the Palestinian, the settlements
are listed as one of the issues to be discussed in negotiating the final-status
agreement. In the Camp David talks that took place in July 2000, Israels
position was that some of the settlements established in the West Bank
would be annexed into Israel.
It is reasonable to assume
that, as in the case of the settlements, the separation barrier will
become a permanent fact to support Israels future claim to annex
territories. In any event, the geographic reality being created by the
erection of the barrier will impair any political solution based on
recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination
and the establishment of an independent and viable Palestinian state.
For these reasons, BTselem
urges Israels government to:
Nullify the government and
Cabinet decisions regarding the separation barrier and immediately stop
all work on the barrier, including the taking of land;
Reopen discussions on ways
to cope with Palestinian attacks within Israel, and examine alternatives
to erecting the separation barrier. Every decision must take into account
the limitations resulting from international law and Israels duty
to respect the human rights of residents in areas under its control;
If it is decided that there
is no choice other than to build the barrier, the government must set
the route to run along the Green Line or, alternatively, within Israel.
Deviations from this principle should be allowed only in exceptional
cases, based on only two considerations: benefit to the local Palestinian
population and meeting Israels military needs in the narrow sense
of the term. In any event, any such deviation must be examined while
taking into account its effects on the human rights of the residents
residing near the barriers rout.