Thinking
Beyond Arafat
By Ali Abunimah
01 November, 2004
The
Electronic Intifada
The
grave illness of Palestinian President Yasser Arafat has given rise
to frenzied speculation about what will happen after he is no longer
on the scene.
Much of this speculation
is based on the false premise that the presence or absence of a single
individual is a decisive factor in settling a complex, century-old conflict.
Removing Arafat - or Israeli Premier Ariel Sharon for that matter -
changes absolutely none of the conditions that make conflict between
Israelis and Palestinians inevitable. The occupation and settlements
will still be there. Israel will still have tens of thousands of troops
in the West Bank and Gaza, denying millions of Palestinians their basic
rights and engaging in atrocities and destruction. Palestinians will
still be determined to resist the occupation with all the means at their
disposal.
Yet various groups
do have vested interests in Arafat's fate. For Israel, Arafat's passing
from the scene would be a mixed blessing at best. Just a few weeks ago,
Sharon was again threatening to murder Arafat, the way he ordered the
killings of Hamas leaders Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abdel-Aziz Rantisi.
Now, Sharon is apparently offering Arafat all medical assistance to
preserve his life.
The reason Israel
focuses so much on Arafat is because it needs to provide an alternative
explanation for the dramatic escalation in the conflict that its policies
and its stubborn refusal to end the occupation have caused. As Sharon's
senior adviser, Dov Weisglass, recently made clear, the Israeli government
is determined to block any peace process, particularly the "road
map" peace plan, so that it can keep its West Bank settlements
and ensure that no viable Palestinian state can emerge west of the Jordan
River.
Arafat, alive and
well in Ramallah, has served Israel as a useful scapegoat. Israel and
its cheerleaders in the United States have painted Arafat as a puppetmaster
who single-handedly controls all Palestinians, and can even determine
the fate of Israeli elections. As Republican pollster Frank Luntz wrote
in a confidential report to Israeli lobbyists in April 2003, Arafat
has been a great asset to Israel because "he looks the part"
of a "terrorist." Ironically, as long as the demonized Arafat
is in Ramallah, Israel can make the claim that "there is no partner."
The totemic power
of Arafat in this role is demonstrated daily as U.S. politicians of
every stripe compete for votes with statements demonstrating their scorn
and contempt for him.
Equally concerned
about Arafat's fate are his immediate entourage, the sycophantic clique
that holds most of the senior offices in the Palestinian Authority.
This group derives its power and influence solely from Arafat's patronage,
and it seems as if no one has a solid enough base to survive without
him. For these people, Arafat is a Brezhnev who must be kept in place
without regard to his actual capacities. His mere presence is the keystone
keeping their ossified, self-serving system in place.
After Arafat's departure,
we can expect an ugly scrap among his entourage to claim his mantle
and with it the dwindling perks, power and prestige that the PA has
to offer. It is unlikely that anyone emerging from such a struggle would
have either the means or legitimacy to represent Palestinians and their
interests. Palestinians will also have to guard against efforts by foreign
powers to anoint Palestinian leaders whom they see as more pliable.
The other losers
from Arafat's possible departure are the members of the self-styled
Israeli "peace camp," particularly adherents of the so-called
Geneva Initiative. The mainstream Israeli peace movement requires the
presence of Arafat as the lynchpin of their fantasy that a credible
Palestinian leader will one day formally accept something less than
true independence, just as the Sharon government relies on Arafat to
be the bogeyman. In this sense, Arafat is almost as potent a symbol
for Israelis on the left and the right as he is for Palestinians.
The international
actors - the UN, the EU and signatories to the 1949 Geneva conventions
- who avoid their responsibility to intervene and protect the Palestinians
from Israel will be robbed of what the International Crisis Group recently
termed the "Arafat issue" as an excuse for their inaction
and their empty calls for Palestinian "reform" while Palestinians
face an assault that threatens their very existence. Ironically, those
who may be among the least affected by Arafat's departure are millions
of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and in exile for whom he
has remained a powerful symbol, but for whom he long since stopped providing
effective leadership.