"Indo-Lanka
Relations Presently
Seem To Be Moving On An Even Keel":R. Swaminathan
By
Nilantha Ilangamuwa & R. Swaminathan
08 December,
2007
Sri
Lanka Guardian
(December,
06, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) “I do not agree with LTTE’s
claim to be the sole champion of Tamil interests in Sri Lanka,”
R. Swaminathan , President & DG of the International Institute of
Security and Safety Management (New Delhi); and a Trustee of the Catalyst
Trust (Chennai), said an exclusive interview with Sri Lanka Guardian.
Mr. R.
Swaminathan spoke his mind clearly on Sri Lanka’s crisis and Indin
opition also current political and military developments in South Asia
nightmare in an exclusive interview with Nilantha Ilangmauwa to Sri
Lanka Guardian. R. Swaminathan joined Indian Police Service in 1954
also served for nearly 33 years in central intelligence and security
organizations. He was retired in 1990 as Special Secretary, DG (Security),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India. He has been actively associated
with a few think-tanks since his retirement from service; and has published
a number of papers on different issues related to national security
and international relations.
“LTTE
may now seem to be facing a critical situation towards the end of 2007,
but it has shown in the past great resilience and capacity to rebound,’
he said.
Whatever,
“India may then be able to deal with an LTTE without Pirabhakaran
and others involved in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi,” he
observed.
According
to him, “Sea Tigers, a third navy in Indo-Sri Lankan waters is
not in the interest of India's national security”
Even,
“the Tamil Eelam is in a different category and a Unilateral Declaration
of Independence by Pirabhakaran is very unlikely to find any supporters
in the international community,” he said.
He must
state at the outset that he have been retired from government service
for more than seventeen years and presently have no role in the government.
Whatever he state in this interview, therefore, represents only my personal
views and assessments.
Excerpts
of the Interview,
Q. Could you please let us know your assessment of the Indian
foreign policy within the context of its regional interests and influence?
A. It is
my view that India is already a significant power - economically as
a matter of fact, militarily as a matter of relative strengths, and
politically if these can be leveraged to her national advantage. Many
analysts have for long been used to India being strong on rhetoric but
an under-achiever, and it may not be easy for them to see that the ugly
duckling is growing into a beautiful swan (like in Hans Christian Anderson’s
fairy tale). India is trying to achieve and is achieving in a few years
what many other significant powers could comfortably achieve in many
decades or centuries - as the world gradually evolved from the Middle
Ages to the modern era. In the process, many intermediate steps are
being skipped (as has happened in many areas of India’s technological
development) and this accelerated growth is not easy to cope with. Though
India may seemingly have allowed foreign invasions and colonial rule
to make her forget her glory days (except perhaps in speeches and school
text books), it has to be recognized that India has in reality grown
out of her exploited under-dog status of nearly two centuries and is
speeding on her way to becoming a big power. India’s changed (and
changing) status has also caused significant changes in the expectations
of other countries about India’s involvement in world affairs.
India should
be expected increasingly to make overall national interest the primary
and supreme consideration in formulating her foreign and security policies.
Domestic politics and partisan interests should and would always provide
major inputs during the stage of consultations, but are unlikely to
become reasons for casting doubts on the credibility of the national
foreign policy as it emerges out of those consultations.
India’s
“Look East” policy, the recent interactions with ASEAN and
initiatives in SAARC are part of her efforts to further her regional
interests and influence. The difficulties in maintaining friendly and
cordial relations with her smaller neighbors may be due to her earlier
inability to deal with them as total equals. The smaller neighbors may
be justifiably worried by the asymmetry in size, human and material
resources and economic and military strengths. India’s readiness
to assert her national interests (e.g. India’s role in the creation
of Bangladesh, Indian support to the Tamil movements in Sri Lanka; Indian
encouragement and support to its political favorites in different countries
of the region) and continuing differences relating to the utilization
of water resources may also be matters of concern to the neighbors.
The affected countries tend to guard themselves by avoiding the development
of very close (and possibly dependent) economic and other linkages with
India, by developing (balancing) economic and military linkages with
other countries. This often results in positions of near hostility,
suspicion and distrust. The Indian Prime Minister’s statement
that India is willing to consider asymmetric concessions to her less
developed neighbors (as distinguished from the customary rule of reciprocity
in matters of trade and commerce), as and when translated into practical
policy, should help in removing or lessening the perception of India
as the ubiquitous “Big Brother” in the neighborhood.
There is
a lot of talk about India and China being rivals for influence in the
region. The reality, as I see it, is that both countries are actively
pursuing their own national interests. In the process, there will be
areas of cooperation, as there will be areas of competition. This should
not pose any major problem as long as both countries are also aware
of and are sensitized to the interests of the other country.
Q.
What do you think about the Indo–Lanka relations based on its
historical experience and its current and future interest?
A. Though
India and Sri Lanka are physically separated by a narrow strip of sea,
the peoples of the two countries are bound together by bonds of geographic
proximity, historical ties, religious and cultural affinities and similarities
etc. State level relations tend to fluctuate from time to time, influenced
by domestic political compulsions, international situation, economic
needs etc. Stable state level relations are possible only when they
closely reflect the reality of people-to-people ties.
Indo-Sri
Lanka relations presently seem to be moving on an even keel. The political
relations between the UPA government in India and the Rajapakse government
in Sri Lanka are “correct”, though not yet very close. Economic
relations are improving gradually, but the dialogue on defense and security
matters is progressing very slowly (mainly due to differing perceptions
and lack of full trust).
There are
two major irritants in Indo-Sri Lanka relations. The first is the “ethnic
issue”, which we will discuss later, and the other relates to
Kachchativu. The latter issue is really less about ownership and sovereignty
over the small island than about fishing rights around it. However,
the issue of sovereignty over the island has been emotionalized to an
unduly large extent, both in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka. The regional
parties in Tamil Nadu have never been happy with the 1974 and 1976 Maritime
Boundary Agreements between India and Sri Lanka. The issue has become
an irritant also in the relations between the Central Government and
the Government of Tamil Nadu; and has the potential of radicalizing
Tamil nationalism.
Despite the
Maritime Boundary Agreements, Indian fishermen have continued to fish
in areas (including those in Sri Lankan territorial waters) where they
have traditionally been carrying on their vocation. The Palk Strait
has also become the conduit through which the Tamil militants move their
men and materials. Though all the concerned entities seem to be happy
to let the situation simmer and be available (whenever required) as
a stick to beat the other entities with, it needs to be defused with
a sense of urgency.
The fishing
communities on both sides of Palk Strait had jointly exploited (with
hardly any outside intervention) the marine resources for centuries.
If the two governments could restore to those communities the right
and responsibility to work out friendly, cooperative and sustainable
fishing in these waters, the problem could probably be solved amicably.
The two governments could encourage and facilitate whatever the fishermen
are able to agree upon and reserve the waters of the Palk Strait for
joint and co-operative fishing, exclusively by artisanal fishermen of
the littoral fishing communities.
Apart from
the fishing issue, it is possible that people to people relations and
the media can act as pressure groups to evolve some kind of synthesis
between differing security and political interests and priorities of
India and Sri Lanka. Intellectuals, human rights advocates, lawyers,
press corps, artistes and film stars could easily set in motion a closer
understanding between the two countries and eventually compel their
governments to agree that cooperation on ecology and efforts to eradicate
poverty and deprivation should receive higher priorities than narrow
political considerations. When the peoples of two countries develop
a vested interest in peace and good relations between their countries,
the governments would have to follow suit.
The repeated
movement of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka to India includes the possibility
of LTTE cadres sneaking in with them. This could lead to instability
and spillover of the culture of violence in Tamil Nadu, as experienced
some years ago.
India may
give the impression of being a helpless spectator of the developments
in Sri Lanka, but it has to be appreciated that presently she has very
little influence on either the Rajapakse Government or the Tamil militants.
However, India has to be concerned about the growing presence and influence
of non-regional Powers in Sri Lanka. If this trend continues, India
may have to consider taking a more active role in Sri Lanka, much against
her natural inclination.
Q.
What do you have to say about Indian assistance to curtail the Tamil
terrorism in Sri Lanka?
A. India
is basically opposed to terrorism of any form anywhere. She has been
suffering from terrorist activities for some decades, and still continues
to be a victim of terrorism, some indigenous and some foreign-inspired
and supported. In my assessment, India is and would be prepared to share
her experience and expertise in handling terrorism and in defusing issues
that give raise to terrorism. However, memories of the manner in which
IPKF suffered in Sri Lanka are unlikely to permit India to provide any
material assistance to the Sri Lankan Government (SLG) in tackling what
you describe as “Tamil terrorism”.
Q.
India has been always stated that it will never support carving out
a separate state of Tamil Eelam for the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Will India
support any Tamil movements to campaign against the Sri Lankan government
as it did in the past by giving military training and practical support?
A. This question
is in two parts and I will try to answer both, one after another.
India’s
consistent opposition to the carving out of a separate sovereign state
of Tamil Eelam is based both on the international requirement normally
to preserve the integrity of existing states and her national interests.
She has herself often had to struggle to preserve her national integrity
against efforts by occasional local movements to secede from the Indian
Union. [India’s support to the inevitable separation of Bangladesh
from Pakistan should be seen in the different context of an intolerable
situation of “genocide” and large scale refugee movement.]
A separate sovereign state of Tamil Eelam is unlikely to function of
a classical “buffer state”, but is more likely to have the
potential to become a focus for pan-Tamil parochialism and nationalism.
On the issue
of Indian support to Tamil movements campaigning against SLG, I would
like to draw attention to India’s normal policy of “non-involvement”
in differences between sovereign states and their populations of Indian
origin. But non-involvement should not be interpreted as lack of concern.
In Sri Lanka, Indian involvement was essentially triggered by SLG’s
attempt to deny citizenship to a large number of Tamils who had been
staying and working in Sri Lanka for generations. Subsequent efforts
at discrimination and marginalization of the Tamil population, coupled
with the non-addressing of legitimate grievances, led to a deepening
crisis in the ethnic issue. The radicalization and polarization on this
issue could probably have been avoided by tolerance of diversity and
sympathetic understanding of grievances and aspirations. India has to
discharge her moral responsibility to support the aspiration of the
Tamils to be “equal” citizens of Sri Lanka.
It is unfair
to second guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the Indian decision
(more than twenty years ago) to provide military training and practical
support to Tamil movements in Sri Lanka. It was obviously based on an
objective analysis of the available facts and the prevailing ground
realities. I am extremely doubtful if, in the current circumstances,
India would repeat those actions.
Q.
What is your assessment about the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
Can you tell your views on their past, present and the anticipated future?
A. LTTE was
one of the many parallel Tamil movements that came up in protest against
SLG’s decisions that were seen as discriminatory against the Tamils.
It was, however, one of the most radical of those organizations and
believed from the beginning that an independent sovereign state of Tamil
Eelam was the real solution to the problem. LTTE was initially very
reluctant to join the other Tamil movements in the 1985 talks at Thimpu,
aimed at finding a solution through the devolution of powers to the
Tamils, within an integrated state of Sri Lanka. Over a period of time,
mainly through the free use of the weapons of violence and assassination,
LTTE eliminated or marginalized most other Tamil movements. In the areas
controlled by it, the LTTE has been able to establish a rudimentary
state structure, without letting those areas become ungoverned and chaotic.
Despite all this, I do not agree with LTTE’s claim to be the sole
champion of Tamil interests in Sri Lanka.
LTTE has
had two faces - one as arguably the most effective champion of the Tamil
cause and another as a dreaded terrorist organization. While there would
be wide-spread support for LTTE’s basic objective of getting justice
for the Tamils, its use of terrorist methods and insistence on having
a separate state perhaps do not elicit the same extent of support from
the Tamils. There would, of course, be considerable reluctance to express
any different point of view, as Pirabhakaran and LTTE have shown total
intolerance of any dissent or even any difference of opinion –
with “elimination” being the favorite solution. Over the
years, LTTE has shown itself to be one of the most ruthless, determined
and murderous terrorist organizations.
LTTE may
now seem to be facing a critical situation towards the end of 2007,
but it has shown in the past great resilience and capacity to rebound.
However, it would appear that the best days of LTTE are behind it. The
differences between the eastern and northern cadres of LTTE may or may
not lead to a change in leadership, but there may still be scope for
that. India may then be able to deal with an LTTE without Pirabhakaran
and others involved in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. It would anyway
be unwise for India or any other concerned party to ignore the reality
of LTTE.
The development
and activities of the Sea Tigers and the fledgling air capability are
major matters of concern, even after the damages claimed to have been
inflicted by SLG. A third navy in Indo-Sri Lankan waters is not in the
interest of India's national security. The Bengal Bay is very sensitive
from India’s security point of view, not necessarily in the military
sense only. India has to ensure the integrity of the Gulf of Mannar
and Palk Strait, lest LTTE misuses them to smuggle material useful for
waging war. The capability and potential of Sea Tigers to disrupt fishing
in the Bengal Bay and for maritime terrorist acts cannot be under-estimated.
The Government of India has made precautionary deployment of Coast Guard
and Naval vessels in the area, but has been surprisingly quiet about
the threat posed by Sea Tigers. This may be due to the peculiar compulsion
of coalition politics, but the stage may soon come when India may have
to take some hard decisions about the Sea Tigers. India may have to
work towards the constitution of an international coalition against
maritime terrorism, which could force LTTE (through diplomatic pressure
if possible and through naval action, if necessary) to dismantle its
maritime capability. The last unenviable option, if Indian security
gets seriously threatened, may be for India unilaterally (or in collaboration
with Sri Lanka) to take the necessary naval actions.
Q.
In his recent Hero's day speech V. Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE
demanded the international community to rethink their approach to support
the Sri Lanka government on the conflict and also asked the Tamil Diaspora
community to support the LTTE struggle. Will his appeal have sympathetic
hearing?
A. It is
my assessment that Pirabhakaran’s appeal displays elements of
frustration and desperation at the present situation. I personally doubt
if the appeal would have any effect, unless accompanied by changes in
the behavior of the LTTE.
Q.
If V. Prahakaran declares Unilateral Declaration of Independence will
the international community support his effort like they did to recognize
the independence of Kosovo, Montenegro and East Timor? What do you think
about his present predicament and Pirabakaran’s war tactics?
A. I hope
that Pirabhakaran would not feel compelled to take such an ill-advised
step. Kosovo and Montenegro had “voluntarily” joined the
Socialist Federal Republic of Jugoslavia at the end of World War II.
They were, in effect, retracting their earlier merger. Tamil Eelam is
in a different category and a Unilateral Declaration of Independence
by Pirabhakaran is very unlikely to find any supporters in the international
community. I doubt if the step (and the possibility of consequent isolation
and sanctions) would even get the support of all the Tamils in Sri Lanka.
I feel that
Pirabhakaran and the LTTE would have to undertake a serious exercise
of introspection, take into account all the realities and decide whether
or not to pursue the goal of an independent state.
Q.
How will the present politics in Tamil Nadu influence the Central government
to intervene in the crisis in Sri Lanka?
A. The coalition
regime in Indian politics produces some strange situations. Regional
and ideological positions, which would normally be considered to be
of marginal consequence, tend to acquire greater importance. In the
case of Tamil Nadu, the regional political parties find it difficult
to adopt moderate positions on many issues, lest they surrender ground
to the more radical political parties like the Pattali Makkal Katchi.
Even considering their present disproportionate influence in decision-making
by the Central Government, I do not think that the mainstream politicians
in Tamil Nadu would attempt to make the Central Government agree to
intervene physically in the crisis in Sri Lanka; or that they would
succeed if they made the attempt.
Q.
How could the Government of Sri Lanka deal with the crisis it is facing
for many decades now?
A. It was
a complex situation to start with and successive governments, as well
as many Sinhala politicians, helped to increase its complexity over
many decades. It is therefore unrealistic to expect that there could
be a miracle cure for this problem. The existing crisis of confidence
needs to be overcome first. The first essential step would seem to be
take measures to convince the majority of the Tamils that their legitimate
grievances and aspirations would be attended to without their having
to resort to coercive actions merely to be heard. The Tamils require
to be convinced that Sinhala political parties do not consider them
to be enemies or second-class citizens. If a comprehensive agreement
cannot be reached with the Tamils, SLG should be prepared to consider
taking the initial steps unilaterally and hope that the Tamils would
respond favorably to those gestures of reconciliation. Such an action
would take the wind out of the sails of radical Tamil elements and strengthen
the presently-silent moderates amongst them. This, however, calls for
a major shift in the thinking of the Sinhala majority and its leadership.
It is as yet a matter of doubt if they can summon up the necessary moral
strength, maturity and pragmatism to take the step.
When Mahinda
Rajapakse won the Presidential election in November 2005, with the support
of Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), it
was expected that the government would move away from Chandrika’s
federal formula for handling the Tamil insurgency.
Q.
What is your observation (negative and positives) about the present
Rajapakse government in Sri Lanka?
A. I will
answer this question only in the limited and narrow context of the ethnic
problem. I am afraid that I cannot say anything positive about the present
SLG in that context. When Mahinda Rajapakse won the Presidential election
in November 2005, with the support of Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)
and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), it was expected that the government
would move away from Chandrika’s federal formula for handling
the Tamil insurgency. The President’s approach to the ethnic problem
appears to carry sufficient credibility to attract at least the guarded
support not only of his electoral allies of JVP and JHU, but also of
the erstwhile electoral opponents of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC)
and the Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC). Though the LTTE was initially
nudged back to the negotiating table at Geneva, the repeated provocative
attacks by the Tigers on the security forces and the retaliatory attacks
by SLG on Tamil areas led to a situation where the Cease-Fire Agreement
(CFA) has died, though short of a formal revocation by the signatories.
On its part, the LTTE has clearly demonstrated that it is not prepared
to work within the existing (or a slightly modified) system. After each
hopeful pause, it resumes its violent methods. Along with the proclaimed
terrorist outfit, the legitimate and democratically elected SLG has
done little to help in resolving the “Tamil problem”. If
anything, the Mahinda government has been equally responsible for escalating
an intractable problem into one that is becoming near-impossible to
solve.
Q. What do you think about present Military offensives against
the LTTE by the state forces?
A. There
have been many claimed successes. It would appear that the capabilities
of the Sea Tigers have been severely crippled, at least for the present.
Limited advances on the ground have also been reported. However, aerial
bombardment of one’s own territory (not under foreign occupation),
with resultant casualties amongst innocent civilians, does not show
SLG as being in control of the situation. Some of the counter-attacks
by LTTE have highlighted the weaknesses of the government. The military
offensives cannot obviously be carried to their logical conclusion.
I doubt the ability of the Sri Lankan Security Forces totally to eradicate
the presence or influence of militant LTTE cadres from the areas presently
controlled by them, much less from all of Sri Lanka.
Armies that
have fought long wars are aware of the phenomenon of battle fatigue,
resulting in lack of motivation and vigor. Similarly, historical evidence
is that ethnic or ideological insurrections or revolutionary movements
lead to their own versions of revolutionary fatigue. Some time after
the CFA stabilized to a certain extent, LTTE showed signs of having
reached that critical stage. The intensified military offensives by
SLG has probably done more to remotivate and reinvigorate the fighting
cadres of LTTE than any exhortation by Pirabhakaran could have achieved.
Further,
the continued offensives ignore the lessons of history. Any movement
by an ethnic minority, based essentially on legitimate grievances of
discrimination and perceived suppression, cannot be eradicated totally
by military means alone. Military measures should be accompanied by
sincere and sympathetic efforts to address the legitimate grievances
and to minimize any discrimination by the state.
Q.
Can Sri Lanka find an effective and a durable solution for the problem
on its own?
A. The question
should not be whether Sri Lanka can find an effective and durable solution,
but whether Sri Lanka can afford not to find such a solution. Ideally,
the solution should be totally indigenous and arrived at by consensus.
Less ideally, it can be achieved with the help of mediators or intermediaries
from outside. It is very clear to me that any solution imposed only
by military force or majoritarian fiat would neither be effective nor
durable.
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