Dearailing
The Naga Peace Process
By Bharat
Bhushan
The Telegraph,
23 May, 2003
This weekend in Bangkok,
when the Indian negotiators for the Naga peace talks - retired home
secretary, K. Padmanabhaiah, and director of the Intelligence Bureau,
K.P. Singh - meet the leaders of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim
(Isak-Muivah), they would have little to say to them. After the fanfare
surrounding the visit of the two NSCN(I-M) leaders, Thuingaleng Muivah
and Isak Chisi Swu, to New Delhi this January, the peace talks have
reached a deadlock.
We are back to square one
because New Delhi lacks the boldness and the political imagination required
to move forward. Peace is being sought in Nagaland without changing
the boundaries of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.
Those negotiating with the
NSCN(I-M) ought to learn from history.
Short-changing the Nagas is the surest route to the assassination of
their leaders and fuelling resistance to New Delhi. India failed the
Nagas by not honouring the 9-Point Akbar Hyderi Agreement of 1947. The
Sixteen Point Agreement of 1962 with the Naga Peoples' Convention led
to the merger of the Naga Hills and Tuensang into Nagaland. But a moth-eaten
Nagaland only fuelled unrest and led to the assassination of the NPC
leader, Dr Imkongliba Ao.
The breakdown of the talks
between the Michael Scott Peace Mission and the Federal Government of
Nagaland led to the ouster of its leadership and the assassination of
Kaito Sema, the defence minister of FGN. The Shillong Accord of 1975
was signed during the Emergency with the Naga National Council. It discredited
and delegitimized the NNC and led to the formation of the NSCN under
Muivah, Swu and S.S. Khaplang (who now heads another faction of NSCN).
It is the stronger of the two factions of the NSCN led by Muivah and
Swu which came up
for negotiations in 1995. If that too is delegitimized, Naga insurgency
will continue under a different organization and
leadership.
As leaders of an armed insurgency,
Muivah and Swu cannot survive for long if they accept meaningless lollipops
from New Delhi instead of a permanent and honourable settlement. That
would primarily involve settling the twin issues of the integration
of Naga territories and the preservation of Naga identity.
The NSCN(I-M), the most effective
insurgent outfit in India's
Northeast, took a big risk by coming forward for peace in 1995. Today
it has gradually come to a position that the areas inhabited by the
Nagas in Myanmar will not be a part of the negotiations with India.
Why is this significant?
One-third of the Naga-inhabited areas of
pre-independence India were put by the British under Burmese control
between 1935 and 1945. Even today the Khiamungan, Konyak, Lainung, Pangmi,
Tangkhul Somara and Yimchunger Mukhori tribes of the Nagas live in Myanmar
abutting the Indian border. By agreeing to keep these areas out of the
negotiations, the NSCN is giving up its territorial ambitions outside
the boundaries of India. The new Naga entity thus would be independent
of the adjoining Myanmar areas and would have
close relations with India. Naming that closely bound relationship
would be premature at this juncture but suffice it to say that it
would not be against the interests of the Union of India.
It is possible that if they
are denied the integration of even the
Naga areas within India, the Nagas could revert to their earlier
position. Rejecting the peace process, a whole new generation of
Nagas could take up arms and go underground. A bloody cycle of civil
war could begin all over again. It took the NSCN two decades to talk
peace after rejecting the Shillong Accord of 1975. Who knows when they
would be willing to smoke the peace pipe with New Delhi again? Since
the NSCN(I-M) has spawned almost all the major insurgencies in the Northeast,
their support for such insurgencies would start all over again.
When the substantive dialogue
with the NSCN began, the Indian
negotiators wanted the less intractable issues to be addressed first
and leave the issues of Naga territory and identity to a later stage.
The Naga leaders seem to have agreed in good faith. Enough confidence
was built between the two sides for the NSCN leaders to visit the Indian
capital and meet the political leadership. Despite some minor hiccups,
Muivah and Swu went back satisfied that the peace process was moving
forward. However, in subsequent interaction, the Indian
negotiators did not come up with any substantive proposals and the Naga
leaders began doubting their sincerity. They then suggested that the
territorial integration and preservation of Naga identity should be
discussed first and everything else later.
Of the substantive issues
before the negotiators, the contentious
ones relate to sovereignty, defence, international relations, flags
and emblems, currency and postage stamps. Everything else is easily
negotiable. Essentially, the territorial question relates to
present-day Manipur. In 1833, the then king of Manipur, Raja Gambhir
Singh, was allowed by the British to annex Naga inhabited areas. The
Nagas claim that they never accepted or acknowledged this domination.
Today, the Nagas continue to live in large numbers in the hill districts
of Ukhrul, Senapati, Tamenglong and Chandel in Manipur.
Nearly ninety percent of
the population of Tangkhul Nagas is in
Manipur. They form the bulk of the armed cadre of the NSCN(I-M). Is
it possible then to discuss peace with the NSCN(I-M) while claiming
that Ukhrul will remain in Manipur? If the population of Ukhrul, Tamenglong
and Senapati, let us say, wants to be part of the present day Nagaland,
can it be denied that right? The Nagas are not seeking to secede. They
want to stay within India and be the masters of their own fate - a right
which has lately been exercised by the people of Uttaranchal, Jharkhand
and Chattisgarh. Manipur, of course, would be needed to be brought into
the consultations and compensated. That too should be done with a generosity
of heart that alone can keep India united.
The National Democratic Alliance
government apprehends electoral trouble in the Northeast if it agrees
to any changes in the existing boundaries of the states there. The Congress
and the Meiteis in Manipur, the Bharatiya Janata Party fears, would
most certainly create trouble. It would be ideal if the Nagas worked
on the Congress and also held a dialogue with the Meitei political leaders,
civil society organizations and the underground to bring them around.
This would limit New Delhi's problems to a great extent. However, why
should creating a political consensus be the job assigned only to the
Nagas and why should it not be the duty of the government of the day
which is better equipped to do so?
New Delhi can begin by setting
up a boundary commission to deal with the issue of territorial integration.
It can poll the people in the areas of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal
which the Nagas claim and find out what they want. Not even the Nagas
expect a resolution of this issue before the next general elections.
But at least some mechanism for resolving this issue should be put into
place before that if the peace process is not to be derailed.