US
Normalising Relations
With The Axis Of Evil
By Abid Mustafa
10 March, 2007
Countercurrents.org
On
March 6 2007, North Korea and the US concluded their first set of normalisation
talks, which are part of the agreement reached in Beijing last month.
Oddly enough the talks also coincide with American efforts to establish
cordial ties with Iran. In her testimony before the Senate Appropriations
Committee, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that that Washington
will join a "neighbours meeting", convened by Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki to be followed by ministerial talks in April.
So after five years of having
labelled Iran and North Korea as part of the axis of evil, the Bush
administration has finally decided to abandon its bellicose stance in
preference for normalisation. Leaving aside America's fading status
in international affairs; US motives behind the restoration drive are
borne out of separate considerations for each country.
In the case of North Korea,
the Bush administration has always insisted that Pyongyang must de-nuclearize
before the US can deliver economic assistance and enter into a security
pact with the North Koreans. However, the agreement signed in Beijing
between the six parties on February 13 2007, represents a climb down
from the hard-line policy that had frequently bedevilled US relations
with North Korea.
The deal reached makes no
mention of North Korea relinquishing its existing nuclear weapons and
is a departure from previous agreements. The omission is particularly
noteworthy as it suggests that America has implicitly-at least-recognised
North Korea as a nuclear weapons state (NWS), after Pyongyang conducted
its first nuclear test on October 9 2006. The atomic test marked an
escalation in hostilities between Pyongyang and Washington, and came
at troubling time for the Bush administration. America starring defeat
in Iraq and Afghanistan could not afford another confrontation-this
time with North Korea. The Bush administration was forced to revise
its policy, and with Chinese help proceeded to engage North Korea, which
eventually culminated in last month's joint statement. The anxiety pervading
the Bush administration over North Korea's nuclear status was recently
echoed by Senator Joseph Biden, the Democratic chair of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, who said," North Korea's programme is much
more dangerous to us now than it was in 2002, when President Bush rejected
virtually the same deal he is now embracing."
History between the two nations does not bode well for a swift outcome.
The last fifty years or so, demonstrate more than anything else, American's
reluctance to find a permanent solution to the nuclear issue, unwillingness
to establish bilateral ties and aversion to see a unified Korean peninsula.
America's intransigence towards North Korea in the past and for the
foreseeable future is directed towards keeping China preoccupied with
North Korea on it South-eastern border. America has kept the issue simmering
and only when Pyongyang has crossed the limits and threatened US interests-
such as South Korea's or Japan's security-has the US instigated precautionary
measures to contain the threat. For instance the firing of two ballistic,
over the Japanese archipelago led to the signing of the Agreed Framework
in 1994. The placing of a satellite in orbit which enhanced the long-range
deep-strike capability of the North Korea prompted the Clinton administration
to convene high level talks in the winter of 1998. In all of the standoffs
between US and North Korea, the US has been quick to involve China and
has used South Korea and Japan its two principal agents in the region
to raise the broader question of Asian Pacific security.
Cheney's recent visit to
the region should be judged within this setting. The visit had a two
fold aim. First it was meant to assuage Japanese concerns about the
pact with North Korea and review progress on the implementation of the
accord. Second, it was to send an unequivocal message to the Chinese
leadership that America would not tolerate the expansion of Chinese
hegemony in the region.
The ongoing negotiations
between North Korea and the US, South Korea, and Japan will lead to
normalisation, only if the US is confident that it can continue using
North Korea to destabilise China.
Unlike North Korea, Iran
is a subordinate state to America and since the early eighties has been
protecting US interests throughout the region. However, the belligerent
statements emanating from Tehran and Washington these days conveys a
different picture altogether-one where both countries are preparing
for war. America's detention of Iranian diplomats, the arrest of Shia
clerics with close ties to Tehran, the arrival of a second air-craft
carrier in the Persian Gulf, the allegation of Iranian explosives used
by the Iraqi resistance and numerous intelligence reports about an imminent
US strike have reinforced the impression that war is inevitable. Likewise,
Iranian allegations that Britain, America and Pakistan are supporting
insurgents amongst Iran's minorities, Tehran refusing to surrender its
right to enrich uranium and Iran conducting war games does little to
dispel the notion that war can be averted.
But when measured against
the backdrop of Iranian influence in Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan,
the confrontational posturing between the two countries belies reality.
America knows full well that without Iranian assistance, she would not
be able to control the Shia population in the South of Iraq. Equally
important is Iranian influence over Hizbollah, and without Tehran's
cooperation the US would be unable to pressurise Israel to resume peace
talks with the Palestinians or stabilise Lebanon. The same can be said
about Afghanistan.
America's intention to hold
talks with Iran has been welcomed by Iran's Supreme National Security
Council Secretary Ali Larijani and other senior officials. The same
officials are actively curbing and undermining Ahmadinejad's limited
powers. There in mounting speculation in Tehran that the President may
not even survive his term. The Iranian leadership has also signalled
its readiness to halt enrichment. This is nothing new-as far back as
2003 in secret talks with the US- a similar offer was made. The aggressive
actions undertaken by the US is designed to bolster American authority
in Iraq ahead of talks with Iran, and deny her agents in Tehran the
ability to rebuff US demands. In the forthcoming US-Iran talks it is
likely that Iran will halt its enrichment programme and withdraw support
for Hizbollah. In return, Iran will be given the responsibility to manage
the affairs of Southern Iraq under American tutelage and be re-admitted
to the comity of nations.
The chances of US normalising
its relationship with Iran is far greater than its endeavours to normalise
ties with North Korea, even though political developments suggest otherwise.
Abid Mustafa is a political
commentator who specialises in Muslim Affairs