The
People’s Struggle
In The Middle East
By Joshua Frank &
Ramzy Baroud
05 September, 2006
Countercurrents.org
Ramzy Baroud is a US author and journalist, currently based in London.
He is the author of The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of
a People's Struggle (Pluto Press, 2006). He is also the Editor-in-Chief
of PalestineChronicle.com. Here Baroud talks with Joshua Frank about
the latest crisis in the Middle East and how it threatens the US and
Israel’s international prowess.
Joshua Frank: So Ramzy, how long is this Lebanon/Israeli ceasefire
going to last? Who won, anyway?
Ramzy Baroud: To begin with,
one must emphasize that Israel doesn’t believe in ceasefires;
it’s understanding of the concept has little to do with the commitment
it makes to the international community and more to do with tactical
reasoning. This was true with Israel’s earliest ceasefire in 1948
when Zionist gangs agreed to stop their onslaught against Palestinian
villages and their fleeing inhabitants, yet resumed killing at will
without adhering to dates or the law of war whenever convenient.
The latest ceasefire in Lebanon
is no exception. For the first time in its history, Israel suffers a
wide scale military setback. I am cautious not to use the word “defeat”,
although in many aspects it was a defeat. Not only did Israel discover
the limitations of its military prowess (similar to the unpleasant discovery
of America’s military limits in Iraq), but it has provided Hizbollah,
and any aspiring Arab resistance groups in the future, with its own
David and Goliath anecdote, which will cement the argument that was
slowly fading among Arabs, that Israel only understands the language
of force, and that a peace treaty without strength to back it up, is
simply signing terms of defeat. Ironically, Syria’s Bashar Assad
reiterated a similar notion in his fiery speech following the war; his
self-assured words were paralleled with Ehud Olmert hesitant admission
of failure before the Israeli Knesset.
JF: So, Israel has
the power to end much of the violence?
RB: Right. The ceasefire
shall last as long as Israel gets set to reengage Hizbollah. The opportune
moment to do this would be to take on a weakened Hizbollah at the internal
Lebanese front. The US and Israel are already leading this planning
campaign, with the help of their loyal friends dotting the Lebanese
political landscape. If Hizbollah is weakened enough (not necessarily
disarmed), and if the Lebanese army (who has little or no real chance
in defending Lebanon’s border, no matter how well intended) is
deployed in areas that Hizbollah had customized to fit its war tactics,
then Israel might be foolish enough to give war another shot. It would
then be a war of different objectives, one that is almost solely aimed
at renewing Israel’s national pride and the people’s confidence
in their once ‘invincible army’, for the Israelis understand
well that their state had been established, conquered and subdued their
foes using tanks and bullets; if such tools are marginalized, then Israel
has very little to justify its arrogance, its dominance. In a sense,
this was the main achievement of Hizbollah: 1200 lightly armed men defending
their country successfully against 30,000 fully geared Israeli soldiers
using the best war technology American money can buy.
Israel, no matter how desperate
its future military adventures will be, must realize that its military
advantage over its neighbors is neither a guarantee of peace nor of
security, even if America’s unconditional aid and loan guarantees
increase by ten fold.
JF: It's seems as
if Israel is not taking the ceasefire seriously at all. They've continued
some military operations in Southern Lebanon. The UN, although upset
about it, seems to be doing nothing to stop it. How long before this
so-called ceasefire ends and Hizbollah and Israel go at it again?
RB: Israel had no other option
but to accept the ceasefire. Abiding by it is a different story. Despite
its military superiority over Hizbollah, Israel has miserably failed
to translate such advantage into yet another military triumph. Militarily,
Israel had one out of two options: first, to carry on with the war unhindered,
risking more causalities and further tainting the image of its supposedly
undefeatable army; second, accepting a cease-fire package with a few
provisions that would allow its leaders to claim a political victory
over Hizbollah. It opted for the second option, but it was too little
too late.
Moreover, Israel has committed
three subsequent strategic mistakes. First, launching a major offensive
while underestimating Hizbollah’s military strength; second, prolonging
the offensive into a 34-day war knowing fully that military victory
was simply unattainable (cementing the Lebanese resistance sense of
victory, and amplifying its army’s sense of defeat.) The third
mistake is being committed right now: Israel is trying to send a message
to Hizbollah and others in the Middle East, which is a mixture of arrogance
and desperation, by violating the cease fire in a nonsensical and frankly
irrelevant show of strength. These actions are similar to a bully who
refuses to accept that the smallest kid in the class beat him senseless,
and still, bleeding, battered and all, insists on provoking yet another
fight.
Of course, the Israeli bully
might end up getting his wish -- provoking Hizbollah into another brawl
-- but by doing so, it would, once again further highlight its vulnerability
and the limits of its military power. Israeli leaders have for long
advocated that “Arabs must be beaten” or “hit hard”
in order for them to accept Israel’s dominance; now Olmert among
others, are having a very difficult time coming to terms with the exact
same logic but reversed.
That said, Hizbollah is also
vulnerable, despite its claim of victory; the internal Lebanese front
is both shaky and largely infiltrated. Another Israeli military onslaught
-- if provoked by Hizbollah -- will not go down as well as the first
one, and Hassan Nasrallah knows that well. Israel only ‘success’
in this war – of course from its own point of view -- was upping
the ante for Hizbollah by destroying Lebanon and killing and wounding
thousands in the process, knowing well that Hizbollah and Nasrallah
will seriously reconsider future actions against Israel. I discussed
this topic in depth in a recent article entitled: “The Logic of
Israel’s War on Civilians”.
JF: What's been the
reaction in Lebanon and other Middle Eastern countries to Israel's most
recent invasion? Has it only emboldened Hizbollah? There have been reports
that Hizbollah, most likely with funding from Iran, is rebuilding infrastructure
in southern Lebanon. Do you think that these sorts of actions are making
Hizbollah a more powerful force in the region? They sure seem to have
support across sectarian lines.
RB: The Hizbollah’s
daring capture of the Israeli soldiers on July 12 took most Arabs, notwithstanding
Lebanese by complete surprise. Unfortunately, the dread of military
defeat has been so ingrained in Arab psyche that a few expected that
Israel would be humbled to this extent by a small resistance group,
even if assisted with the exaggerated firepower of the Iranian anti-tank
missiles.
The initial indecision and
fear of the Arab public gave rise to a defeatist interpretation of the
war, offered by religious circles known for its loyalty to corrupt regimes.
Some went as far as issuing religious rulings (Fatwas) forbidding the
support of Hizbollah on the ground that it’s a Shia (as opposed
to Sunni) faction.
The tide quickly turned when
Hizbollah exhibited steadfastness never displayed by entire Arab armies
of well-armed legions with extensive political and material support.
Every Arab I know watched in disbelief as events folded in Lebanon.
The best they’ve hoped for is nominal resilience from Hizbollah,
enough to thwart Israel’s overall objectives. A few went as far
as predicting an Israeli defeat. Needless to say, Hizbollah’s
victory has managed to help most Arabs and Muslims rise above their
religious and sectarian divides, and has helped the group re-establish
itself as a formidable political power and a military force not to be
reckoned with.
That said, it’s important
not to underestimate Arab factionalism, but especially Lebanese factionalism
and its feasible role in helping Israel and the US achieve what they’ve
failed to achieve through war.
In Lebanon, a redoubtable
elite, representing various sects is greatly alarmed that the balance
of power -- struck in Lebanon through years of civil wars and subsequent
treaties (fair to some, utterly unfair to others) -- might be hindered
with the re-rise of Hizbollah.
At one point, it was hoped
that by removing the Syrian factor from the Lebanese equation, and weakening
Hizbollah militarily, a pro-American Lebanon would effortlessly emerge:
the old neoconservative calculation. That is yet to happen. However,
Saad Hariri, son of former prime minister Rafik Hariri’ condemnation
of Syria, calling it a greater threat to Lebanon than Israel, just a
day after the end of the Israeli onslaught, speaks volumes regarding
the nationalistic priorities of this crowd.
JF: How is the US
and Israel attempting to capitalize on all this?
RB: They are both hopeful
and actively trying to ensure that a post-war Lebanon will give rise
to a pro-American stance, and that is only possible through undermining
Hizbollah and its Iranian benefactors. Hizbollah understands this well,
and will do their outmost to maintain strong presence both politically
and militarily (even after the deployment of international forces),
notwithstanding playing a larger part in rebuilding what the Israeli
war has destroyed.
In fact, I strongly believe
that the ‘rebuilding of Lebanon’ will become the unparalleled
mantra for the various leaderships in the country, vying for power and
recognition, and those who finance and back them outside. Though their
intent might be partly humanitarian, it’s most certainly largely
political. Remember that Hizbollah is already being blamed by some within
the Lebanese political landscape for inviting Israel’s wrath and
destruction; just imagine, if the anti-Hizbollah forces managed to take
credit for ‘rebuilding’ what Hizbollah has ‘destroyed’.
Hizbollah’s open war
with Israel might be over for now, but the internal conflict it’s
likely to face in Lebanon itself is yet to begin.
JF: So what does
this mean for the plight of the Palestinians? How will Hizbollah's holding
off of the Israeli military effect Hamas and other groups in the region?
RB: The humiliating nature
of the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2000, under intense
Hizbollah strikes effected the relationship between the Israeli army
and Palestinian resistance groups in the Second Palestinian Intifada,
which commenced merely a few months later. I discussed this relationship
in the entry to my recent book, the Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle
of a People’s Struggle.
Those who had advocated armed
resistance to Israeli military occupation were empowered by the Lebanese
resistance; the Hizbollah achievement renewed confidence in the armed
option. The Hizbollah yellow banner suddenly became a major symbol for
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, and some factions, like Hamas
introduced the yellow color to its own banners.
Israel was also wary of the
possible affects of its military failures in Lebanon on the behavior
of the Palestinian resistance; various Israeli army officials, including
Shaoul Mofaz warned Palestinians from expected a repeat of the Lebanese
scenario in the Occupied Territories. This, in part, explains Israel’s
use of unprecedented violence against Palestinians in the territories,
as early as the first days of the uprising, thus sending a clear message
that “Lebanon is not Palestine.” (The Israeli military used
F-15, F-16 and helicopter gunships against Palestinian towns and refugee
camps) ; it also explains why Palestinians upgrading their methods of
resistance, going beyond rocks and slingshots.
Once again, Israel is preparing
to send another clear message packed with violence to the Palestinians
should they feel inspired by Hizbollah’s recent victory in Lebanon.
In fact, Israel might not even wait for a provocation to send that message,
especially as the politically besieged Olmert is in desperate need for
an outlet, a distraction and an easy victory. By postponing its ‘disengagement’
plan in the West Bank, the isolation of the elected Palestinian government
and the lack of any peace initiative (or the interest to start one),
the Israeli government is fully equipped to upgrade its violence against
the Palestinians. Though Palestinian factions, due to the political
uncertainty and the ongoing struggle between the government and Fatah,
might not be ready to change tactics or amend styles any time soon,
the success of the armed resistance in Lebanon shall leave an impact
on Palestinian and Arab psyche for generations.
Since Israel has already
ruled out a just peace with Palestinians, such a realization could only
mean one thing: another military onslaught.
Joshua Frank, author of Left Out! How Liberals Helped
Reelect George W. Bush, edits http://www.BrickBurner.org