Baglihar
And Other Chestnuts
By Zafar Choudhary
26 February, 2007
Countercurrents.org
On
February 12, the Indian Water Resource Minister Saif-ud-Din Soz (a Kashmiri)
was exceptionally joyful as equally was his Pakistani counterpart Liaqat
Ali Khan Jatoi. Soz said it is a “win-win” situation for
India while Jatoi described it as victory for Pakistan when World Bank
appointed Neutral Expert Prof Raymond Lifette delivered his verdict
on Baglihar hydro-electric project –a bone of contention between
both countries.
The 450 MW run of the river
project coming up on river Chenab in Doda district of Jammu and Kashmir,
Baglihar ran into troubled waters two years back when Pakistan accused
India of violating the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. At the time of independence,
the boundary line between the two newly created independent countries
i.e. Pakistan and India was drawn right across the Indus Basin, leaving
Pakistan as the lower riparian. Moreover, two important irrigation head
works, one at Madhopur on Ravi River and the other at Ferozepur on Sutlej
River, on which the irrigation canal supplies in Punjab (Pakistan) had
been completely dependent, were left in the Indian Territory. A dispute
thus arose between two countries regarding the utilization of irrigation
water from existing facilities. Negotiations held under the good offices
of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank),
culminated in the signing of Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. The Treaty
was signed at Karachi by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, the then
President of Pakistan, Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Indian Prime Minister
and. W.A.B. Ill if of the World Bank on 19th September, 1960. The Treaty
however is effective from 1st April, 1960.
In 2004-05 Pakistan lodged
severe protest against India for raising height of the dam, at Baglihar
hydro-electric project, which it said violated the treaty that has weathered
all storms between both countries over past 47 years. The matter came
up for discussion at the Indus Water Commission (as provided under the
treaty, India and Pakistan both have a special commission on Indus Water).
During several rounds of meetings between the officials of Indus Water
Commission from both countries in New Delhi, Islamabad and then site
visit to Baglihar; Pakistan outrightly rejected what India had offered
to resolve the dispute. Following, protests from Pakistan, which were
already telling on the bilateral relations between both countries, India
offered well thought out concessions which included: 1.5 meter reduction
on the 4.5 meter freeboard –a safety device to prevent overtopping
of the dam in event of surging of sudden storm. Pakistan did not agree.
The matter was reported to the World Bank for arbitration. On January
15, 2005 Pakistan rushed to the World Bank with its Baglihar complaint.
Subsequently after consulting the governments of India and Pakistan,
the World Bank appointed Prof. Raymond Lafitte, Professor at the Federal
Institute of Technology of Lausanne, Switzerland as the Neutral Expert
(NE) on 10th May, 2005, to determine the claims.
Pakistan’s request
made on 15th January, 2005 raised a number of Points of Difference for
Expert Determination in respect of the design of the Project on the
basis that certain features of the design did not confirm to criteria
specified in the Treaty. Pakistan contended, inter alia, that conditions
at the Baglihar site did not require a gated spillway; that the spillway
gates were not at the highest level; Indian calculations of the design,
flood and the height of the dam (Freeboard) were excessive; India’s
calculation of the required Pondage of 37.5 Mm was also too high as
the correct Pondage should be 6.22 Mm; and that the level of intakes
for the Power Plant were not at the highest level as required by the
Treaty”.
Third Party intervention
After two years of arbitration,
meetings, spot survey, case studies and wastage of time, Prof Raymond
Lifette has delivered almost nothing beyond what India had offered as
concession to Pakistan. And interestingly, the Neutral Expert refused
to entertain what Pakistan had demanded. India had offered Pakistan
1.5 meter reduction on the 4.5 meter freeboard –the only significant
recommendation made by NE in his verdict. Pakistan had demanded reduction
of Baglihar pondage from 37 million cu m to 6.22 million cu m to convert
the project from peaking to constant load station –contention
firmly rejected by Pakistan.
Both countries have agreed
to a verdict which was already under discussion. Save for the mutual
mistrust between India and Pakistan, the issue could have been resolved
two years back when India had offered to Pakistan what now Prof Raymond
Lafitte has suggested. Prof Raymond Lafitte was appointed as Neutral
Expert by the World Bank which is a signatory to the Indus Water Treaty
and not the guarantor. The settlement described by India and Pakistan
in their battle term phraseology of “win-win and victory”
has been arrived at by a third party intervention. The countries made
their people think that they had little choice but to accept ruling
made by a third party –though neutral.
Baglihar is not the only
water dispute between India and Pakistan and also water is not the only
point of conflict between two neighbours divided at birth for a mutual
animosity ever after. There is politics, there is territorial conflict.
The rejoice in New Delhi and Islamabad over the Baglihar verdict has
made the peacenicks to think beyond the water disputes about the possibility
of a third party brokering. The verdict has thrown some questions: is
this unprecedented agreement between India and Pakistan to agree on
a third party verdict an indication of a mutual will between both countries
on moving from conflict management to conflict resolution. Does this
change in approach points a way to setting a maritime boundary in Sir
Creek by the international cut off date; Can India and Pakistan accept
a UN monitored peace zone in Siachen glacier –the world’s
coldest, highest, bloodiest and costliest battlefield. Though India
has always been suspicious about motives of the West but has shown amenability
to Baglihar; it has to be seen keenly if Pakistan uses Baglihar to make
a way for third party intervention on Kashmir.
The Verdict
During the 18 months of study
Prof Lafitte had five meetings-in Paris, Geneva, London, and Washington
and a visit to the Baglihar site and its hydraulic model at Roorkee.
The Parties made written and oral submissions during the course of the
Expert Determination. The NE upheld the overall design of Baglihar Dam
who also recognized India’s right to utilize waters of western
rivers more effectively within ambit of Indus Water Treaty for Power
generation.
The NE after a detailed analysis of a data base of about 13000 dams
from the International Commission on Large Dams’ world Register
of Dams to analyse the type of spillway, gated or ungated, and a historical
review of construction of large orifice outlets as well as a consideration
of International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) guidelines, held that
the site conditions at Baglihar require a gated spillway, and also held
that in view of the high flood discharges and heavy silt loads, India’s
design of gated spillways-both chute (surface) spillway and sluice spillways,
as well as the number, size and location of their gates for the Baglihar
dam complies with the design criteria set out in Annexure D of the Indus
Water Treaty.
This important element in the NE’s Determination will deeply influence
all future interpretations of the Indus Water Treaty. The NE has observed
that the present day state of scientific and technical knowledge with
advances in technology in dam design, not known or developed in 1960,
can and should be utilized in dealing with problems such as those posed
by heavy sediment which shorten the effective life of a plant. He is
of the view that the reference in the Treaty to conceptual notions such
as the need to ensure “satisfactory construction and operation”,
“sound and economical design” and “customary and accepted
practice of design” clearly not only permit but require use of
latest technology. The NE has adopted the principle of effective interpretation
which gives full effect to the rights and obligations provided by the
Treaty, taking into account its object and purpose set out in the Preamble
which is “attaining the most complete and satisfactory utilization
of the waters of the Indus System of rivers”.
The NE accepts and regards as prudent India’s calculation of the
design flood of 16,500 cumec (as against Pakistan’s figure of
14,900 cumec). After observing that for such possibilities India has
developed all possible methods of analysis specially climatological
and geo-morphological analysis.
The NE observes that the
designer of a spillway is not only faced with the problem of flood control
but also with that of sediment control and cites the “ICOLD”
to note that the state of the art is today that “Bottom outlets
may be used for under sluicing of floods, emptying of reservoirs, slucicing
of sediments and preventing sediment from entering intakes etc”.
Accordingly, India’s design of sluice spillway at Baglihar with
five outlets is regarded as appropriate and permissible under the Treaty
for sediment control of the reservoir and evacuation of a large part
of the design flood and being in conformity with the international practice
and the state of the art. This decision will help India to deal more
effectively with the problems of sedimentation in its future projects
as the NE has confirmed India’s design of large bottom outlets
(sluice spillway) as the most important technique to be employed in
managing the high volumes of sediment which characterise the Himalayan
Rivers. Incidentally, this had been an element of strenous objection
and India, in the course of the Expert Determination, constantly maintained
that India’s design to deal with sedimentation problems by modern
methods does not in any way interfere with the flow of waters of Chenab
River into Pakistan as required by the Treaty Based on the guidelines
of ICOLD, the NE considers that the freeboard could be reduced by 1.5
metres. In this context, it is to be noted that India, in the spirit
of good neighbourly relations, had offered possible reduction of freeboard
to Pakistan even before the process of Expert Determination had started.
According to the NE, the
first objective of “Pondage” is to regulate the flow of
the river to meet the consumer demand. He considers that “Pondage”
volume should be calculated taking into account only the variations
in the load thus confirming the methodology adopted by India for calculation
of Pondage. He disagrees with Pakistan’s method of determination
of “Pondage” i.e. with the objective of operating the plant
at constant power and regulating the fluctuations in the river flow.
The NE has recognized the uncertainties in projecting future load variations.
The NE has arrived at a slightly lower value of 32.56 Million Cubic
Metre (MCM) of maximum permissible “Pondage” as against
India’s design of 37.50 MCM. NE arrived at the lower value as
he adopted a daily pattern of power generation which is slightly different
from that adopted by India. As a result, there will be a minor change
in the schedule of peak power generation. However, the number of hours
of power generation per week would remain at about 49 hours as designed
by India. According to Pakistan’s calculations, the maximum “Pondage”
allowed was 6.22 MCM.
Another point of difference
raised by Pakistan was regarding the elevation of Intakes for the Turbines
for the Plant. The Treaty requires these to be located at the highest
level, consistent with satisfactory and economical construction and
operation of the Plant and with customary and accepted practice of design
for the designated range of the Plant’s operation. Pakistan had
suggested that provision of anti-vortex devices could raise the intake
levels by about 7 metres from that designed by India. According to the
NE, the normal practice is to go for an appropriate arrangement of the
intake structure. In particular cases where this is not possible for
technical or economic reasons, then resourse could be taken to anti-vortex
devices. The NE has also observed that the intakes should be so located
as to avoid asymmetrical flow of water towards them. From his application
of well know semi-empirical formulae, the NE considers that it is necessary
to raise the power intakes by 2 metres and an additional 1 metre to
allow for the slight reduction in “Pondage”. While the Indian
designers of the project do not agree with the NE’s approach,
as it reduces the water seal by 2 metres, no difficulty is expected
in incorporating this change in the design of the Baglihar Plant.
The three elements of design
which require marginal changes, i.e. reductions in freeboard and Pondage
and increase in the height of the intakes all arise from calculations
and not from basic principles.
The NE’s Final Determination
confirms that India’s design has been compliant with the basic
principles of the Indus Waters Treaty.
The Project
One of the most prestigious
hydro-electric projects coming up in Jammu and Kashmir, Baglihar’s
problems run beyond the conflict with Pakistan which though have been
sorted out. The 450 MW project conceived long back was contracted out
in anticipation of financial closure to two contractors –Jayprakash
Industries Limited and Siemens for Civil and Electro Mechanical works
respectively in the year 1999. The initial deadline for project completion
was set for 60 months –which means project should have been operational
by ending December 2004.
Two years have already passed
by; project has overrun its estimated cost by several hundred millions
of rupees. It is still nowhere near completion. The Construction companied
and the government both have announced another deadline of December
2007, but a cursory project assessment suggests that this deadline too
is not realistic.
The project was appraised
by IDBI led consortium at a cost of Rs.3810 crores, but the financial
closure could not be achieved upto the year 2003. Owing to non achievement
of financial closure, delay in land acquisition, difficult Geological
strata and labour problems the project could not be completed by the
due date, says Jammu and Kashmir’s Minister for Power Nawang Rigzin
Jora. Meanwhile the expenditure on project in anticipation of the financial
closure was met from Bonds of Rs.1054 crores raised from financial market
and annual plan outlays of the state.
Another consortium, led by PFC, was approached in the year 2003 for
the financial closure of the project and PFC appraised the project at
a revised cost of Rs.4000 crores and financial closure was achieved
in the year 2004. Revised date of completion of the project was fixed
for December 2006. That too could not be achieved.
A loan amount of Rs.1131
crores has been lifted so far and an expenditure of Rs.3274 crores excluding
financing costs of Bonds of Rs.508 crores have been spent till December
2006 on the project. In July-August 2005, heavy and sustained flood
discharge in the River Chenab followed by sudden draw down triggered
heavy slides on the up stream sloops of diversion tunnel inlet faces
which blocked the diversion tunnels causing the river to over flow the
dam blocks and eventually leading to scouring of the right bank on down
stream of dam side and damaging the trail track.
Later, after series of deliberations
between Jammu and Kashmir State Power Development Corporation, Foreign
Consultants Lahmeir International, Contractor and CWC, the strategies
to tackle these damages were decided and the new date of completion
of the project was determined as December 2007.
The Other Chestnuts
Baglihar is not a case in isolation, there are at least 27 power projects
being built or already operational on Indian side which have been objected
to by Pakistan. Quite often, Pakistan uses its logic of objections on
these projects, under the ambit of Indus Water Treaty, to halt progress
on Kashmir issue resolution.
Pressing with its objects
hard and linking up with the political issues, Pakistan has already
made India suffer tremendously. Over two decades back, Pakistan made
serious objections over the 480 MW Salal projects, on river Chenab in
Jammu province. Pakistan contended that storage of water in dams on
this project could dry the rivers and canals downstream and can also
later be used for flooding of the lower riparian states. India budged
to the pressure and made design change in the dam. The project now faces
siltage.
Actually a flood retardation
scheme, Tulbul Navigation Project too has been under severe resentment
from Pakistan. This project is actually about retaining water of the
river Jhelum, as a natural rise, and then releasing it after October
in a regulated manner. This is used for impounding water from Uri hydro-electric
project and for navigational purposes. But Pakistan insists that it
is a dam –which actually is not. Following objections from Pakistan
laced with too much of politics, construction on the project had to
be stopped in 1987. No significant development after that.
Another serious bone of contention
between India and Pakistan is the Kishanganga project –a tributary
based project on river Jhelum.
The Kishanganga project has
to dam the Kishanganga (Neelum) River. The proposed 103-metre high reservoir
could submerge almost the entire Gurez valley. From this reservoir,
water will flow through a channel and a 27-kilometre tunnel dug south
through the North Kashmir mountain range. The channel will change the
course of Neelum River by around 100 kilometres, which will finally
join the Wullar Lake and Jhelum River near the northern township of
Bandipur. Presently, the Neelam and Jhelum rivers join each other at
Muzaffarabad (in Pakistan administered Kashmir) at a point called Domail.
Through the proposed Wullar barrage project, India plans to maintain
constant yearly flow in Jhelum. Pakistan has serious objections on this
project. As a consequence of this 100- kilometre diversion of the Neelum
River, Pakistan's Neelum Valley could dry up and become a desert.
India has made a significant
headway on resolving dispute over Kishanganga project but Pakistan is
yet to agree to the proposed design change. In a bid to end a long-standing
dispute over the Kishanganga project, India has now proposed to Pakistan
modifications in the 330 mw hydro-electric power plant to convert it
into a run-of-the-river project instead of generating electricity from
water stored in a dam.
The decision was taken by
the Union Cabinet on April 18, 2006, to convert the project into a run-of-the-river
scheme comes in the wake of Pakistan`s objection of storage of 220 million
cubic metres of Indus River water in a reservoir and produce power.
This has been done to end
objections raised by Pakistan that India could not store water (under
annexure E of the Indus Water Treaty). Now the project is sought to
be covered under Annexure D of the treaty. While New Delhi continues
to contend that it has the right to construct reservoirs on tributaries
of Indus and has not violated the treaty, the cabinet decision was actually
aimed at ending the dispute over the project, which was originally proposed
in 1994.
The author is Editor-in-Chief, Epilogue, monthly magazine and news portal
www.epilogue.in on Jammu and Kashmir. He can be reached
at [email protected]