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Co-joined With Kashmir

By F. S. Aijazuddin

Dawn, Pakistan
31 July, 2003

One would have to possess a heart of granite not to have been moved
by the plight of the Iranian twin-sisters Ladan and Laleh Bajani.
Co-joined at the head for all the twentynine years of their common
life, they showed unbelievable determination in wanting to be
separated.

They disregarded an insensitive fatwa denouncing such an operation,
they defied their foster parents, they consciously took the risk of
undergoing a lengthy, complicated operation knowing that it could
result in their simultaneous deaths. And in the end, it did. What
nature had fused together, the painstaking diligence of medical
science could not rend asunder.

Their brief, brave lives though have not been a waste, for in their
act of self-sacrifice, Ladan and Laleh have provided a parable for
others to consider. The Pakistan government for one could learn from
their example. For the past fifty-six years (coincidentally nearly
the sum of the twins' lives), Pakistan has chosen deliberately to
remain co-joined at its head with Kashmir. To some observers, this
diplomatic deformity is a case history in itself, but not unique in
world history, no more than the Bajani sisters were the only
co-joined twins in medical history.

A squabble for political custody similar to the argument over Kashmir
occurred in northern Europe during the nineteenth century. It was
known as the Schleswig-Holstein question, and consisted of a tussle
between the small kingdom of Denmark and its larger and more powerful
neighbour Prussia over the two contiguous Duchies of Schleswig and
Holstein that lay in between.

From 1844 onwards, control of these inconsequential territories
oscillated between Denmark and Prussia with such confusing frequency
that Lord Palmerston (then the British foreign secretary) confessed
that there were only three people who had ever understood the
Schleswig-Holstein question: one was dead, the other had gone mad,
and he the third had forgotten what the original issue was.
Eventually, after almost eighty years of argument, in 1920, a
plebiscite was held. The north part of Schleswig voted to join
Denmark, and the southern opted for union with Germany.

Today, most of Schleswig-Holstein which has a population roughly half that of
Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir is a part of the present Federal
Republic of Germany, and no one except historians can be bothered to
remember why it was ever such an inflammable casus belli.By that
measure, the argument between India and Pakistan over Kashmir would
appear to have many more years to go before a comparable solution can
be found. During the past fiftysix years, though, ever since the
Maharaja of Kashmir's signature on the fateful instrument of
accession on August 25, 1947, almost as much ink has been spilt over
Kashmir as human bloodshed over it. Shelves of books have been
published on it, reams of articles written on it, yards of speeches
delivered on it, millions of grey cells have turned white over it,
and yet it remains a bone of contention between two neighbours, a
bone that is slowly petrifying into a fossil.

Is Kashmir such an intractable problem? Is it really the core issue
preventing a modus vivendi between the two countries? This is a
question that needs to be asked. It is a question that countless
young men and women on both sides of the border, in the dying moments
of their unnecessary martyrdom, have asked. It is the question that
every surviving mourner - every grieving mother, widow or orphaned
child - continues to ask every day that they are forced to live
without their loved ones. It is a question that one billion Indians
and 150 million Pakistanis are entitled to ask, of themselves and
their governments, today and every day, until a definitive answer is
forthcoming. Is Kashmir really the core issue?

To some, if it is indeed a core issue, it is the core that has been
left after the surrounding body flesh has been eaten away by Time.
Today, when the United Nations, half a century after its first
intervention in the dispute, finds itself emasculated, its aged
discoloured resolutions cannot be expected to have retained any of
their relevance. In any case, the outside world beyond the
subcontinent is suffering from Kashmir fatigue. It has heard the same
refrain sung too often, it is over-familiar with the repetitive
rhetoric, the same circular argument. Neither Pakistan nor India
needs to play to the international gallery anymore. They have lost
their audience; the gallery has emptied. Now, they have an audience
of only one - each other.

If Kashmir was essentially a political problem, then three
generations of politicians since 1947 should have been able to
resolve it by now. They have met often enough over the years - Ayub
Khan/Nehru in Murree, Ayub Khan/Shastri at Tashkent, Z.A. Bhutto/Mrs
Indira Gandhi at Simla, Benazir Bhutto/Rajiv Gandhi in Islamabad,
Nawaz Sharif/Vajpayee at Lahore, and the last time at Agra when
Musharraf interacted with Vajpayee. On each occasion, though,
something always prevented consummation.

Was it the force of public opinion on both sides? Definitely not. The
Kashmir question has never been put to the litmus test of a public
poll or a referendum by either side. What masquerades as 'public
opinion' in Pakistan is, in all honesty, nothing more than the
prejudices of right-wing editors of high circulation Urdu dailies.
Because they believe they mould public opinion, periodically they
take plaster casts from that mould and present them as fresh
impressions of the public's mind on any particular issue.
Why does Kashmir remain an issue then? Is there any other inhibiting
factor? Perhaps the answer lies in the question itself. It may need
to be re-framed: Is Kashmir a core issue, or simply a corps
commanders' issue?

One is aware that such a daring statement could be read in some
barracks as a sinister play on words bandied by an uninformed,
ununiformed civilian. It is not being proffered as a provocation. It
is intended as a genuine, earnest attempt to use a pen to cauterize,
even if only at the edges, and to let ink disinfect a wound that
should not be allowed to suppurate for another generation.
Whatever the solution to the Kashmir question may be - a plebiscite,
union with India, merger with Pakistan, independence, autonomy,
acceptance of the Line of Control, continuation of the status quo -
whatever may be the framework of a political or constitutional
settlement, it can only be signed, sealed, and delivered for
implementation after it has also been duly witnessed by the nine
Pakistani corps commanders.

Had President Musharraf enjoyed the unequivocal mandate to decide
Kashmir on his own, he would have done so when he was alone with
Prime Minister Vajpayee at Agra. It is because as the Chief of Army
Staff, he needs to take his corps commanders into this battle with
him, he needs their unanimous support. He cannot afford to rely on a
reluctant comrade, or lean on an impatient successor.

Is any government in Pakistan ever likely to fall should there be an
agreement over Kashmir? One doubts it. Whenever governments have
fallen as a result of public agitation as opposed to when they have
been removed by the military, they have invariably been sent home
over mundane issues like the price of sugar or the blatant rigging of
elections. If the public has choked, it is over such gnats; it has
swallowed elephants like the nuclear programme or constitutional
violations without a hiccup.

There will be one school of thought that will advocate letting the
sleeping dog of Kashmir lie. It has its uses, especially when
awakened. There is a much larger number on both sides of the border
which would want to see this ageing animal put to sleep. It would be
an act of mercy, a merciful end to far too many merciless killings.
Pakistan, unlike the co-joined twins Ladan and Laleh Bajani, has a
choice because its attachment to Kashmir is a deliberate, voluntary
act of political co-junction. The solution is simple. It requires
Bajani-like courage. Who knows? Both Pakistan and Kashmir may well
survive the trauma, and actually thrive as a result. If asked their
opinion, one billion Indians and 150 million Pakistanis would
consider the risk worth taking.