"Out
Of Iraq"
By Kevin Zeese
07 December, 2006
Countercurrents.org
William Polk is co-author with
George McGovern of "Out
of Iraq" and can be purchased on Amazon and at many other outlets.
He taught at Harvard University from 1955 to 1961 when President Kennedy
appointed him a Member of the Policy Planning Council of the United
States Department of State. In 1965, Dr. Polk became Professor of History
at the University of Chicago. There he also established the Center for
Middle Eastern Studies and was a founding director of the Middle Eastern
Studies Association. He was called back to the White House briefly during
the 1967 Middle Eastern War to write a draft peace treaty and to act
as an advisor to McGeorge Bundy, the former head of the National Security
Council, who was the president's personal representative during that
crisis. Dr. Polk is also the author of a treatise on "The
United States and the Arab World "(Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1963, 1969. 1975, 1980 and 1991), "Understanding
Iraq," (HarperCollins Publishers, 2005) and numerous other
books. More information on Dr. Polk can be found at: http://www.williampolk.com/
and in the article below.
Kevin Zeese: Describe the relevant parts of your background,
e.g. connection to Iraq, experience with insurgencies and your study
of insurgencies.
William Polk:
I visited the Middle East first in 1946 because my older brother George
Polk was then the chief CBS correspondent there. On my way back to America,
I stopped for some weeks in Baghdad. I was to return there many times
over the years. In 1951, as a Fellow of the Rockefeller Foundation,
I lived in and began a serious study of Iraq. That resulted in a short
book for the American Foreign Policy Association called "What the
Arabs Think." I then went on to Oxford where I studied Arabic and
Turkish. After Oxford, I taught and did my doctorate at Harvard where
I was assistant to the director of the Middle East Studies Center, Sir
Hamilton Gibb. From there, President Kennedy appointed me to the Policy
Planning Council where I was responsible for most of the Islamic world
and took part in a wide range of studies and actions. I was head of
the interdepartmental task that helped to end the Algerian war and was
a member of the crisis management subcommittee that dealt with the Cuban
Missile Crisis. Through my work on Egypt, President Nasser gave me an
opportunity to visit, travel extensively in and meet the senior officials
in Yemen and then Crown Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia afforded the same
opportunity for me to meet with the Yemeni Royalist guerrillas. During
that period, I also visited Viet Nam where former Vice President Henry
Cabot Lodge allowed me free rein to talk with all the American and Vietnamese
officials. Drawing these first-hand experiences together and reading
widely on others, I made an extensive study of guerrilla warfare on
which I lectured at the National War College. After four exciting and
informative years in government, I resigned, partly because of the Viet
Nam war which I opposed and (unpopularly) predicted we would lose, and
became professor of history and founder-director of the Middle East
Studies Center at the University of Chicago.
While at Chicago, I co-chaired
(with Evgeni Primakov who later became Russian prime minister) a Pugwash
committee on peace in the Middle East, twice lectured at the Soviet
Academy of Sciences in Moscow and participated in various study groups
at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. In 1967, I also became
president of the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs
where I participated in a number of studies of guerrilla warfare including
those of David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan who both began their books
on Viet Nam there.
Over the next few years,
I often visited Iraq and wrote several books (The United States and
the Arab World, The Elusive Peace: The Middle East in the Twentieth
Century, etc.). I visited Iraq a few days before the invasion and discussed
with Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz how it might have been avoided.
I then reported at the School of Advanced International Affairs in Washington
what I thought could have accomplished the purposes of the American
government while preventing the tragic events that followed the invasion.
Obviously, I failed.
But as I read and heard what was being reported, I was appalled by the
lack of understanding of Iraq by almost all journalists and most officials.
With one outstanding exception, a former student of mine, Ambassador
Hume Horan, no one even in Paul Bremer's administration knew Arabic
and had a sophisticated understanding of Iraq. So I wrote a primer on
the subject entitled Understanding Iraq. After reading that, Senator
George McGovern, whom I have long admired as a man of rare integrity,
suggested that we write together the book that laid out clearly and
succinctly how we got into Iraq, what happened to us, the Iraqis and
our position in the world when we did, how we could extricate ourselves
with the least possible damage to ourselves, Iraq, and our reputation,
and what will happen if we do not. That project became Out of Iraq:
A Practical Plan for Withdrawal Now (Simon & Schuster, October 2006).
KZ: Of the
insurgencies you have studied, which ones provide the most relevant
experience for the situation in Iraq? What do we learn from them?
WP: Obviously,
all insurgencies are somewhat different because they arise in countries
with different cultures and experiences. However, there are persistent
themes. Let me tick off a few:
The first is that most are
directed toward getting foreigners to leave. That was true of our own
insurgency, The American Revolution; it was the main theme in the Spanish
guerrilla against Napoleon, the Philippine Insurrection against us,
the Irish struggle against the British, Tito's war against the German
occupiers of Yugoslavia, the Vietnamese war against the French colonialists
and subsequently against us, the Algerian war of national independence
against the French, the Afghan and Chechen wars against the Russians
and a number of others - the twentieth century produced a remarkable
array of guerrilla wars!
A second theme is that insurgencies
seem to follow a more or less set pattern. They usually start very small,
often with only a dozen or so determined men and women. Such groups
are too small to conduct guerrilla warfare so they usually begin with
terrorism. Then, if they are successful enough to gather more followers,
arms, and money, they gradually move toward larger forms of combat,
eventually acquiring the wherewithal to conduct guerrilla warfare.
That form of combat is usually
very difficult to counter because the guerrillas are elusive. Napoleon,
fighting the Spanish guerrillas lost almost as many men (about 300,000)
as in his much better known invasion of Russia (400,000). This stage
of insurgency is a bit like ju-jitsu: it uses the numbers and power
of the occupying power against itself. But it is usually not satisfactory
to the insurgent leaders: they want to move toward parity with the armed
forces of their enemies so they put aside as fast as they can guerrilla
tactics and structure and organize themselves into formal armies. That
was what George Washington did in our Revolution and what Tito did in
his.
At that point, the leaders
often turn on the guerrillas and suppress them. That is what Eamon De
Valera did in Ireland and Ben Bella did in Algeria. They can do this
because they or their movements have accomplished the fundamental aim
of the insurgency, getting rid of the foreigners, so that many of their
supporters are satisfied and want to return to normal life. That, I
believe, could be critical in Iraq once the Americans leave.
A third theme arises from
this. It is that without popular support, insurgents are powerless.
Mao Tse-tung reflected this in his famous analogy of the fish and the
sea. The actual combatants are the fish; they must be supported by the
people, the sea, or they die. Viet Nam is a powerful example of the
failure of "counterinsurgency." There (and in Iraq today)
America is attacking the "fish." We have about 16,000 of them
in prisons today and have killed an unknown number of thousands. These
figures multiplied describe what we did in Viet Nam. But, the "sea"
keeps on producing more "fish." We were so frustrated there
that we tried (as did the Russians in Afghanistan) to destroy the country.
Neither the Russians nor we could do it. What Viet Nam should have taught
us is that the only way to end the war is to get out.
The fourth theme is one that
is most often either overlooked or downplayed. It is that insurgency
is not about military combat so much as about politics. I have a shelf
full of books that dwell on weapons, tactics, even uniforms of combatants,
but very few observers have grasped the central point that all successful
guerrilla leaders have known: either the people are brought aboard politically
or the movement fails.
The last theme I will mention
here directly pertains to Iraq but is also demonstrated in Algeria:
when the insurgency and the counterinsurgency last a long time, both
the natives and the foreigners become brutalized. Pushed further, societies
implode. Algeria, nearly half a century after achieving independence
still has not recovered its civic "balance." That process
is now at work in Iraq. It is a wounded society and will take a generation
or so to return to "normality." The longer we stay, the harder
it will be. And, let us not forget, the costs to us will also rise as
we have discussed in Out of Iraq.
KZ: When
I wrote about "Out of Iraq," the book you wrote with Senator
McGovern and mention your view on violence subsiding after the occupation
ends, perhaps with a brief spike in violence, the common critical reaction
I get is -- "yes, but this is no longer an insurgency. It is a
civil war and when we leave it will escalate. The Shia'a majority will
punish the Sunni minority; they will be supported by Iran and the Sunni
by Saudi Arabia. Thus, this civil war will escalate into a regional
war." I expect that civil wars are not an uncommon bi-product of
occupation because very often the occupying power uses people from the
occupied country to help control the population, i.e. divide and rule.
This can easily develop into a civil war. Do any of the insurgencies
you study provide lessons for the type of sectarian war we are seeing
in Iraq? How do you think the end of the occupation will impact this
internecine warfare?
WP: Of course
no one knows exactly what will happen when we leave. It would be as
naïve to suggest that the next day all would be sweetness and light
as it was when the Neoconservatives told us the Iraqis would greet us
with flowers in their hands. There will be a difficult and bloody period.
We have not been able to stop it with about 150,000 troops in the country.
However, we argue that, based
on what is known of other insurgencies, once the major irritant - us
-- is removed, conditions can be created for a healing of the wounds.
To encourage and promote that process, we advocate a careful program
including a "stabilization force" under the UN working for
the Iraq government to police the major facilities (roads, hospitals,
schools, banks, factories, etc.). This force would not engage in counterinsurgency
and would have a limited mandate so the things that have made an American
presence unacceptable will be lessened.
The civil war, which of course,
is already going on cannot be immediately stopped. We recognize that.
If we look back at Viet Nam, we see that it was extremely bitter during
the American period. As Neil Sheehan pointed out in his excellent A
Bright and Shining Lie, during the Tet Offensive it involved in just
a few days the death of about 3,000 people of whom some where shot,
others beheaded and still others buried alive. In short, it was as bad
as the worst of Iraq today. In Algeria, during the last week of the
war, when I was in Algiers city, some 16,000 people were summarily executed.
Then, when the French out of Algeria, the terror abated and then stopped.
The consensus on Viet Nam was that there would be a national bloodbath
when we pulled out. There was a painful period. Many people were killed
and more were imprisoned or otherwise harmed but there was nothing like
the bloodbath that had been predicted.
It is unrealistic to think
that the Iraqis will be gentler than the Algerians or the Vietnamese.
But, equally, there is no reason to think that they will necessarily
be more bloodthirsty. Much will depend on when and how we get out.
We stress in our book that
much will depend on the Iraqi government. The present government is
certainly regarded as an American creation and will have trouble containing
the violence. We believe that there will be an interval between an American
withdrawal and the emergence of some sort of consensus. That is the
dangerous period. My hunch, based on other insurgencies, is that the
current government will lose control and be replaced over a year or
so but that during this period there will be stages during which the
UN-sponsored stabilization force can ameliorate the worst and gradually,
as a new, more broadly supported government begins to take over, restore
an acceptable degree of order. Local militias, to the degree that they
can be encouraged to work within their own neighborhoods, will be beneficial.
Perhaps most important, as the public works projects we call for take
hold, the socially destructive high rate of unemployment (as much as
50% in much of Iraq) will decline, and as exiles begin to trickle back
to rebuild public health, etc. -- the various parts of the program we
have outlined - piece by piece, people will demand that the gunmen stop
shooting. Without public support, they will become vulnerable.
We are realists and know
how hard it will be to coax the genie back into the bottle, but there
is no other way. The longer we stay, the harder will be the process.
So we have laid out what we believe is the best possible means, given
the very difficult situation the American invasion and occupation has
created. It will certainly not be perfect, but we have sought to mobilize
every possible means to ameliorate the current tragedy and work toward
a better future. As I have said, other insurgencies suggest that once
the central aim, getting rid of the invader, is achieved, enough people
want a return to normal life that there is something with which to work.
Today, and as long as we stay, there is not.
The idea that when we leave,
Iraq will be invaded by Iran, Syria, Kuwait or Saudi Arabia is a red
herring. None of those countries would have anything close to the capacity
we have. And none of them would be any more successful. There is every
sign that their leaders realize this. Moreover, their history and recent
policies suggest that they have no such idea in mind.
KZ: Your
exit proposal contains many parts. If various parts are not met is exit
conditional or will exit proceed no matter what happens regarding reconstruction
funds, a stabilization force or other aspects of your proposal?
WP: If our exit is conditional on the Iraqis doing
what we want them to do, they will keep on fighting. Our intention must
be clear and definite if we want the war to wind down. The best we can
do is to make possible (by helping to finance) what we think are intelligent
moves (e.g. hiring a stabilization force while building a national police
force) and by not helping to finance those that are counter-productive
(e.g. reconstituting a national army which so often in the past has
suppressed moves toward peaceful and representative government and empowered
dictators). Most of the proposals we make will serve the healing process.
We would hope that whatever Iraqi government emerges will see merit
in them, but we Americans must give up the idea that we can tell them
what to do. We cannot if we want the war to stop.
KZ: It seems
that the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Working Group is going to advocate that
a bit less than half the troops leave in a short amount of time (with
the timing currently unspecified). This also seems to be the position
of many leading Democrats -- start a withdrawal process this year, but
without any discussion of actually completing the withdrawal. What does
your experience show you about these types of middle ground approaches
when the occupying country is not ready to face the reality of defeat,
but at the same time are not ready to increase their involvement in
the occupation? Any lessons? What do you think of this halfway approach?
WP: Compromise positions always appear attractive.
They seem more sensible, more realistic, and less dangerous. They protect
reputations. They proclaim progress. But consider one episode in our
past when we opted for this "solution." We were in the quagmire
of Vietnam in 1968 and things were bad. The Tet offensive had shown
that we could not win the war. So what to do? The compromise first Johnson
and then Nixon chose was gradually to cut back our troops as some now
advocate for Iraq. But, the Viet Nam war kept going until our last people
left from the roof of a Saigon building in helicopters four years later.
During those years, almost 21,000 Americans were killed and over 50,000
seriously wounded.
Our plan would, among other
things, halt the killing of Americans which surely will continue, and
probably grow, if we just scale back. Is this a perfect solution? Obviously
not. Is it better than any known alternatives? Yes, we think it is.
KZ: Before
the recent mid-term election a Bush Administration official asked "How
would [the Democrats] force the president to withdraw troops? Yell?"
The Democrats can yell, i.e. hold hearings that show how bad Iraq is,
how poorly managed an occupation it has been, all the mistakes that
have been made or pass resolutions calling for withdrawal. But, all
this will amount to nothing if the president decides the U.S. is staying.
The only real power the Democratic Congress has to direct the withdrawal
is the power of the purse. This power seems to be something the Speaker
of the House and the Majority Leader has taken off the table. Should
it be a power Congress uses? Is there any other way for Congress to
really end this war?
WP: In the American system, the key role of the legislature,
of course, is to fund or not fund what the executive wants to do. The
power of the purse is its ultimate power. It is a crude power and few
legislators will wish to use it except as a last resort.
The legislature, however,
has a second, more subtle and ultimately more important role. It is
to act as the school for the public. It has the authority to demand
and make public information, the lack of which was extremely detrimental
to America in recent years. Such information may be considered something
like a text book for the public; the legislature can use it to conduct
"school." This is what Senator William Fulbright did during
the Viet Nam war. He educated the Congress and the American public.
Something like what he did is needed now.
It is also enormously important
that the press play a role in this educational process. It was a long
time in doing so in Viet Nam and has been particularly inadequate on
the Iraq.
But the buck stops with us,
the citizens: no other agency, neither the Congress nor the press, is
going to do our job for us. We have the obligation to inform ourselves.
Sadly, we are more inclined to watch sports or soapbox opera than the
(few) intelligent programs of thought and information available on radio
or TV. Worse, our school system produces young people who do not even
know where other countries are, much less anything about their politics,
culture or aspirations. As the Roper pollsters found, after three years
of the Iraq war, few young college students could even find it on a
map.
A president can, at least
for a time, obscure or deny objections to any policy, as Johnson did
and as Bush is doing. But, let us be honest: we get the government we
deserve.
KZ: What
should the anti-war movement be doing to make sure this war ends as
quickly as possible?
WP: The
key factor in the protests against Viet Nam was the draft. By using
only the "volunteer army," the Bush administration has avoided
most protests. Few American families have to worry about having sons
and daughters incapacitated or killed unless they choose to put themselves
in harm's way. So new recruits are increasingly drawn from those who
seek to escape from deprived backgrounds.
The Administration has also
shrewdly lessened the pain of the war's cost by huge borrowings abroad
which enabled it to cut taxes. The public so far does not seem to care
that also cut were social services which had made our society more humane,
more fulfilled and stronger.
Initially, it sought to shield
us from disturbing sights like coffins containing our dead which were
virtually sneaked into the country. The public also seemed willing to
have the true horror of war masked or at least cleaned up for it. Television
programs show combat just like we know it from the movies, not as it
really happens in filth, blood and pain, because, as one TV executive
put it, "Americans don't want their breakfasts spoiled with obscene
pictures."
So what to do? There is no
easy answer. But a first step is to face the realities: we have had
over 2,800 young men and women killed. There would have been many more
but for the superb medical technology we have. Well over 20,000 have
been wounded of whom about half will never recover. And additional 40,000
or perhaps many more have suffered severe psychological damage and about
an additional 50,000 have received severe or multiple concussions. Thousands
more will develop cancer or have malformed children as a result of the
explosion of depleted uranium shells (which as the noted biologist,
Dr. Hans Noll has informed me), generate an extremely toxic form of
uranium oxide in the form of U3O8. Dr. Noll says that "there is
persuasive evidence that most of the Gulf War Syndrome is caused by
the neurotoxicity of U3O8 and not by post-traumatic stress disorder,
as claimed by the Pentagon." The victims will pay for these effects
for the rest of their lives - and so will tax payers. I find that Americans
do feel the pain when hit in that most sensitive of organs, their pocket
books. When I have mentioned to audiences around America the costs estimated
by some of our very best economists, between $1 and $2 trillion, that
got the attention of even the most bellicose.
We have a long way to go.
Kevin Zeese
is Director of Democracy Rising
and a co-founder of Voters for
Peace. He wrote a summary
of “Out of Iraq” that appears on www.DemocracyRising.US.
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