The
Bush Administration Manoeuvres To Unseat Iraqi Government
By Peter Symonds
17 March, 2007
World
Socialist Web
Despite
denials from Washington, there are growing signs that the Bush administration
has issued threats to its puppet government in Baghdad to meet US-dictated
“benchmarks” or face the consequences. The White House aims
not only to end the military disaster in Iraq and open up the country’s
oil for exploitation, but to fashion an Iraqi regime more supportive
of US preparations for aggression against Iran.
Associated Press reported
on Wednesday that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki feared the Bush
administration would “torpedo” his government if it failed
to meet US demands. The article highlighted a US threat to withdraw
support from the government if it failed to pass a draft hydrocarbons
law by the end of June that would open up Iraqi oil and gas fields to
American corporations.
In line with its efforts
to forge an alliance of so-called Sunni states against Shiite Iran,
Washington is also demanding a government in Baghdad by the end of the
year “acceptable to the country’s Sunni Arab neighbours,
particularly Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt”. These governments
are concerned that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the emergence
of a Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad have bolstered Iran’s
influence in Iraq and throughout the region.
The Arab League, which consists
largely of states controlled by Sunni elites, issued a statement earlier
this month demanding an end to anti-Sunni discrimination and measures
to enhance the political role of the Sunni minority, which formed the
social base of Hussein’s Baathist regime. The comments provoked
an angry statement from the ruling Shiite United Iraqi Alliance (UIA),
denouncing the Arab League for its “flagrant interference in Iraq’s
internal affairs,” which would “incite discord and acts
of violence inside Iraq”.
The US has reinforced “Sunni”
demands by imposing “benchmarks” on the Maliki government,
requiring a reversal of previous de-Baathification laws, fresh elections
for regional councils and changes to the present Iraqi constitution.
The measures would open the door for members of the Sunni elite to play
a greater political role and resume their posts in the state bureaucracy
and security forces.
The New York Times yesterday
reported that the Maliki government had already failed to meet these
objectives which were due to be completed this month. A Pentagon assessment
submitted to the US Congress on Wednesday said Maliki had “promised
to reform his government, beginning with his cabinet and ministries,”
but there had been no changes as yet. It also pointed to “little
progress on the reconciliation front [with Sunnis]” and modest
steps toward finalising the oil legislation.
At the end of last month,
the Maliki cabinet, under pressure from Washington, adopted an oil law
aimed at ending the bitter differences over the internal sharing of
revenues. But the legislation is yet to be passed by the national assembly,
where it is opposed by two significant blocs—the Iraqi National
List led by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and the Sunni-based Iraqi
Accord Front. Both are demanding constitutional changes to enhance the
position of Sunnis as the price for supporting the oil legislation.
As a result, Maliki is caught
in a dilemma. Any concessions to the Sunni minority are bitterly opposed
by the Shiite fundamentalist parties on which his ruling coalition rests.
But if he fails to meet the Bush administration’s “benchmarks,”
in particular the passage of the oil law by June, he risks the loss
of American backing. “Al-Maliki is committed to meeting the deadline
because he is convinced he would not survive in power without US support,”
one of his close associates told Associated Press.
Officially, the Bush administration
has denied issuing any ultimatum to the Maliki government. “The
notion that we have in any way, shape or form threatened to bring down
his government over this law is simply untrue,” US State Department
spokesman Tom Casey told the media. Behind the scenes, however, US officials
are not only insisting that the “benchmarks” have to be
met, but are actively conniving with Allawi to undermine the Maliki
government and prepare an alternative regime.
Allawi is a former Baathist
thug who broke with the Hussein regime. A longstanding CIA asset, he
was installed as prime minister in May 2004 by the US proconsul in Baghdad,
Paul Bremer III, but failed dismally in national ballots. In the December
2005 election, Iraqis overwhelmingly repudiated Allawi’s Iraqi
National List (INL), which currently has only 25 seats in the National
Assembly. After retiring to London, he then returned to Iraq and is
attempting to make a comeback with obvious backing from Washington.
Allawi is positioning himself
as the mouthpiece for the Bush administration’s policies: opposing
anti-Sunni discrimination, posturing as a “secular” alternative
to Maliki’s Shiite coalition and seeking support from neighbouring
Arab states. His INL, which currently has five ministers, is threatening
to pull out of Maliki’s government if its demands are not met.
In a statement issued on March 1, the bloc warned “it will soon
no longer be able to accept the responsibility of being in this government,
because of its sectarian domination and narrow-mindedness”.
In recent weeks, Allawi,
with US support, has assembled an alliance of more than 80 seats in
the 275-seat National Assembly, including the Sunni-based Tawafuq bloc,
as well as independents and smaller parties. His prospects of challenging
Maliki were boosted by the decision of the Shiite Fadhila party to walk
out of the UIA coalition last week. Fadhila, which has 15 MPs, has criticised
the UIA’s “sectarianism” and is being actively courted
by Allawi, but has yet to join his grouping.
Allawi is also wooing the
Kurdish nationalist parties, which have 55 seats. He travelled to the
Kurdish north last week to meet with Massoud Barzani, who is head of
the Kurdish regional government. As Barzani’s spokesman Abdul-Khaleq
Zanganah told Associated Press, the two held talks on forming “a
national front to take over from the political bloc now supporting al-Maliki”.
The presence of the US ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, at the
discussions was an obvious sign of US backing for the enterprise, as
well as a warning to Maliki.
Just as significant is the
fact that the two men flew to Riyadh this week for discussions with
the Saudi monarchy, which, with Washington’s encouragement, has
taken a more aggressive role in regional politics since the end of last
year, with the aim of undermining Iranian influence. Sections of the
Saudi elite are openly hostile to the Maliki government, regarding it
as little more than a stooge for their regional rival Iran. Allawi needs
no convincing to get rid of Maliki, but Kurdish leaders may well need
inducements and guarantees.
The main objective of the
two major Kurdish parties—Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party
(KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—has been to secure
an autonomous Kurdish regional government and to extend it to include
the oil-rich northern area around Kirkuk. Allawi and his bloc, however,
are calling for constitutional changes that would weaken or even abolish
regional groupings of provinces. At the same time, Barzani may consider
an alliance with Allawi as necessary to ensure continued US backing.
Much of the commentary about
Allawi’s obvious manoeuvring is preoccupied with speculation about
possible political combinations that would give him a parliamentary
majority. For instance, if Allawi fails to gain the support of the Kurdish
parties, the UIA will continue to control the National Assembly, provided
its 113-seat bloc remains intact. Such calculations ignore the fact
that neither the Bush administration nor Allawi would have the slightest
hesitation in ignoring the Iraqi constitution, dispensing with its extremely
limited “democratic” norms and using other means to seize
power.
The World Socialist Web Site
reported a series of articles in the US press last year, beginning in
August, openly hinting that the Bush administration was considering
dispensing with the Maliki government and “democracy” in
Iraq. It is significant that the reemergence of Allawi into the political
limelight coincides with an article in the Los Angeles Times on March
12 revealing that the Pentagon has already begun planning for a fallback
strategy if the current “surge” of US troops in Baghdad
should fail to suppress the anti-US insurgency and expanding sectarian
civil war.
According to the newspaper,
the “El Salvador” option is currently under consideration,
which includes a gradual withdrawal of US forces and a renewed emphasis
on training Iraqi fighters. “El Salvador veterans and experts
have been pushing for the model of a smaller, less visible US advisory
presence,” the article reported. “Some academics,”
it noted in passing, “have argued the US military turned a blind
eye to government-backed death squads or even aided them.” In
fact, the US-backed death squads and savage military repression were
the strategy used to eliminate leftist opponents of the regime in El
Salvador and terrorise the entire population. At the height of the bloodletting
in the early 1980s, over 13,000 people were being slaughtered a year.
Stephen Biddle of the Council
on Foreign Relations argued in the Los Angeles Times that the El Salvador
option would not work in Iraq because of the country’s raging
sectarian civil war. Any attempt to build a plan around training the
Shiite-dominated government forces, he said, was bound to fail. The
obvious solution is to get rid of the Maliki government and install
a strongman who is prepared to do whatever it takes to stamp his authority
on the security forces and unleash death squads to eliminate opposition
to the US occupation.
Allawi certainly fits the
bill. During his long exile from Iraq before 2003, he maintained close
connections with dissident elements of the Baathist security and intelligence
apparatus and has been accused of masterminding several terrorist acts
against Hussein’s regime. After his installation as prime minister
in 2004, he reappointed former Baathist officials to key posts to exploit
their expertise in suppressing political opposition. During Allawi’s
term of office, notorious death squads such as the Wolf Brigade were
established with the assistance of US advisers such as James Steele,
a veteran of the El Salvador campaign.
Allawi is not averse to getting
his hands dirty. In July 2004, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that
two Iraqi eyewitnesses saw Allawi shoot dead six handcuffed and blindfolded
prisoners at the Al-Amariyah security centre in Baghdad the previous
month. The cold-blooded executions, carried out in front of US special
forces troops, were meant as a lesson to Iraqi police and troops that
they could also kill with impunity. No adequate investigation has been
carried out into this brutal incident.