InsideThe
Iraqi Resistance
By P. Mitchell
Prothero
United
Press International
05 December, 2003
"Wait
fifteen minutes," Abu Mujhid says after looking at his watch. Sipping
a 7-UP soda after having broken his Ramadan fast just after nightfall
in mid-November, Abu Mujhid -- not his real name -- has just been challenged
by a reporter to prove he commands a resistance cell that performs violent
attacks on American troops occupying his home town of Baghdad.
It's a critical
question for men claiming to be part of anti-U.S. forces. Most demand
money for exclusive interviews and eventually approach journalists working
in Iraq. These interviews usually end with some unknown man wearing
a kaffiya -- or Arabic headscarf -- around his face, holding an AK-47
and talking about some unverifiable incident in which he personally
killed scores of American troops.
But Abu Mujhid has
never asked a reporter for money. And he sits at a table in Western
dress for this meeting -- one of four he and his men conducted with
United Press International -- his round face clearly identifiable in
a public place.
The conditions placed
on the meetings were that UPI not use a satellite telephone -- from
which a location can easily be tracked by U.S. intelligence -- or cameras
and recording devices. Each of the meetings was after nightfall, in
a public place and the location and timing of the interviews were never
set in advance. Abu Mujahid also disclosed the neighborhood he lives
and operates from but asked it not be identified in the article. He
also said that he alone could be quoted for the story.
Sixteen minutes
after Abu Mujhid told UPI to wait, four mortar rounds fired from a southwestern
Baghdad neighborhood about 3 miles away flew overhead, landing in the
compound of the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority.
"God willing
we hit something this time," he says, wryly smiling. "Our
mortars are very inaccurate. We cannot wait to aim them, so we use timers.
"The American
helicopters come too fast for us to properly use the mortars as we were
trained to. But we are finding ways to fight these helicopters. Before
we would shoot flares at them. But this did no good. Now some of our
colleagues have SA-7s or Strellas (Soviet-era anti-aircraft missiles),
but me and my colleagues have no such equipment."
Abu Mujhid said
he did not want to fight the Americans when they first arrived in April.
"Saddam, I
liked him. He was a strong leader," he says. "But I was in
the Baath Party and I knew that his men, mostly even Saddam's sons,
were corrupt. They stole and stole from the Iraqi people. So I waited
to see whether the Americans would liberate or occupy our lands.
"Before 1991,
Saddam was a strong leader that killed his enemies," he says. "But
the honest people were left alone. If a man was good and didn't involve
himself in bad things, it was OK. But after 1991, because of the Americans
and the war in Kuwait, Saddam became crazy and started killing even
good people."
All decent Iraqis,
he says, felt happy on the inside when the Americans came, though some
Saddam supporters might have felt some sadness, everyone else knew there
was a new chance for Iraq.
"I had always
looked at the American government as respectable until now," he
says. "I had met Americans before and always respected them. I
still do. They are educated, they know how to build things, how to think
and how to work hard.
"They promised
to liberate us from occupation, they promised us rights and liberty
and my colleagues and I waited to make our decision on whether to fight
until we saw how they would act."
But for Abu Mujhid
and his men these things never materialized. They say the U.S. troops
acted savagely towards Iraqis and failed to provide security for them.
"They should
have come and just given us food and some security," he said. "Even
today I feel like I cannot drive my car at night because of Ali Baba
(the Baghdad slang for criminals)."
"It was then
I realized that they had come as occupiers and not as liberators,"
he says. "And my colleagues and I then voted to fight. So we began
to meet and plan. We met with others and have tried to buy weapons.
None of us are afraid to die, but it is hard. We are just men, workers,
not soldiers."
While he says many
American soldiers have offended him and his men, Abu Mujhid acknowledges
some have been polite. Behavior, he says, has saved some of their lives.
"There have
been some that say 'hello' or 'peace be unto you' in Arabic to me,"
he says. "They give our children sweets and do their jobs with
respect. One of these men I even see as my friend. So we were conducting
an operation, about to shoot at a Humvee one night when I realized it
was the nice soldier. I told my man not to shoot him.
"But others
treat us like dogs. I saw one put his boot on the head of an old man
lying on the ground (during a raid.) Even Saddam would not have done
such a thing."
Another incident
soured Abu Mujhid on the occupation, he says. When a Humvee passed him
and his friends one night while they were standing around drinking tea,
the soldiers got out and accused them of having yelled obscenities at
the troops.
"They cuffed
our hands and one soldier kicked me," he says. "Then they
released us because we had done nothing. It was that night I went and
got my gun. The next night I shot the soldier that kicked me. But his
(body armor) protected him. I don't think he died."
"But my colleagues
and I don't hate the American people or even most of the soldiers,"
he says. "We just want them out of our land. If they promised to
leave in one month and hold elections we would put down our arms. I
don't want to kill anyone else. I don't want American to hate Iraq.
I would wait to see if they left."
But the decision
has already been made by his cell, comprised of former Baath Party members,
that Saddam cannot return to power.
"We actually
took a vote at a meeting last week," he says, laughing. "If
the Americans leave and Saddam comes back, we will fight him too. Maybe
if he were elected we'd allow it. But no one in Iraq wants Saddam back.
He turned into a thief and a murderer who made too many mistakes. We
don't want Saddam, but American cannot occupy us any longer."
The anti-U.S. Iraqi guerrillas have a loosely organized command structure
that prevents any one man from knowing too many specifics about the
rest of the operations, says Abu Mujahid, a cell leader for a Baghdad
neighborhood. But while some coordination and support exists among the
different cells, most are left to operate independently and are required
to obtain many of their own weapons.
"We have to
find ways to get our own money to buy weapons," he says. "The
Baath Party members at the top were rich, but I don't think many of
them help us fight. They don't send us money or weapons."
"I have friends
and colleagues who fight with the Army of Mohammed (a cell based in
the Western Iraqi city of Fallujah) and they have more money for anti-aircraft
weapons and explosives. Sometimes they help us, but mostly we are left
to our own," he says.
But one source of
support has been foreigners from other Arab countries.
In earlier interviews,
Abu Mujahid acknowledged that both Syrian intelligence and al-Qaida
members were operating in Iraq against the U.S.-led coalition forces
but denied he received direct assistance from them. But in later interviews,
he said he received support from some people he suspects have ties with
terrorist organizations.
"In my neighborhood,
we have many students from Yemen, Syria and Jordan," he says. "Several
of them give us money to buy weapons and conduct operations."
When asked if he
thought these students were members or supporters of al-Qaida, he smiles
and shrugs.
"How does a
student living in Iraq get money to give to me to buy RPG-7s (an anti-tank
rocket common in the region)?" he asks. "They have to get
their money somewhere. The Syrian ones I think they get money from their
government, but we get some money from Yemenis and Saudis. I think they
must belong to al-Qaida to have such money. But I don't ask such things.
I don't like Osama bin Laden and don't want to fight jihad against America.
The Iraqi people just want the Americans to leave our country."
He has, however,
used the money to send men to Saudi Arabia to buy equipment.
"In Iraq, we
all have the AK-47 assault rifle," he says. "But we need a
high-powered rifle -- like a sniper gun with a scope. We don't have
hunting stores here in Iraq. Saddam never allowed the Iraqis to have
hunting rifles like these because, I think, he feared being shot. So
we have sent men to Saudi -- where they have hunting rifles -- to buy
such weapons with scopes. These guns, we hope can break the American
(body armor)."
Abu Mujahid also
says Iraqi police opposes the suicide attacks on international groups
and the Iraqi police should not support the Americans, but says they
are needed to help protect the Iraqi people from criminals.
"I know that
it is haraam (forbidden under Islam) to support the invader," he
says after a moments pause. "And anyone who does support him should
be killed under Islamic law. But the police protect Iraqis from Ali
Baba (Baghdad slang for criminals), so they should be left alone."
In another interview,
he details how he became the leader of his neighborhood cell.
"When we decided
to fight the occupation, my colleagues and I elected our first leader,"
he explains. "And on one of our first operations we allowed al-Jazeera
(the Qatari-based news network) reporters to come with us. The Americans
were waiting for our attack. Six of our men and our leader were arrested
because of this reporter, we think he was an informer for the Americans.
"Because I
was an organizer for the operation and did not meet with the reporter,
the Americans did not arrest me. So the remaining men selected me to
lead the group. I know our men, of which there are about 10. And I know
one leader of another cell nearby. We both report to a leader who commands
five of our groups. He has a commander, who I know about but do not
know his name, who commands five of those groups -- about 250 men, or
25 cells. And that commander reports to a man who commands about 10
of these groups. I think my organization has about 2,500 men. But I
know there is someone above him. But I only know the names of my men
and two men: the one above me and (another cell commander based nearby)."
"So if the
Americans arrest me they can only get me. If they torture me, I can
only tell them two names of commanders. Each of those commanders only
knows a few names and none of my men or the other men in the cells."
When asked if this
organization was put into place before the invasion, Abu Mujahid agrees,
though he does not know for sure.
"We are told
that Saddam might be at the top of the organization," he says.
"I don't know if I believe that but my colleague has seen Saddam,"
he said. "He comes to tell my colleagues to continue to fight.
But we look at him as a strong leader. But we don't want him back."
But when asked if
he thinks Saddam leads the resistance, he laughs.
"I think Saddam
is too busy hiding," he says. "I think that the leaders above
me are former generals who want to replace Saddam when the Americans
leave."
In the last interview
with UPI, conducted at the height of the American campaign against the
resistance, codenamed "Iron Hammer," Abu Mujahid says his
men had taken serious losses at the hands of the U.S. troops in recent
days, but they had also infiltrated the U.S. military translator core
and hoped to free some of their arrested colleagues.
"It has been
very bad," he says sighing one evening even as American airstrikes
could be heard pounding targets in southwest Baghdad, the night sky
illuminated by bombs and flares of the ongoing operation.
"We have lost
more men to these strikes and in arrests," he says. "One of
our men was waiting to ambush a U.S. Humvee, when he was arrested. He
was carrying a heavy machine gun, which is forbidden."
But the man -- a
guerrilla -- has a permit from the coalition to carry an AK-47 but was
caught with a heavy machine gun. Abu Mujahid says his men paid an Iraqi
translator $600 to replace the heavy gun with an AK-47 so their colleague
can go free. Abu Mujahid expected the man to be released the next day.
But after promising
another meeting and even a dinner with UPI to celebrate the end of the
Muslim holy month of Ramadan, Abu Mujahid has disappeared. Neither he
nor his men contacted UPI after that final meeting and their status
-- whether killed or captured by the Americans, or just no longer willing
to talk to reporters -- cannot be established.
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