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InsideThe Iraqi Resistance

By P. Mitchell Prothero


United Press International
05 December, 2003

"Wait fifteen minutes," Abu Mujhid says after looking at his watch. Sipping a 7-UP soda after having broken his Ramadan fast just after nightfall in mid-November, Abu Mujhid -- not his real name -- has just been challenged by a reporter to prove he commands a resistance cell that performs violent attacks on American troops occupying his home town of Baghdad.

It's a critical question for men claiming to be part of anti-U.S. forces. Most demand money for exclusive interviews and eventually approach journalists working in Iraq. These interviews usually end with some unknown man wearing a kaffiya -- or Arabic headscarf -- around his face, holding an AK-47 and talking about some unverifiable incident in which he personally killed scores of American troops.

But Abu Mujhid has never asked a reporter for money. And he sits at a table in Western dress for this meeting -- one of four he and his men conducted with United Press International -- his round face clearly identifiable in a public place.

The conditions placed on the meetings were that UPI not use a satellite telephone -- from which a location can easily be tracked by U.S. intelligence -- or cameras and recording devices. Each of the meetings was after nightfall, in a public place and the location and timing of the interviews were never set in advance. Abu Mujahid also disclosed the neighborhood he lives and operates from but asked it not be identified in the article. He also said that he alone could be quoted for the story.

Sixteen minutes after Abu Mujhid told UPI to wait, four mortar rounds fired from a southwestern Baghdad neighborhood about 3 miles away flew overhead, landing in the compound of the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority.

"God willing we hit something this time," he says, wryly smiling. "Our mortars are very inaccurate. We cannot wait to aim them, so we use timers.

"The American helicopters come too fast for us to properly use the mortars as we were trained to. But we are finding ways to fight these helicopters. Before we would shoot flares at them. But this did no good. Now some of our colleagues have SA-7s or Strellas (Soviet-era anti-aircraft missiles), but me and my colleagues have no such equipment."

Abu Mujhid said he did not want to fight the Americans when they first arrived in April.

"Saddam, I liked him. He was a strong leader," he says. "But I was in the Baath Party and I knew that his men, mostly even Saddam's sons, were corrupt. They stole and stole from the Iraqi people. So I waited to see whether the Americans would liberate or occupy our lands.

"Before 1991, Saddam was a strong leader that killed his enemies," he says. "But the honest people were left alone. If a man was good and didn't involve himself in bad things, it was OK. But after 1991, because of the Americans and the war in Kuwait, Saddam became crazy and started killing even good people."

All decent Iraqis, he says, felt happy on the inside when the Americans came, though some Saddam supporters might have felt some sadness, everyone else knew there was a new chance for Iraq.

"I had always looked at the American government as respectable until now," he says. "I had met Americans before and always respected them. I still do. They are educated, they know how to build things, how to think and how to work hard.

"They promised to liberate us from occupation, they promised us rights and liberty and my colleagues and I waited to make our decision on whether to fight until we saw how they would act."

But for Abu Mujhid and his men these things never materialized. They say the U.S. troops acted savagely towards Iraqis and failed to provide security for them.

"They should have come and just given us food and some security," he said. "Even today I feel like I cannot drive my car at night because of Ali Baba (the Baghdad slang for criminals)."

"It was then I realized that they had come as occupiers and not as liberators," he says. "And my colleagues and I then voted to fight. So we began to meet and plan. We met with others and have tried to buy weapons. None of us are afraid to die, but it is hard. We are just men, workers, not soldiers."

While he says many American soldiers have offended him and his men, Abu Mujhid acknowledges some have been polite. Behavior, he says, has saved some of their lives.

"There have been some that say 'hello' or 'peace be unto you' in Arabic to me," he says. "They give our children sweets and do their jobs with respect. One of these men I even see as my friend. So we were conducting an operation, about to shoot at a Humvee one night when I realized it was the nice soldier. I told my man not to shoot him.

"But others treat us like dogs. I saw one put his boot on the head of an old man lying on the ground (during a raid.) Even Saddam would not have done such a thing."

Another incident soured Abu Mujhid on the occupation, he says. When a Humvee passed him and his friends one night while they were standing around drinking tea, the soldiers got out and accused them of having yelled obscenities at the troops.

"They cuffed our hands and one soldier kicked me," he says. "Then they released us because we had done nothing. It was that night I went and got my gun. The next night I shot the soldier that kicked me. But his (body armor) protected him. I don't think he died."

"But my colleagues and I don't hate the American people or even most of the soldiers," he says. "We just want them out of our land. If they promised to leave in one month and hold elections we would put down our arms. I don't want to kill anyone else. I don't want American to hate Iraq. I would wait to see if they left."

But the decision has already been made by his cell, comprised of former Baath Party members, that Saddam cannot return to power.

"We actually took a vote at a meeting last week," he says, laughing. "If the Americans leave and Saddam comes back, we will fight him too. Maybe if he were elected we'd allow it. But no one in Iraq wants Saddam back. He turned into a thief and a murderer who made too many mistakes. We don't want Saddam, but American cannot occupy us any longer."


The anti-U.S. Iraqi guerrillas have a loosely organized command structure that prevents any one man from knowing too many specifics about the rest of the operations, says Abu Mujahid, a cell leader for a Baghdad neighborhood. But while some coordination and support exists among the different cells, most are left to operate independently and are required to obtain many of their own weapons.

"We have to find ways to get our own money to buy weapons," he says. "The Baath Party members at the top were rich, but I don't think many of them help us fight. They don't send us money or weapons."

"I have friends and colleagues who fight with the Army of Mohammed (a cell based in the Western Iraqi city of Fallujah) and they have more money for anti-aircraft weapons and explosives. Sometimes they help us, but mostly we are left to our own," he says.

But one source of support has been foreigners from other Arab countries.

In earlier interviews, Abu Mujahid acknowledged that both Syrian intelligence and al-Qaida members were operating in Iraq against the U.S.-led coalition forces but denied he received direct assistance from them. But in later interviews, he said he received support from some people he suspects have ties with terrorist organizations.

"In my neighborhood, we have many students from Yemen, Syria and Jordan," he says. "Several of them give us money to buy weapons and conduct operations."

When asked if he thought these students were members or supporters of al-Qaida, he smiles and shrugs.

"How does a student living in Iraq get money to give to me to buy RPG-7s (an anti-tank rocket common in the region)?" he asks. "They have to get their money somewhere. The Syrian ones I think they get money from their government, but we get some money from Yemenis and Saudis. I think they must belong to al-Qaida to have such money. But I don't ask such things. I don't like Osama bin Laden and don't want to fight jihad against America. The Iraqi people just want the Americans to leave our country."

He has, however, used the money to send men to Saudi Arabia to buy equipment.

"In Iraq, we all have the AK-47 assault rifle," he says. "But we need a high-powered rifle -- like a sniper gun with a scope. We don't have hunting stores here in Iraq. Saddam never allowed the Iraqis to have hunting rifles like these because, I think, he feared being shot. So we have sent men to Saudi -- where they have hunting rifles -- to buy such weapons with scopes. These guns, we hope can break the American (body armor)."

Abu Mujahid also says Iraqi police opposes the suicide attacks on international groups and the Iraqi police should not support the Americans, but says they are needed to help protect the Iraqi people from criminals.

"I know that it is haraam (forbidden under Islam) to support the invader," he says after a moments pause. "And anyone who does support him should be killed under Islamic law. But the police protect Iraqis from Ali Baba (Baghdad slang for criminals), so they should be left alone."

In another interview, he details how he became the leader of his neighborhood cell.

"When we decided to fight the occupation, my colleagues and I elected our first leader," he explains. "And on one of our first operations we allowed al-Jazeera (the Qatari-based news network) reporters to come with us. The Americans were waiting for our attack. Six of our men and our leader were arrested because of this reporter, we think he was an informer for the Americans.

"Because I was an organizer for the operation and did not meet with the reporter, the Americans did not arrest me. So the remaining men selected me to lead the group. I know our men, of which there are about 10. And I know one leader of another cell nearby. We both report to a leader who commands five of our groups. He has a commander, who I know about but do not know his name, who commands five of those groups -- about 250 men, or 25 cells. And that commander reports to a man who commands about 10 of these groups. I think my organization has about 2,500 men. But I know there is someone above him. But I only know the names of my men and two men: the one above me and (another cell commander based nearby)."

"So if the Americans arrest me they can only get me. If they torture me, I can only tell them two names of commanders. Each of those commanders only knows a few names and none of my men or the other men in the cells."

When asked if this organization was put into place before the invasion, Abu Mujahid agrees, though he does not know for sure.

"We are told that Saddam might be at the top of the organization," he says. "I don't know if I believe that but my colleague has seen Saddam," he said. "He comes to tell my colleagues to continue to fight. But we look at him as a strong leader. But we don't want him back."

But when asked if he thinks Saddam leads the resistance, he laughs.

"I think Saddam is too busy hiding," he says. "I think that the leaders above me are former generals who want to replace Saddam when the Americans leave."

In the last interview with UPI, conducted at the height of the American campaign against the resistance, codenamed "Iron Hammer," Abu Mujahid says his men had taken serious losses at the hands of the U.S. troops in recent days, but they had also infiltrated the U.S. military translator core and hoped to free some of their arrested colleagues.

"It has been very bad," he says sighing one evening even as American airstrikes could be heard pounding targets in southwest Baghdad, the night sky illuminated by bombs and flares of the ongoing operation.

"We have lost more men to these strikes and in arrests," he says. "One of our men was waiting to ambush a U.S. Humvee, when he was arrested. He was carrying a heavy machine gun, which is forbidden."

But the man -- a guerrilla -- has a permit from the coalition to carry an AK-47 but was caught with a heavy machine gun. Abu Mujahid says his men paid an Iraqi translator $600 to replace the heavy gun with an AK-47 so their colleague can go free. Abu Mujahid expected the man to be released the next day.

But after promising another meeting and even a dinner with UPI to celebrate the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, Abu Mujahid has disappeared. Neither he nor his men contacted UPI after that final meeting and their status -- whether killed or captured by the Americans, or just no longer willing to talk to reporters -- cannot be established.

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