The
Baker- Hamilton Study:
Pluses And Minuses
By William R. Polk
19 December, 2006
Countercurrents.org
The
most important positive element in the Baker-Hamilton study is to focus
attention on the central predicament of the Middle East – the
Arab-Israeli problem. Like a cancer, this issue has infected Middle
Eastern affairs for over half a century. No American administration
has chosen to attack it head-on. Simply giving Israel a blank check
to do anything it decides to do is not an American policy. Indeed, as
many thoughtful Israelis have pointed out, it is bound to bring out
the worst in Israeli politics. For alerting the government and the public
to the need to do something to solve or at least put into remission
this problem is important and for doing so Baker-Hamilton deserves praise.
However, there are two minuses
on this issue: Baker-Hamilton does not give more than a hint as to what
an intelligent American policy would involve. The only concrete step
it proposes is indirect – to return the Golan Heights to Syria
– in the hope that the Syrians will then help persuade the Palestinians
to opt for peace. As in other parts of Baker-Hamilton, this is to replace
objectives or desires for means to achieve them. The Palestinians have
their own agenda which arise from such issues, which Baker-Hamilton
does not address, as illegal settlements, release of the 10,000 or so
long-term prisoners in Israeli camps, severe and growing restrictions
on the ability of Palestinians to work, move or even remain in their
homes. Land for peace is a good slogan, but it is apparently not supported
in Israel and probably is no longer regarded as feasible by Palestinians.
Moreover, the explicit support for Mahmud Abbas rather than the group
that won the last election, HAMAS, will be seen by most Palestinians
as an attempt to divide them. Finally, here as in the rest of the study,
Baker-Hamilton fails to lay out concrete steps much less indicate what
such steps would require, how much they would cost, what the likelihood
of success for each would be or indicate their cumulative effect. What
they have done is merely to indicate a goal, not the means to reach
that goal.
The second positive element
in Baker-Hamilton is their suggestion that America turn toward diplomacy
in its relations with Iran and Syria.
Baker-Hamilton put this suggestion
in the context of America’s desire to solve the Iraq dilemma.
That is an understandable desire. But it is not a policy. It does not
lay out a means to achieve our desire. Moreover, even the desire rests
on intelligence appreciations that are weak or even unlikely. Briefly
put, they include these:
First, why should Iran or
even Syria wish to assist America in solving the Iraq problem? Baker-Hamilton
suggests that Syria be “bought” by the return of the Golan
Heights which the Syrians believe are legally theirs, but there is little
reason to believe that the Syrian government puts so much emphasis on
getting back the Golan Heights that it would radically alter its policies.
Those policies arise in part at least from considerations that have
nothing to do with the Golan Heights. Any Syrian and most outside observers
will affirm that the lodestar of the Syrian government is fear of America.
Thus, unless or until the United States forswears its often repeated
proclamations that point toward invasion of Syria, change of its regime,
and ostracizing it for alleged support of terrorism, the Syrians have
insufficient reason to help America in any fashion. Moreover, the Syrians
observed that in the conflict between Lebanon and Israel, the United
States treated Israel as a surrogate military force; so, whether right
or wrong, the Syrians would almost certainly require some sort of guarantee
that it will not use force itself or allow Israel again do so before
even considering helping the United States even if, which is doubtful,
it could in any appreciable degree dampen the Iraqi insurgency or put
a stop to the Palestinian resistance.
Iran, similarly, must see
that a solution to America’s mistakes in Iraq is more likely to
be detrimental than beneficial to its national and governmental interests.
The Bush administration has repeatedly told Iran that it is an enemy,
the third member of the Axis of Evil, a suitable candidate for preemptive
attack. Those set out what the Bush administration wants. What has held
back is that it could not carry out such an attack because it was bogged
down in Iraq. Would a rational government wish to help America free
up its military force which might then be used to attack it? Baker-Hamilton
substantiates the Iranian belief that this is a possibility in its recommendation
18 which points to “resources that might become available as combat
forces are moved from Iraq.”
Second, even if Iran wished
to help the United States solve the Iraqi dilemma, could it do so? Baker-Hamilton
not only does not address that question. The probable answer is that
it has far less leverage in Iraq than Baker-Hamilton posit. During the
Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi Shiis fought determinedly against Iran. Moreover,
the Iraqi Shiis are internally divided with many determined not to allow
Iran to determine their agenda. Baker-Hamilton also fails to tell us
what specifically it would want Iran to do. Presumably Baker-Hamilton
wants the Iranians to tell the Iraqi Shiis to do what America wants
them to do, but presumably the Iraqi Shiis do what they are doing from
their estimate of what is fundamental to their interests or even to
their survival. If this is so, it is unlikely that Iran can lead them
to do otherwise. The idea that they are simply the puppets of Iran is
based on an ignorance of history and current politics. Even if Baker-Hamilton
believe America should make the attempt, it does not lay out a plan
specifying what America would be willing to do to get Iran to act as
it wishes. Simply to invite Iran to a conference is hardly a sufficient
inducement. As with Syria, AmericaSyria, it would have to back off –
and get Israel to back off – from its statements and threats on
Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear capacity. Baker-Hamilton does
not address these issues. My own belief is that the only feasible way
they can be addressed now is serious movement toward both general and
regional nuclear arms control. Regional nuclear arms control must involve
Israel which has a huge nuclear arsenal. Is forcing a reluctant Israel
into giving up some or all of its nuclear arsenal feasible for any American
government? Baker-Hamilton does not even raise the question.
The third positive element
in Baker-Hamilton is the admission that we need to get out of Iraq.
The negative aspect of Baker-Hamilton is that it does not realistically
face what that means. What it does, understandably given its origin
and composition, is to attempt reach a compromise. Such compromises,
of which diplomatic history affords many examples, are attractive because
they preserve reputations, cover over mistakes and seem statesmanlike.
Baker-Hamilton’s chosen
move is reduction of combat forces and their replacement by Iraqis.
This is what the administrations of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon
tried in Vietnam. In fact the numbers proposed are eerily similar. But
is this a practical move in Iraq? Was it in Vietnam? Consider where
we are in Iraq, mired down in an unwinnable and wasting war and where
we were in Vietnam in 1968 when the Tet offensive had shown that what
we were doing militarily had failed. Thus, it appears logical to take
steps to adjust to that reality.
In our book, Out of Iraq:
A Practical Plan for Withdrawal Now (which was published shortly before
Baker-Hamilton), George McGovern and I have urged that this be done
cleanly, clearly, definitively and over a six months period. Baker-Hamilton
thinks that it should be done piecemeal over a much longer but unspecified
period. Why? Their argument is that Iraq is in the midst of a civil
war and without the restraining hand of America troops there would be
a bloodbath. Their proposal would cut down on combat forces but keep
a large American training and advising force in Iraq.
We believe that such a force
would inevitably be drawn into the fighting. In evaluating the Baker-Hamilton
proposal, bear in mind that in Vietnam force reduction did not stop
the war: in fact, in the following years as it was slowly implemented,
almost 21,000 Americans were killed and over 50,000 were seriously wounded.
Are Iraqi likely to stop fighting while we slowly reduce our combat
troops but keep a significant presence of “advisers” to
train – or as the insurgents will charge, control -- Iraqi security
forces? We find that hope highly unlikely.
Baker-Hamilton appears to
recognize the weakness of this hope and so urges that while American
combat units are reduced more attention be given to improving the quality
of the Iraqi army. We strongly disagree as we said in our plan. Iraqi
history shows that building an army is a dangerous strategy. It was,
after all, the relative strength of the Iraqi army vis-à-vis
such relatively weak institutions as representative government, an independent
judiciary, a free press and “grass roots” organizations
that caused coup d’état after coup and dictator after dictator.
Thus, in the quest for a short-term solution to America’s Iraqi
dilemma, Baker-Hamilton may have opted for long-term catastrophe.
A less costly, more acceptable
(to the Iraqis) and more likely-to-succeed approach, Senator McGovern
and I assert in our book Out of Iraq: A Practical Plan for Withdrawal
Now is to introduce into Iraq what we have called a “stabilization
force.” That force, we argue, must be made up of non-Americans,
drawn from mainly Arab and Muslim countries, working for the Iraq government
but under the umbrella of the United Nations, with an American financial
subvention. This force would operate in Iraq during the transitional
period, when we can expect the current civil war to continue but also
to gradually wind down. Is this just a pious hope? We think not. It
has happened in all guerrilla wars during the last two centuries. Once
the principal aim of the insurgents, usually to get the foreigners to
leave, is met, the insurgency abates. Not immediately, to be sure, to
meaningfully. During this period, with its sovereignty assured, it needs
help: help to create minimal public security for schools, hospitals,
government buildings etc. which is the role we propose for the multinational
stability force, help in building an effective national police force,
and help in getting the economy going so that the unemployed can earn
decent livings and a significant portion of the refugees be lured back.
During this period, we advocate
that the Iraqi army, on which we are spending $2.2 billion and which
Baker-Hamilton finds (rightly) to be dysfunctional, be converted into
what Iraq really needs, an organization somewhat like our Corps of Engineers.
Such a group could provide the infrastructure on which an Iraqi economy
could reconstitute itself.
Overall, we have proposed
a series of programs to accomplish our objectives, given estimates of
cost, analyzed the chances of success, provided a timetable, and shown
how they would save the American tax payers about 97% of what the occupation
is now costing. That is, we provide in our book exactly what Baker-Hamilton
does not address, a practical plan to get us out of Iraq with the least
possible damage to ourselves, to the Iraqis, and to America’s
position in world affairs.
A key proposal in Baker-Hamilton
is a regional conference. The idea of a regional conference sounds appealing.
We all like the idea of sitting down together and thrashing out our
differences. It appears sensible, positive, practical and “diplomatic.”
But a review of all international gatherings since the 1814 Congress
of Vienna shows that a conference is meaningless, or sometimes even
counter-productive, unless fundamental issues either have been resolved
or at least narrowed beforehand. Merely to meet to discuss an issue
which is worrying one party but not the others, us but not them, is
hardly a recipe for success. Put bluntly, a conference is not the first
step, the means, but the last step, the ratification, of the process.
Baker-Hamilton states that
there are four “alternative approaches for moving forward”–
“Precipitate Withdrawal,” “Staying the Course,”
“More Troops for Iraq” and “Devolution to Three Regions.”
Baker-Hamilton rejects precipitate
withdrawal. We do too. The word “precipitate,” of course,
gives the answer but obscures the question. Everyone agrees that the
United States must withdraw. The question is when and under what conditions.
In the action plan contained in Out of Iraq: A Practical Plan for Withdrawal
Now, we lay out a definite timetable and specify measures, each analyzed
in terms of cost, effectiveness and likelihood of success, designed
to bring about withdrawal in an orderly fashion with the least possible
damage to American soldiers and interests and to Iraqis.
President Bush has repeatedly
called for “staying the course” which Baker-Hamilton does
not favor and recognizes will simply continue the casualties and huge
expenditures without positive result. We agree.
The third alternative is
to send in more troops. Baker-Hamilton believes that this will not work
and will “hamper our ability to provide adequate resources for
our efforts in Afghanistan or respond to crises around the world.”
If we cannot control a small country, most of which is uninhabited desert,
or contain a guerrilla force estimated at less than 20,000 with 150,000
American troops, it is just wishful thinking to believe we can do it
with another 10,000 or so Americans. We agree with Baker-Hamilton on
this. We also point to the history of Vietnam where we were told, time
after time, that just a few tens of thousands more of American soldiers
would bring victory. Victory proved elusive but casualties were ever-present.
The fourth scenario is to
break up Iraq which, Baker-Hamilton believes (in our opinion rightly)
would be a political, military and humanitarian disaster, which, should
it happen, would require that the United States “manage the situation
to ameliorate humanitarian consequences, contain the spread of violence,
and minimize regional instability,” each of which is a likely
result. As Baker-Hamilton rightly points out, the map showing Iraq divided
into three areas is misleading: virtually every town and all cities
are mixed. Thus, a division of Iraq would literally tear the society
apart and would so “balkanize” it as to sow the seeds for
future wars. Certainly, an independent Kurdistan would invite intervention
from Turkey and possibly also from Iran.
Implicit throughout Baker-Hamilton
is that stability must be achieved in Iraq before America can leave.
History suggests that the sequence is wrong: only when the central objective
of insurgents, usually getting the foreigners to leave, has been realized
can “security” be attained. This is the lesson of insurgencies
from the American Revolution against the British, the Spanish guerrilla
against the French, Tito’s Yugoslav partisan war against the Germans,
the Algerian war of national liberation from the French and so on. In
each of these wars, to be sure, there was a period of chaos immediately
after the foreigners pulled out -- they had been unable to prevent chaos
with their massive armies -- but, once they were gone, the fighting
died down. would have to forswear in some meaningful way the threat
of force. And, more difficult than with
Why did this happen and is
it likely in Iraq? The answer was given to us by that great practitioner
of guerrilla warfare, Mao Tse-tung: there are two elements in guerrilla
wars, he said, the combatants and those who support them. He called
the combatants the “fish” and their supporters “the
water.” Without water, fish die. What has happened in guerrilla
war after war is that the people, Mao’s “water,” get
tired of the suffering that is inherent in guerrilla war and when the
object for which they have sacrificed has been won, they don’t
want to continue to sacrifice. So they stop supporting the “fish.”
Then, one of two things happens: either some of the fish take over the
government (which is the most common) and then themselves suppress the
more radical combatants (as happened in America, Spain, Ireland, Yugoslavia,
Algeria, etc.). The second possible outcome is that the combatants become
outlaws or “warlords” (as happened in Afghanistan after
the Afghans forced the Russians out). This is already happening under
the guise of religious strife among Shia and Sunni Muslims in Iraq.
Foreigners cannot prevent this; the only way it can be prevented, or
at least the only way it has ever been prevented or stopped, is by natives.
They can be helped, however, as we have urged in our plan with an international
stabilization force during the period when a national police, no longer
tainted by appearing to be collaborators with foreigners, become functional.
In short, sovereignty is the first, not the last step in the process.
Once sovereignty, not just a collaborationist government, is established,
the steps lead (and can be helped to move with all deliberate speed)
toward security.
That is why the plan we have
proposed contains the interlocking elements that together constitute
Out of Iraq A Practical Plan for Withdrawal Now.
William R. Polk taught
at Harvard from 1955 to 1961 when he was appointed the member of the
State Department’s Policy Planning Council responsible for the
Middle East. In 1965 he became professor of history at the University
of Chicago where he founded its Middle Eastern Studies Center. Subsequently,
he also became president of the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International
Affairs. Among his books are “The United States and the Arab World;”
“The Elusive Peace: The Middle East in the Twentieth Century;”
“Neighbors and Strangers: the Fundamentals of Foreign Affairs;”
“Understanding Iraq;” and together with Senator George McGovern,
the just published “Out
of Iraq: A Practical Plan for Withdrawal Now.”
For an interview with William
Polk "When U.S. Occupation in Iraq Ends the Violence is More Likely
to Subside,” see: http://democracyrising.us/content/blogcategory/74/122/.
Leave
A Comment
&
Share Your Insights