Paradoxes
Doom Bush’s
‘New Strategy’ In Iraq
By Nicola Nasser
17 January, 2007
Countercurrents.org
President George W. Bush’s
paradoxical “new strategy” in Iraq is doomed by its own
contradictions as much as by Iraqi and regional paradoxes and would
in no time prove that the U.S. president’s go-it-alone approach
will only extend the failure of the 2003 military invasion in developing
into a permanent occupation, amid wide spread world and American calls
for withdrawal and political solution.
“The new strategy I outline tonight will change America's course
in Iraq,” Bush said in a speech on January 10; on scrutiny however
the “change” he promised boils down essentially to upholding
the same course but trying to change the tactics; on deeper scrutiny
even the “new” tactics are unmasked as the same old ones.
His speech was more a noisy acknowledgement of failure in Iraq than
a robust declaration of a new strategy for success: Four years on, he
was still unable to declare that “we could accomplish our mission
with fewer American troops” in Iraq; “the opposite happened.
The violence … overwhelmed the political gains;” “Their
strategy worked,” he announced, referring to “Al Qaeda terrorists
and Sunni insurgents;” there are now “death squads”
and “a vicious cycle of sectarian violence.” “The
situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American people -- and it is
unacceptable to me,” he concluded, and took the responsibility
for the “mistakes (that) have been made.”
However Bush stopped short of honestly admitting his failure, though
the “message came through loud and clear;” according to
him the “failure” is not yet the reality of the day in Iraq,
but only a possible threat that “would be a disaster for the United
States” and should be averted. Hence his “new strategy”
to avert the imminent “disaster;” and this was his first
paradox because he could not correctly diagnose the U.S. predicament
in Iraq and consequently he could not prescribe the right course.
“The most urgent priority for success in Iraq is security,”
Bush said; accordingly he resorted to more military force. Of course
the “success” he meant was that of the U.S. invasion and
not the success of any political process that would save the Iraqis
from their disastrous and tragic status quo created by the invasion
itself. Here lies his second paradox: The four-year military failure
has been brought about by the failed “political process”
his administration sponsored in Baghdad’s Green Zone, which houses
the Iraqi government and the huge U.S. embassy, and by the absence of
a credible Iraqi national reconciliation political process.
The latest U.S.-air covered “Iraqi” 3-day military attack
on the civilian Haifa Street, which controls the bridges linking eastern
to western Baghdad, one kilometer away from the Green Zone, was a humiliating
symbol of the failure of both the U.S. military strategy and the U.S.-sponsored
political process. How could this resounding failure be rectified by
the meager increase in U.S. troops by 21,000, which Bush announced,
to accomplish a mission that 140,000 could not accomplish over four
years?
The prerequisite for any credible Iraqi national reconciliation process
is the withdrawal of the occupying forces, or at least setting a definite
timetable for their withdrawal, something that Bush was keen to completely
ignore in his “new strategy” speech, which was his third
paradox.
The Iraqi resistance - which surprisingly was active on the ground on
the first days of the U.S. occupation and all throughout ever since
undermined his strategy - is the integral backbone of any credible Iraqi
national reconciliation political process; Bush has not only ruled it
out of his political process for the past four years but singled it
out as the main target of his new military campaign, thus sliding his
county into the 4th paradox of his “new strategy.”
His 5th paradox is more like shooting oneself in the legs. According
to Bush, the sectarian violence is the source of insecurity in Iraq.
His speech however had no mention whatsoever of either the U.S. or Iranian-sponsored
militias, the major culprits in the death squads, ethnic and sectarian
cleansing, assassinations, kidnappings, random killings and other sever
human rights violations, all which created a hell of an insecurity environment
across Iraq, but mainly in Baghdad.
Adding insult to injury Bush, in his 6th paradox, wanted the Iraqis
to sweep his waste: “Only Iraqis can end” the sectarian
violence, he said, absolving himself of the responsibility for the sectarianism
that mushroomed with the rumbling and roaring of his invading tanks
and war planes to shake the very fabric of the Iraqi society and break
into the peace of their daily life.
Destroying the Iraqi state could not but drive people to seek security
and services in tribal or sectarian brotherly protection, or to look
for them under the protection of armed gangs. In the absence of the
state, destroying a secular ruling ideology creates the empty space
that could only be filled by sectarian, ethnic, tribal and gangster
players. Bush did exactly that; his country should be held accountable
as long as her forces remain in Iraq; only when these forces leave can
“only Iraqis” sweep away their waste.
Bush also set the end of the sectarian violence as the main target of
his new strategy, but hinged its success on “the Iraqi government”
and offered it as a plan that compliments “their campaign to put
down sectarian violence,” thus indulging himself in his 7th and
8th paradoxes. On the one hand he entrusts a sectarian government that
is part of the problem to quell the sectarian violence depending on
an army, police and security agencies that are structured on shares
for the political sect leaders whom Bush brought in as successors to
late Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party. On the other hand he and his
Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, undermined the credibility they
tried to bestow on Prime Minister Noori al-Maliki and his government
by warning them publicly to deliver on their “promises,”
otherwise “America's commitment is not open-ended.” Rice
has stated on several occasions that al-Maliki is “living on borrowed
time,” unless it delivers.
It was only normal that Bush had resorted to warnings to mobilize Iraqi
support for his doomed strategy as a prelude and a pre-emptive measure
to lay the responsibility for the expected failure of the “new
strategy” at their doorsteps.
The 9th component of his self-contradictory strategy is leading more
than 300,000 U.S.-trained Iraqi troops and police and more than 150,000
American troops and Marines to focus on besieging Iraqi cities, towns
and villages and breaking into Iraqi homes and neighborhoods instead
of directing them to defend the Iraqi borders against what he condemns
as the infiltration of “foreign fighters” from the neighboring
countries, especially from Syria and Iran.
This leads to his 10th paradox. If more than 450,000 U.S. and Iraqi
troops are engaged in domestic missions is it not logical to engage
the neighbors, especially Iran and Syria, at least to secure the sections
of the common border with Iraq until the time those troops are ready
to deploy and defend their borders themselves?
Closely linked to this is Bush’s 11th paradox. A success or a
face-saving exit from Iraq after four years of proven failure requires
at least a bipartisan consensus internally in the United States, but
Bush seems determined to go it alone, contrary to the recommendations
of the James Baker-Lee Hamilton bipartisan panel, the advice of his
top generals and the wishes of the majority of U.S. voters according
to the Washington Post-ABC News poll conducted immediately after Bush’s
January 10 speech.
Similarly world as well as regional support is detrimental for the success
of any U.S. plan in Iraq, let alone a plan to turn failure into a success
or to face-save Washington with an exit outlet, but Bush’s new
strategy in its 12th paradox seems to have alienated potential support
both internationally and regionally: Only Australia’s Prime Minister
John Howard offered unqualified support and the al-Maliki government
in Baghdad.
The closest U.S. allies and friends were not forthcoming: Britain was
ambiguous and said she remained on track to withdraw its forces from
Iraq, not increase them. On Thursday, Angela Merkel, the German chancellor,
declined to discuss Iraq with reporters. The French and Spanish views
had publicly favored “broad political strategy” and “only
political solutions,” according to their respective foreign ministers,
as their Dutch counterpart concluded that Bush’s new plan “hasn’t
changed anything.” Italy’s Prime Minister criticized Bush:
“He should listen to the Baker report and to the American public.”
Japan’s Asahi Shimbun warned of his “dangerous gamble.”
The Israeli security expert Chuck Freilich warned of a zero-sum game
that could “splinter” Iraq, “radicalize” the
region and turn Iran into “the regional hegemon.” Moscow
saw that Washington’s “calculation remains the same: To
achieve a settlement of the Iraq crisis by force,” according to
the Russian Foreign Ministry. France’s Le Monde published a cartoon
depicting Bush as a bulldozer driver shoveling American soldiers into
a ditch in the shape of Iraq.
Regionally Bush’s 13th paradox is provokingly seeking the support
of Sunni Arab governments in his new military campaign against their
co-religious brothers in Iraq and mobilizing their anti-Iran efforts
while at the same time his new strategy will only strengthen Tehran’s
hands in Baghdad. “As a key component of the Iraqi social fabric,
the Iraqi Sunni community must be included as partners in building Iraq's
future,” and not targeted, Jordan’s King Abdullah II told
Rice on Sunday, a view voiced also by Egypt and the Saudi Foreign Minister
Saud al-Faisal, as a representative view of the 6-member GCC countries:
A change in U.S. policy toward Iraq was inevitable, “Unity of
Iraq is necessary, independence of Iraq is necessary and peace in Iraq
is necessary,” he said, adding: “None of these have been
achieved so far. There must be a change, of course.”
Rice’s latest regional tour was building on Bush’s warning
to moderate Arab states that the U.S. failure in Iraq threatens “to
topple moderate governments, create chaos in the region;” Bush
held the stick but sent Rice with an illusionary carrot: She tried to
give the impression that Washington could strike a deal with them to
trade their support in Iraq and against Iran for their hope to revive
the deadlocked peace process with Israel. However very few in the region
believe the Bush Administration could deliver now on what it failed
to deliver during the past six years, with less than two remaining years
in office.
Bush’s Paradoxical “New Strategy” blinded him to see
that the threats he warned against in his speech are already in the
works in Iraq and threatening to spill over the borders: The “radical
extremists” are growing and not “would grow” in strength
and gaining new recruits; they are and not “would be in a better
position” to create chaos in the region; Iran is and not “would
be emboldened;” U.S. enemies have already and not “would
have a safe haven” in Iraq and America that “must succeed”
there has failed.
It would be a miracle if “the Iraqi government” could “take
responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces by November,”
a date that Bush suggested to Americans as the date for success or for
a U.S. exit, although he was careful to redress by stating that “there
is no magic formula for success in Iraq.”
Nicola Nasser is a veteran Arab journalist based in
Ramallah, West Bank of the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories.
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