A Black Cat
In A Dark Room
By Malcom Lagauche
11 April, 2005
Uruknet.info
When
one looks back at statements and articles by Iraqis during the period
of 1991 to 2003, it is uncanny how accurate they were. On the other
hand, much of what the U.S. put forward has been shown to be nothing
less than outright lies.
For instance, in
October 2002, the U.S. issued a document called "Key Judgements:
National Intelligence Estimate." It concluded that Iraq was constantly
developing its stockpile of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and, at
times, maintained that the 2002 inventory of Iraqi WMD may be larger
than that of the country prior to 1991. The report included many doomsday
scenarios.
This document was
publicised world-wide. Virtually every daily newspaper in the U.S. carried
it, or excerpts from it. Many foreign countries saw it as well and it
helped convince some leaders who were on the fence about whether to
support a war or not to come aboard the U.S. ship. In looking at the
document today, one would have a hard time finding even one bit of truth.
Even U.S. administration officials admitted it was way off; after the
illegal invasion, of course.
On the other hand,
in November 2002, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Naji Sabri, sent a letter
to the Unite Nations refuting the report. Then, he gave in detail the
standing of Iraq in regards to its WMD. He mentioned when they were
destroyed and how programs were never re-started. The U.S. called the
letter a big lie and condemned the Iraqis for again trying to pull the
wool over the eyes of the world. In looking at the letter today, it
is extremely accurate in every detail.
Sabri's letter received
little attention, other than the obligatory denouncement by the U.S.
Few people read it.
When Iraq and the
U.S. shared diplomatic ties in the 1980s, Nizar Hamdoon was the Iraqi
Ambassador to the U.S. In Washington, he was well-regarded and built
many friendships. In the 1990s, with no diplomatic ties between the
two countries, Hamdoon was called back to action and served as the Iraqi
Ambassador to the U.N. In 2000, he was replaced and called back to Baghdad
to serve in the Foreign Service.
Hamdoon was very
visible in the U.S. and many people remember him from television appearances,
although he was usually lambasted by interviewers. His was a lonely
job. On July 4, 2003, a few months after the illegal U.S. invasion of
Iraq, Hamdoon died of cancer.
Let's to back to
the latter part of 1998. The U.S. was accusing Iraq of concealing the
most deadly chemicals on Earth and in December, Clinton ordered the
bombing of Iraq and called the procedure Operation Desert Fox. Most
people remember this as the "Iraq/U.N. standoff." Even the
method of removing the inspectors from Iraq was a lie. The U.N. ordered
the inspectors from Iraq a few days before the bombing, yet the U.S.
always stated that Saddam Hussein kicked them out.
During this time,
Nizar Hamdoon wrote an op-ed piece for the New York Times called "A
Black Cat in a Dark Room." The paper carried it, yet few people
took it seriously. Go back to the time and refresh your memory and you
will see how exact and precise Hamdoon was in his assessment. He did
not lie, yet few listened.
"A BLACK CAT
IN A DARK ROOM" by Nizar Hamdoon
Much has been said
and published about recent standoffs between Iraq and the United Nations
arms inspectors. But those criticizing Iraq for suspending its cooperation
with the United Nations special commission on arms inspection, better
known as Unscom, give no recognition whatsoever to the underlying reason
that led Iraq to adopt this position. It is time to set the record straight.
First, the whole
world knows by now that Iraq has lost well over a million of its people
as a direct result of the sanctions that have been in place for eight
years. A former president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, was
chillingly correct when he called sanctions a "peaceful, silent
and deadly remedy." U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
herself characterized them as "the toughest multilateral sanctions
in history." Many critics seem to think the government of Iraq
is supposed to stand idle while watching a whole generation of its people
melt away like snowflakes.
Second, Iraq has
complied with all the fundamental requirements of disarmament in Security
Council Resolution 687. Unscom itself admitted this reality in its April
11, 1997 report to the Security Council when it said, "The accumulated
effect of the work that has been accomplished over six years since the
cease fire went into effect between Iraq and the coalition is such that
not much is unknown about Iraq's proscribed weapons capabilities."
But the United States and Britain refuse to recognize this fact. Their
role in preventing the Security Council from closing the clearly done
nuclear file a few months ago is a case in point.
The disagreement
between Iraq and the inspectors is not on existing weapons. No weapons
or sites have been discovered by the Unscom inspectors on their own
since 1991. Those that have been found have been produced by the Iraqi
government itself. Rather, the recent disputes involve paper documentation
that precedes the gulf war. Those issues can be pursued in the context
of the already established ongoing monitoring regime.
There are two main
questions that need to be asked when assessing Iraq's compliance with
disarmament requirements: does Iraq still possess proscribed weapons
or the means to produce them, and is the monitoring process working?
The answer is no to the first, yes to the second. Unscom's allegations
about documentation are nothing but excuses to manufacture a crisis
whenever one is needed to prolong the sanctions.
Iraq has said all
along that there must be a creative way to reconcile the two goals:
the need for more documentation and the easing of the suffering of the
Iraqi people. Unscom, unfortunately, is insisting on everything or nothing.
Iraq will never
be able to satisfy Unscom because it is being asked to prove the negative:
that it does not have any more weapons. There is, of course, no way
Iraq can prove that it has nothing if it has nothing. How many more
Iraqis will have to die because Richard Butler's team has not yet found
another document, which cannot be located because there is no such document
in the first place? The inspectors are searching for a black cat in
a dark room where the cat does not exist.
Third, many American
officials have stated that even if Iraq complies with the Security Council's
resolutions, the United States will not approve the lifting of sanctions.
The declared goal of Washington is to remove the current government
of Iraq. We wonder of this goal is in line with the letter and spirit
of international law and the United Nations resolutions. Iraq continues
to believe that the resolutions are used by the United States as a cover
for an illegal political agenda. The allocation of money to the Central
Intelligence Agency for subversion in Iraq is just a unit in this series.
One might wonder why Iraq should continue being part of this futile
and endless game.
Fourth, Ms. Albright
claims that every Iraqi receives a daily ration basket equivalent to
the recommended caloric intake of the average American. Perhaps she
needs to review the latest reports by the United Nations and other organizations
which state that millions of Iraqi children and women are still suffering
and that the oil-for-food program is not adequate. For instance, the
1998 World Disaster Report by the International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies described Iraq as a country under siege and
said 16 to 27 percent of the population is malnourished.
Finally, many high-ranking
American officials keep speaking about Iraq as being a threat to American
interests and the region. We would like to assure these officials, and
through them the American people, that Iraqi is eager to live in peace
with its neighbors and the world. But Iraq will not submit to intimidation,
bullying and coercion. Peace will come only through dialogue based on
mutual respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty and the
observance of international law.