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Exporting The Islamic
RevolutionTo Iraq

By Michael Jansen

The Jordan Times
05 December, 2003

George W. Bush may be on the way to transforming Iraq into an Islamic state modelled on the Iranian system of “valayet-e-faqih”, rule of the jurisprudence. This became clear on Nov. 29 when Iraqi Shiite Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani issued a “fatwa”, or religious ruling, which opposes the step-by-step plan for the hand over to Iraqi governance, put forward by the US occupation administrator L. Paul Bremer III on Nov. 15. This plan envisages the adoption of a “basic law” and the convening of local caucuses to choose representatives to a national assembly which would select a provisional government. This would rule until a new constitution can be drafted and elections for a democratic government held.

In a two-part “fatwa”, the septuagenarian Sistani said that the basic law should be “presented to the [elected] representatives of the Iraqi people for their approval” and called for elections to the proposed assembly with voters presenting ration cards for identification. Sistani had previously said the basic law should reflect Iraq's Islamic identity and stipulated that legislation should not contradict Islam. Since he is the only figure in a position to make such determinations, the fatwa amounted to a declaration of intent to not only remain involved but also to expand his role in the political process.

In July, Sistani issued his first postwar fatwa, demanding that members of a constitutional commission be elected. Bremer ignored the fatwa for several months, but eventually had to scrap his original strategy which involved the appointment of a commission to draft a constitution, the holding of a referendum on the text, elections and the transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi government.

Iran-born Sistani has emerged as the most powerful political figure in the country because he commands the loyalty and respect of the majority of the Shiites, 60 per cent of the populace. Although he has refused to endorse the war and occupation and to meet US officials, he has called upon Shiites to give the US time to deliver democracy and reconstruct the country. If the ayatollah called for popular Shiite resistance, the US and its allies would find their occupation untenable.

Sistani, a devout and learned man belonging to the “quietist” school of Shiite thought which holds that clerics should not engage in politics, has been thrust into a key role by the uncertain postwar situation. He must also prevent Shiites from turning to his rival, Muqtada Sadr, a rabble-rousing preacher who calls for the prompt end to the occupation and withdrawal of US forces, a policy which could precipitate all-out war between occupiers and occupied. Sadr's followers are accused of murdering a pro-Western cleric and attempting to kill a grand ayatollah. They have also fought pro-Sistani elements in the streets of the holy city of Najaf for control of mosques and funds.

Sistani opposes, in principle, the installation in Iraq of the “valayet-e-faqih”. On this issue he differs from Sadr, Abdel Aziz Hakim, head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and several other Shiite leaders. Under this system, a clerical superstructure, holding the levers of power and vetting all decisions and laws, has been imposed on Iran's elected president and parliament. This system has not been a success in Iran. It has given the conservative clerics ultimate authority and put them at odds with the Iranian people and their elected representatives who have, over the past six years, tried and failed to liberalise the social system and adopt the rule of law and democratic institutions. As a result, Iran has suffered from a struggle for power between conservatives and reformists, which has prevented the country from moving forward on the social, political and economic fronts and has given rise to popular frustration with the entire clerical caste and the polity created by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979.

Nevertheless, in practice, Sistani had to accept the assumption of power by an informal “valayet-e-faqih” as the only way to proceed in the current political vacuum. Therefore, Sistani has, unofficially, taken over the role of Supreme Guide which is formally held in Iran by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. If this trend continues, the Iraqi Shiite Hawza, the theological institution based in Najaf, could come to exercise the responsibilities performed in Iran by the Council of Guardians and the Expediency Council.

Sistani's latest fatwa forced Bremer to see what is happening. By indirectly consulting the ayatollah on policy, Bremer had given him both a veto and the right of approval. Having recognised where Iraq is headed, Bremer has attempted to back away from his previous practice of listening to what Sistani has to say on key policy issues. But having lent an ear in the first place, Bremer is finding it difficult to ignore the grand ayatollah. Some members of Iraq's appointed Governing Council, which had followed Bremer's lead, also recognised the danger that Sistani could marginalise the council and deprive it of the limited powers it possesses.

Although Shiite members belonging to parties with a religious background are inclined to accept Sistani's authority, the majority is not. However, division on this issue could weaken the council, strengthening Sistani.

Fifteen years after the end of the eight-year war which halted Iran's attempt to export its Islamic revolution to Iraq by subverting that country's Shiite majority, Bush could very well be in the process of installing in Iraq the very Iran-style “valayet-e-faqih” Khomeini had in mind. If Sistani becomes the key power-broker in Iraq, this means the million soldiers and civilians who lost their lives on both sides in the Iraq-Iran conflict may have died in vain and the tens of billions of dollars spent by Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to halt the export of the Iranian revolution were wasted.

It also means that Washington, sooner rather than later, had better reconcile and seek rapprochement with Tehran, the regional Shiite power. Bush had also better stop characterising Iran as part of his “axis of evil”. Even if Bremer and the Iraqi Governing Council manage to contain Sistani and prevent the planting of a “valayet-e-faqih”, the grand ayatollah and the Hawza will remain key players on the Iraqi political scene. Therefore, it would be wise if Bush and the anti-Tehran neoconservatives in his administration dropped the feud with Tehran which began when Ayatollah Khomeini overthrew the Shah in 1979.