Hearts and Minds:
Post-war Civilian Deaths In Baghdad
Caused By U.S. Forces
Report By Human
Rights Watch
To Read The Full Report Clik
HERE
This
report documents and analyzes civilian deaths caused by U.S. military
forces in Baghdad since U.S. President George W. Bush declared an end
to hostilities in Iraq on May 1, 2003. It is based on research in Baghdad
from September 18-30, and follow-up research on October 5 and 9. During
that time, Human Rights Watch interviewed the witnesses to civilian
deaths, family members of the deceased, victims who were non-lethal
casualties, Iraqi police, lawyers and human rights activists, U.S. soldiers,
officers from the U.S. Army Judge Advocate Generals office (JAG)
and members of the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), responsible
for governing Iraq.
The U.S. military
with responsibility for security in Baghdad is not deliberately targeting
civilians. Neither is it doing enough to minimize harm to civilians
as required by international law. Iraq is clearly a hostile environment
for U.S. troops, with daily attacks by Iraqis or others opposed to the
U.S. and coalition occupation. But such an environment does not absolve
the military from its obligations to use force in a restrained, proportionate
and discriminate manner, and only when strictly necessary.
The U.S. military
keeps no statistics on civilian casualties, telling Human Rights Watch
that it was impossible for us to maintain an accurate account.
Such an attitude suggests that civilian casualties are not a paramount
concern.
Based on interviews
with witnesses and family members, Human Rights Watch confirmed the
deaths of twenty Iraqi civilians in Baghdad in legally questionable
circumstances between May 1 and September 30. Eighteen of these deaths
are documented in this report. In addition, Human Rights Watch collected
data on civilian deaths by U.S. forces from the Iraqi police, human
rights organizations, Western media and U.S military statements on the
topic. In total, Human Rights Watch estimates the U.S. military killed
ninety-four civilians in questionable circumstances. Human Rights Watch
did not verify each of these individual cases but, taken as a whole,
they reveal a pattern of alleged illegal deaths that merit investigation.
As of October 1,
2003, the U.S. military had acknowledged completing only five investigations
above the division level into alleged unlawful killings of civilians.
In four of those incidents, the soldiers were found to have operated
within the U.S. militarys rules of engagement. In the fifth case,
a helicopter pilot and his commander face disciplinary action for removing
a Shi`a banner from a tower in al-Sadr City, which led to an armed altercation
with demonstrators. A sixth investigation is ongoing: the killing of
eight Iraqi policemen and one Jordanian guard by soldiers of the 82nd
Airborne Division in al-Falluja on September 12.
The individual cases
of civilian deaths documented in this report reveal a pattern by U.S.
forces of over-aggressive tactics, indiscriminate shooting in residential
areas and a quick reliance on lethal force. In some cases, U.S. forces
faced a real threat, which gave them the right to respond with force.
But that response was sometimes disproportionate to the threat or inadequately
targeted, thereby harming civilians or putting them at risk.
In Baghdad, civilian
deaths can be categorized in three basic incident groups. First are
deaths that occur during U.S. military raids on homes in search of arms
or resistance fighters. The U.S. military says it has begun using less
aggressive tactics, and is increasingly taking Iraqi police with them
on raids. But Baghdad residents still complained of aggressive and reckless
behavior, physical abuse, and theft by U.S. troops. When U.S. soldiers
encountered armed resistance from families who thought they were acting
in self-defense against thieves, they sometimes resorted to overwhelming
force, killing family members, neighbors or passers-by.
Second are civilian
deaths caused by U.S. soldiers who responded disproportionately and
indiscriminately after they have come under attack at checkpoints or
on the road. Human Rights Watch documented cases where, after an improvised
explosive device detonated near a U.S. convoy, soldiers fired high caliber
weapons in multiple directions, injuring and killing civilians who were
nearby.
Third are killings
at checkpoints when Iraqi civilians failed to stop. U.S. checkpoints
constantly shift throughout Baghdad, and are sometimes not well marked,
although sign visibility is improving. A dearth of Arabic interpreters
and poor understanding of Iraqi hand gestures cause confusion, with
results that are sometimes fatal for civilians. Soldiers sometimes shout
conflicting instructions in English with their guns raised: Stay
in the car! or Get out of the car!
In all of these
scenarios, U.S. soldiers can be arrogant and abusive. They have been
seen putting their feet on detained Iraqis headsa highly
insulting offense. Male soldiers sometimes touch or even search female
Iraqis, also a culturally unacceptable act.
Of course, not all
soldiers behave in this way. Human Rights Watch met many U.S. military
personnel who dealt respectfully with Iraqis and were working hard to
train police, guard facilities and pursue criminals. Some of these soldiers
expressed frustration at the lack of sensitivity shown by their colleagues.
It takes a while to get the Rambo stuff out, one officer
told Human Rights Watch.
In general, U.S.
military police in Baghdad seem better suited for the post-conflict
law enforcement tasks required by military occupation. More problematic
were combat units like the 82nd Airborne Division and the 1st Armored
Division, who have been called upon to provide services for which they
are not adequately trained or attitudinally prepared. Human Rights Watch
documented eight Baghdad incidents involving these two divisions in
which sixteen civilians died. Many of these soldiers fought their way
into Iraq, and are now being asked to switch without proper preparation
from warriors to police who control crowds, pursue thieves and root
out insurgents. Military officials told Human Rights Watch they recognized
the problem and were providing extra training. Their declared aim is
to hand over policing functions to Iraqi security forces, but these
institutions are still being built.
A central problem
is the lack of accountability for U.S. soldiers and commanders in Iraq.
According to CPA Regulation Number 17, Iraqi courts cannot prosecute
coalition soldiers, so it is the responsibility of the participating
coalition countries to investigate allegations of excessive force and
unlawful killings, and to hold accountable soldiers and commanders found
to have violated domestic military codes or international humanitarian
law. The lack of timely and thorough investigations into many questionable
incidents has created an atmosphere of impunity, in which many soldiers
feel they can pull the trigger without coming under review.
Human Rights Watch
welcomes the five investigations conducted thus far, but has reservations
about some of the findings. Two of the five cases are documented in
this report, and the evidence suggests that U.S. soldiers used excessive
lethal force. There are also many questionable civilian deaths for which
no investigation has taken place. The most notable example is the killing
of up to twenty people by the 82nd Airborne in al-Falluja on April 28
and 30, documented in a May Human Rights Watch report, Violent Response:
the U.S. Army in al-Falluja.
At the same time,
some steps have been taken to reduce civilian deaths. Checkpoints are
more clearly marked and some combat troops have received additional
training for police tasks. Iraqi police are more frequently escorting
U.S. soldiers on raids.
But more initiatives
are required. Basic language and cultural training to teach soldiers
hand gestures used and understood by Iraqis and essential Arabic words
and phrases would minimize confusion at checkpoints or during raids.
Soldiers should know that placing a foot on the head of a person forced
to lie on the ground is a grave insult. Combat troops should receive
additional training in post-conflict policing, as was provided to the
1st Armored Division.
The rules of engagement
are not made public due to security concerns. But Iraqi civilians have
a right to know the guidelines for safe behavior. The coalition should
mark all checkpoints clearly, for instance, and inform Iraqis through
a public service campaign of how to approach checkpoints and how to
behave during raids.
Of central importance
are prompt investigations of and punishment for all inappropriate or
illegal use of force, as required under international law. U.S. soldiers
at present operate with virtual impunity in Iraq. Knowledge that they
will be held accountable will be an effective restraint on the excessive,
indiscriminate, or reckless use of lethal force.