Divide
And Rule - America's
Plan For Baghdad
By Robert Fisk
11 April 2007
The
Independent
Faced
with an ever-more ruthless insurgency in Baghdad - despite President
George Bush's "surge" in troops - US forces in the city are
now planning a massive and highly controversial counter-insurgency operation
that will seal off vast areas of the city, enclosing whole neighbourhoods
with barricades and allowing only Iraqis with newly issued ID cards
to enter.
The campaign of "gated
communities" - whose genesis was in the Vietnam War - will involve
up to 30 of the city's 89 official districts and will be the most ambitious
counter-insurgency programme yet mounted by the US in Iraq.
The system has been used
- and has spectacularly failed - in the past, and its inauguration in
Iraq is as much a sign of American desperation at the country's continued
descent into civil conflict as it is of US determination to "win"
the war against an Iraqi insurgency that has cost the lives of more
than 3,200 American troops. The system of "gating" areas under
foreign occupation failed during the French war against FLN insurgents
in Algeria and again during the American war in Vietnam. Israel has
employed similar practices during its occupation of Palestinian territory
- again, with little success.
But the campaign has far
wider military ambitions than the pacification of Baghdad. It now appears
that the US military intends to place as many as five mechanised brigades
- comprising about 40,000 men - south and east of Baghdad, at least
three of them positioned between the capital and the Iranian border.
This would present Iran with a powerful - and potentially aggressive
- American military force close to its border in the event of a US or
Israeli military strike against its nuclear facilities later this year.
The latest "security"
plan, of which The Independent has learnt the details, was concocted
by General David Petraeus, the current US commander in Baghdad, during
a six-month command and staff course at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas.
Those attending the course - American army generals serving in Iraq
and top officers from the US Marine Corps, along with, according to
some reports, at least four senior Israeli officers - participated in
a series of debates to determine how best to "turn round"
the disastrous war in Iraq.
The initial emphasis of the
new American plan will be placed on securing Baghdad market places and
predominantly Shia Muslim areas. Arrests of men of military age will
be substantial. The ID card project is based upon a system adopted in
the city of Tal Afar by General Petraeus's men - and specifically by
Colonel H R McMaster, of the 3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment - in early
2005, when an eight-foot "berm" was built around the town
to prevent the movement of gunmen and weapons. General Petraeus regarded
the campaign as a success although Tal Afar, close to the Syrian border,
has since fallen back into insurgent control.
So far, the Baghdad campaign
has involved only the creation of a few US positions within several
civilian areas of the city but the new project will involve joint American
and Iraqi "support bases" in nine of the 30 districts to be
"gated" off. From these bases - in fortified buildings - US-Iraqi
forces will supposedly clear militias from civilian streets which will
then be walled off and the occupants issued with ID cards. Only the
occupants will be allowed into these "gated communities" and
there will be continuous patrolling by US-Iraqi forces. There are likely
to be pass systems, "visitor" registration and restrictions
on movement outside the "gated communities". Civilians may
find themselves inside a "controlled population" prison.
In theory, US forces can
then concentrate on providing physical reconstruction in what the military
like to call a "secure environment". But insurgents are not
foreigners, despite the presence of al-Qa'ida in Iraq. They come from
the same population centres that will be "gated" and will,
if undiscovered, hold ID cards themselves; they will be "enclosed"
with everyone else.
A former US officer in Vietnam
who has a deep knowledge of General Petraeus's plans is sceptical of
the possible results. "The first loyalty of any Sunni who is in
the Iraqi army is to the insurgency," he said. "Any Shia's
first loyalty is to the head of his political party and its militia.
Any Kurd in the Iraqi army, his first loyalty is to either Barzani or
Talabani. There is no independent Iraqi army. These people really have
no choice. They are trying to save their families from starvation and
reprisal. At one time they may have believed in a unified Iraq. At one
time they may have been secular. But the violence and brutality that
started with the American invasion has burnt those liberal ideas out
of people ... Every American who is embedded in an Iraqi unit is in
constant mortal danger."
The senior generals who constructed
the new "security" plan for Baghdad were largely responsible
for the seminal - but officially "restricted" - field manual
on counter-insurgency produced by the Department of the Army in December
of last year, code-numbered FM 3-24. While not specifically advocating
the "gated communities" campaign, one of its principles is
the unification of civilian and military activities, citing "civil
operations and revolutionary development support teams" in South
Vietnam, assistance to Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq in 1991 and
the "provincial reconstruction teams" in Afghanistan - a project
widely condemned for linking military co-operation and humanitarian
aid.
FM 3-24 is harsh in its analysis
of what counter-insurgency forces must do to eliminate violence in Iraq.
"With good intelligence," it says, "counter-insurgents
are like surgeons cutting out cancerous tissue while keeping other vital
organs intact." But another former senior US officer has produced
his own pessimistic conclusions about the "gated" neighbourhood
project.
"Once the additional
troops are in place the insurrectionists will cut the lines of communication
from Kuwait to the greatest extent they are able," he told The
Independent. "They will do the same inside Baghdad, forcing more
use of helicopters. The helicopters will be vulnerable coming into the
patrol bases, and the enemy will destroy as many as they can. The second
part of their plan will be to attempt to destroy one of the patrol bases.
They will begin that process by utilising their people inside the 'gated
communities' to help them enter. They will choose bases where the Iraqi
troops either will not fight or will actually support them.
"The American reaction
will be to use massive firepower, which will destroy the neighbourhood
that is being 'protected'."
The ex-officer's fears for
American helicopter crews were re-emphasised yesterday when a military
Apache was shot down over central Baghdad.
The American's son is an
officer currently serving in Baghdad. "The only chance the American
military has to withdraw with any kind of tactical authority in the
future is to take substantial casualties as a token of their respect
for the situation created by the invasion," he said.
"The effort to create
some order out of the chaos and the willingness to take casualties to
do so will leave some residual respect for the Americans as they leave."
FM 3-24: America's new masterplan
for Iraq
FM 3-24 comprises 220 pages
of counter-insurgency planning, combat training techniques and historical
analysis. The document was drawn up by Lt-Gen David Petraeus, the US
commander in Baghdad, and Lt-Gen James Amos of the US Marine Corps,
and was the nucleus for the new US campaign against the Iraqi insurgency.
These are some of its recommendations and conclusions:
* In the eyes of some, a
government that cannot protect its people forfeits the right to rule.
In [parts] of Iraq and Afghanistan... militias established themselves
as extragovernmental arbiters of the populace's physical security -
in some cases, after first undermining that security...
* In the al-Qa'ida narrative...
Osama bin Laden depicts himself as a man purified in the mountains of
Afghanistan who is inspiring followers and punishing infidels. In the
collective imagination of Bin Laden and his followers, they are agents
of Islamic history who will reverse the decline of the umma (Muslim
community) and bring about its triumph over Western imperialism.
* As the Host Nation government
increases its legitimacy, the populace begins to assist it more actively.
Eventually, the people marginalise insurgents to the point that [their]
claim to legitimacy is destroyed. However, victory is gained not when
this is achieved, but when the victory is permanently maintained by
and with the people's active support...
* Any human rights abuses
committed by US forces quickly become known throughout the local populace.
Illegitimate actions undermine counterinsurgency efforts... Abuse of
detained persons is immoral, illegal and unprofessional.
* If military forces remain
in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be running
scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. Aggressive saturation
patrolling, ambushes, and listening post operations must be conducted,
risk shared with the populace and contact maintained.
* FM 3-24 quotes Lawrence
of Arabia as saying: "Do not try to do too much with your own hands.
Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is
their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them."
* FM 3-24 points to Napoleon's
failure to control occupied Spain as the result of not providing a "stable
environment" for the population. His struggle, the document says,
lasted nearly six years and required four times the force of 80,000
Napoleon originally designated.
* Do not try to crack the
hardest nut first. Do not go straight for the main insurgent stronghold.
Instead, start from secure areas and work gradually outwards... Go with,
not against, the grain of the local populace.
* Be cautious about allowing
soldiers and marines to fraternise with local children. Homesick troops
want to drop their guard with kids. But insurgents are watching. They
notice any friendships between troops and children. They may either
harm the children as punishment or use them as agents.
© 2007 Independent News
and Media Limited
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