Grozny
And Baghdad: Disturbing Parallels
By
Tristan Ewins
9 April , 2003
Today in Chechnya, the city
of Grozny formerly the home of almost half a million people -
lies in ruins: utterly devastated. The fate of Grozny thus stands as
a testament to the brutal and terrible cost of modern urban warfare.
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, separatist ambitions
previously repressed in the overwhelmingly Muslim republic once again
bubbled to the surface to provide the greatest crisis faced by the Russian
Federation since that fateful (some would say disastrous) moment.
As the separatist movement
rose to challenge the authority of the Kremlin, intense and bloody battles
erupted in Chechnya during the period 1994-1996. During this period,
and the later conflict, beginning in 1999, it is estimated that over
2,500 Russian troops paid with their lives. Unofficial estimates suggest
an even higher price was paid. The price paid by the Chechens themselves
was even more onerous: with an estimated 80,000 casualties, and the
virtual leveling of habitations and infrastructure. Heating, water,
electricity: were all devastated. Guerilla resistance continues to this
day, providing an ongoing nightmare for Russian occupation forces, who
continue to grapple with regular ambushes.
Like the current war in Iraq,
the war in Chechnya also concerned what US commentators like to refer
to as resource security: that is, the control of oil. In
the case of Chechnya, at stake was one of the most oil and natural gas
rich regions of the former USSR, including refineries and a major oil
pipeline. The risk of losing control of this pipeline, in particular,
posed a major strategic dilemma for the Kremlin. Whitehouse strategists,
however, seem to be far more ambitious than successive Kremlin leaders,
apparently aiming for nothing less than domination of the worlds
oil supply via the Persian Gulf. Containment of Iran and Syria will
prove to be a useful byproduct of this process.
There are important differences,
however, between the nightmare confronted by Russian forces, and the
ordeal currently facing coalition forces in their attempt to take Baghdad.
The Kremlin invaded Chechnya originally with a force of some 45,000
troops: this in an entire region of barely over one million. http://www.infoplease.com/spot/chechnyatime1.html
By comparison, coalition
forces in Iraq number over 300,000, but are attempting to subdue a nation
of some 22 million. Baghdad itself comprises a sprawling metropolis
of over 5 million: a potential nightmare for Coalition troops facing
a hostile populous and vicious house to house fighting over a huge urban
landscape.
Furthermore, though, while
Chechen fighters were able to retreat to neighboring Dagestan to reorganize,
one suspects that Syria would not dare provide a base for such a movement
in a post-Baathist Iraq under long term US occupation. Additionally,
as compared to the mountainous terrain of Chechnya and neighboring Dagestan:
used by rebels as a base from which to continue an ongoing guerilla
war, Iraqi forces in the North confront overwhelming Coalition airpower,
and the further obstacle of Kurdish forces.
Some military aspects of
the two conflicts, however, will seem disturbingly familiar to Coalition
commanders. Suicide bombings have been employed in Chechnya, as in Iraq,
to devastating effect. In one such period the Kremlin admitted to having
lost 37 soldiers to suicide trucks. Chechen rebels, meanwhile,
claimed the figure to be more in the vicinity of 200. http://www.rnw.nl/hotspots/html/chechnya000704.html
As Coalition troops penetrate Baghdad in greater numbers and concentration,
vulnerability to such attacks will increase exponentially.
And while Baghdad: a city
boasting a fairly low and level skyline, does not provide the same ambush
opportunities as some cities, this certainly ought not be taken as cause
for complacency on the part of the Coalition. Russian armour, for instance,
often faced devastating ambushes in the streets of Grozny. Boasting
extensive smuggling and organized crime links, Chechen rebels were able
to secure potent anti-tank weaponry to wreak havoc upon Russian formations.
One Russian soldier recalled the horror of Chechen ambushes on Russian
armoured columns in Grozny during the period of the initial invasion:
According to the well-developed
tactics, the first and the last vehicles in the convoy are destroyed
first. Then, the rest of the column is methodically eliminated. Reliable
tactics. Very few ever escape. http://www.artofwar.ru/english/mironov_eng4.html
Baghdad, also, developed
a sprawling worldwide smuggling network with the intent of evading sanctions,
and preparing for invasion. Already the Americans are aware of the import
of night-vision goggles and anti-tank missiles from a firm in Russia.
Who knows, then, what surprises might await Coalition forces in Baghdad?
With the Coalitions technological advantage significantly eroded
by the prospect of close urban combat, the Republican Guards possession
of night-vision goggles alone would present a nightmare for Coalition
troops.
Presently, the Coalition
is intent on showing its capacity to move in an out of Baghdad
at will, inflicting devastating casualties upon those units intent on
resisting heavy armour with small arms fire alone. In the event that
Iraqs stockpile of Russian anti-tank missiles is minimal, such
incursions may continue to meet with success, but imposing a lasting
and successful occupation on a sprawling city of 5 million will be a
different matter entirely. Eventually, presuming Iraqi forces continue
to resist, Coalition forces will be driven from the protection of their
heavy armor, and forced to clear neighborhoods house to house.
Aaron Zitner, Elizabeth Shogren
and Paul Richter, writing in the Los Angeles Times, for
instance, detail the horror of house to house fighting in Grozny, as
Russian troops attempted to clear out Rebel strongholds:
Russian troops would
toss grenades into basements, hoping to kill snipers or other rebels.
But the practice would also wipe out entire families at a time.
A similar horror, no doubt,
awaits in Baghdad.
Houses and other buildings
could also be booby-trapped, making high casualties inevitable in the
instance of intense house to house fighting. Such traps were widely
employed in Grozny, amidst rubble, and recently vacated buildings. These
unconventional fighting tactics turned out to be the bane of the Russian
military. If Saddams Republican Guard has any sense, such tactics
will inevitably take their toll.
While the Russians ultimately
resorted to the virtual leveling of Grozny in 2000 to deprive Chechen
rebels of cover, or opportunities for ambush, the Coalition will have
no such option in Baghdad for the immediate future. This will remain
the case at least so long as the city continues to house millions of
Iraqi civilians. The fear here is that of a massive public opinion backlash
which could send shockwaves through the Arab world.
One possibility discussed
amongst some quarters, however, is that of knocking out what remains
of Baghdads basic civilian infrastructure: water, electricity,
sanitation. Presuming sufficient care had been taken to prepare for
the flow of refugees, this would free Coalition forces to take for advantage
of superior firepower, including total air superiority. In such an instance,
we could expect the ancient and beautiful city of Baghdad to be devastated:
much in the same way that Grozny was reduced to ruins by Russian airpower
and artillery.
No matter what happens, it
is unlikely that anything can deter the likes of Bush and Rumsfeld from
following this war through to its brutal, hideous conclusion. While
anti-American feeling will, no doubt, reach fever pitch throughout the
Arab world as any assault on Baghdad unfolds, much of the Western media
has proven to be pliant and uncritical in the face of the Pentagons
orchestrated campaign of spin and propaganda. At home, at least, government
strategists have the information war in the bag. In the
US, as elsewhere, dissent will be contained through spin and misinformation,
as well as a hysterical appeal to nationalism.
Presuming, however, that
Coalition forces are not able to destroy the Baathist regimes
underground intelligence networks, the end of the conventional war could
only be the beginning. Once again, the parallels with the Russian campaign
in Chechnya are poignant. Any new client regime could be haunted by
the spectre of assassinations, while any US occupation force will live
under the cloud of possible Lebanon-style suicide truck-bomb attacks,
the likes of which claimed the lives of 241 Marines in 1983. While the
scale of the US occupation, it must be noted, will go some way towards
reducing this risk, Iraq could become a nightmare which haunts the US
for many years to come