Iraq
A Move Toward Open Dictatorship
By James Cogan
25 March 2006
World
Socialist Web
The
announcement on March 19 that steps are being taken to form an extra-parliamentary
“National Security Council” (NSC) is a warning that the
Bush administration is moving toward an openly dictatorial regime in
Iraq.
The White House’s attempts
to portray Iraq as a country in a transition to “democracy”
are becoming increasingly threadbare. More than three months after the
December 2005 elections, there is no new government and no indications
that one will be formed anytime soon. No party or alliance holds a majority
of seats, let alone the two-thirds majority constitutionally required
to elect the presidential council that names the prime minister.
The longer the intractable
stalemate continues, the more the struggle for dominance in post-invasion
Iraq is being fought out on the streets. A low-level civil war is raging
between rival Sunni and Shiite militias in Baghdad and the surrounding
regions. Since the destruction of the Shiite al-Askariya mosque in Samarra
on February 22, bombings, mortar strikes, ethnic cleansing and targeted
death squad killings have claimed hundreds of lives on both sides of
the sectarian divide. At the same time, attacks on American troops by
predominantly Sunni guerillas are continuing unabated.
The NSC is the Bush administration’s
solution. The brainchild of Zalmay Khalilzad, the US ambassador in Iraq,
and Massoud Barzani, the Kurdish nationalist leader who heads the autonomous
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, the intention is
that the 19-member council will take control over the Iraqi state, regardless
of what happens in the bitterly divided parliament.
The NSC is particularly intended
to undermine the position of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance (UIA),
which holds 130 of the parliament’s 275 seats and dominates the
“transitional” government that was formed in May 2005. The
UIA is comprised of the Da’awa movement of the current prime minister
Ibrahim al-Jaafari; the Iranian-linked Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI); and the fundamentalist movement headed by
cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. It has insisted on retaining the posts of prime
minister and interior minister, as well as the main portfolios responsible
for providing social services.
The UIA’s demands have
been rejected by the Kurdish nationalist alliance, Sunni Arab-based
parties and the coalition led by Iyad Allawi—the émigré
collaborator with the US invasion who the Bush administration installed
as the country’s “interim prime minister” in 2004.
Combined, the Kurd, Sunni and secular blocs have 133 seats, more than
enough to block any attempt by the Shiite alliance to form a government.
The Kurdish nationalists
are hostile to Jaafari and the Sadr faction, which opposes the Kurd’s
perspective of incorporating the oil-rich city of Kirkuk into the KRG.
Sunni parties and Allawi accuse SCIRI of using its control over the
interior ministry to infiltrate its supporters into the security forces
and wage a reign of terror against Sunni supporters of the former Baathist
regime and the Sunni population in general. The Kurds are insisting
that the UIA nominate someone beside Jaafari, while Sunni leaders are
demanding the UIA hand over the security ministries to so-called “non-sectarians”,
a phrase considered by Shiites to be little more than a euphemism for
former generals in Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-dominated armed forces.
Behind the opposition to
the UIA is the Bush administration. Under conditions of rising tension
between Washington and Tehran, the White House considers the Shiite
parties too close to the Iranian regime to control the Iraqi security
forces. The Pentagon also calculates that incorporating elements of
the ex-Baathist establishment into the Iraqi government will convince
elements of the resistance to end their guerilla war against the occupation.
The announcement of the NSC
is clearly a compromise by the UIA after weeks of unrelenting US pressure
that they agree to form a “national unity government” with
the other factions. According to unnamed American officials, the council
will function as a “parallel” authority to the caretaker
government headed by Jaafari, while negotiations continue in the parliament.
It will formulate policy for the army and police, the budget and the
distribution of oil revenues. It will reportedly develop strategies
to disarm the Shiite militias and end the anti-occupation resistance
that is raging in the largely Sunni Arab provinces of western and central
Iraq.
Despite there being no basis
in the Iraqi constitution for any body apart from the government exercising
such sweeping powers, NSC decisions will only be referred to the parliament
if they require legislation.
The security council will
consist of nine members of the Shiite alliance, four from the Kurdish
parties, four from Sunni parties and two “secular” politicians.
The only concession to the UIA is that a two-thirds vote will be required
to make any decision, giving a veto to the Shiite parties. The concentration
of power in the hands of such a small group, however, will make it much
easier for Khalilzad and other American officials to manipulate.
While the US is calling for
ongoing operations against the Sunni resistance, there are hints that
it is considering another bloody crackdown against the more extreme
Shiite militias, such as elements of the Sadrist movement. General Rick
Lynch threatened last month that the US military would “not allow”
the Sadrists to take control of any area of Iraq. By all reports, Sadr’s
Mahdi Army openly controls most of the Shiite suburbs of Baghdad.
The composition of the NSC
underscores that its purpose is to reduce the power of the Shiite fundamentalist
alliance and deliver it to more trusted collaborators of the US. The
19 members will reportedly include the president, vice presidents, prime
minister and deputy prime ministers. As the new parliament has not elected
any of these positions, they will be filled by the individuals who hold
them in the caretaker “transitional” government.
Thus, Ahmad Chalabi, the
longtime CIA asset whose party did not win a single seat in the recent
elections, will sit on the council, as he is one of the three deputy
prime ministers in the transitional administration. The other deputy
prime ministers are Abed Mutlak al-Jiburi, a former general under Saddam
Hussein, and Rowsch Shaways, a Kurdish nationalist. The pro-American
Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani is currently president. While a SCIRI
official is one vice president, the other is the Sunni leader Ghazi
al-Yawar who has worked with the US forces since the invasion.
Barzani will have a place
as KRG president, while pro-US Sunni Adnan Pachachi, another émigré
with little popular support, will sit on the council because he was
named last week as the caretaker speaker of parliament.
Most significantly, Iyad
Allawi will represent the “secular” bloc, which won only
25 seats in December. In 2004, Allawi, as interim prime minister, gave
the green light for the brutal US operations against the short-lived
Sadrist uprising in the Shiite cities of Karbala and Najaf and the assault
on the Sunni city of Fallujah. Earlier, in June 2004, he was accused
of personally executing six alleged Sunni insurgents in a Baghdad prison.
While he is despised among ordinary Iraqis, he has relations with the
ruling elite and military office caste that held sway under Hussein
and is considered reliable in Washington due to his role in the first
year of the occupation.
For this reason, he is being
groomed by the White House to play the role of Iraq’s new strongman.
Press reportage has consistently referred to Allawi as the most likely
head of the NSC. An unnamed “senior political source” told
Reuters: “The job was created for him. We have been discussing
it for at least two months.”
At a press conference on
March 21, Bush declared he was “encouraged” by the “progress
toward a council that gives each of the country’s main political
factions a voice in making security and economic policies”. He
hailed the formation of the NSC as “an indicator that Iraq’s
leaders understand the importance of a government of national unity”.
In reality, the discussion
in Washington, and among the Iraqi leaders closest to the White House,
is that the security council provides a means to bypass the political
impasse in the parliament altogether. In interview with Reuters on March
21, Allawi sought to use the danger of civil war to justify the NSC—and
himself—assuming dictatorial executive powers immediately.
“Unfortunately, the
talks [in parliament] are still about the concept of a national unity
government. We are saying, let’s form a government [the security
council] until things are more stable”, he declared. “Then
we could change the government. But the tragedy of killing and terrorism
must not go on.” The main task of the NSC, he said, was to take
control of the security apparatus and “strengthen the army, police,
security and intelligence services”.
Hinting at the discussion
in occupation circles that the NSC may become a permanent fixture, Reuters
reported: “Technically, the council would be a temporary body
designed to help pull Iraq out of crisis, sources said, but it might
be needed for a long time.” In other words, an unconstitutional
and unelected cabal, worked out behind closed doors with American officials,
is preparing to take open-ended control of the armed forces, the budget
and the oil industry. This is Iraqi “democracy” three years
after the US invasion.