Tired, Terrified, Trigger-Happy
By Andrew M.
Cockburn
Los Angeles Times
20 November, 2003
Among
the less publicized incentives propelling Iraq overseer Paul Bremer's
urgent dash to Washington last week was the concern in various quarters
of the administration that the U.S. expeditionary force in Iraq was
in a dangerously unstable state. "We are one stressed-out reservist
away from a massacre," remarked one senior official closely involved
in the search for an exit strategy.
He was expressing
the fear that a soldier, possibly a reservist, pressed beyond endurance
by the rigors and uncertainties of his or her condition in a hostile
land far from home, might open up with a machine gun on an Iraqi crowd,
with obviously disastrous consequences for the future of the occupation.
In case anyone considers
this contingency unthinkably remote, examples already abound of overstressed
U.S. soldiers behaving in a lethally trigger-happy fashion. As U.S.
soldiers get more and more stressed, their tempers fray and you see
more altercations on the streets, more browbeating of ordinary Iraqis
by soldiers and, as a result, a general deterioration in the already
tense relationship that helps convince Iraqis that the U.S. is nothing
but an ugly, arrogant occupying army.
In traveling around
Iraq, I always stay well away from American convoys, for reasons well
known to all Iraqi drivers and best illustrated by an incident (by no
means unique) outside Fallouja last month. Gunners in an armored column
responded to a roadside bomb blast by opening up, apparently indiscriminately,
with heavy automatic weapons on traffic moving in the opposite direction
on the other side of the highway median. Six civilians died, including
four in a single minivan, some of whom were decapitated. An 82nd Airborne
spokesman was later quoted as insisting that "the use of force
was justified."
Indiscriminate fire
and other atrocities can be understood, if not explained, by the degree
of stress endured by hot and exhausted soldiers terrified of an unseen
enemy. U.S. Army Field Manual 22-51 addresses what it calls "misconduct
combat stress behavior," which it deems most likely in guerrilla
warfare. The manual notes that, "even though we may pity the overstressed
soldier as well as the victims," such cases must be punished.
The manual also
identifies other stress behaviors, including looting and pillaging,
practices that many people in Iraq including non-Iraqis
report is widespread among the occupation force.
"I keep hearing
rumors about our attached infantry company. Apparently they are under
investigation for a few 'incidents,' " a young officer based in
the Sunni Triangle wrote home to his family in August. "It seems
that whenever they get the chance, they steal money from the locals.
I'm not talking about small amounts of cash, I'm talking about a nice,
fat bankroll. They take the money during raids, while searching cars,
while detaining locals."
Questioned about
various examples of misconduct, the official military response in Iraq
tends to range from professed ignorance about the incidents to excuses
like "these things happen in the heat of the action" to vague
promises of future investigation. Yet surely the anonymous author of
the U.S. Army Field Manual was correct in writing that "only a
strong chain of command and a unit identity which says 'We don't do
that, and those who do aren't one of us and will be punished' can prevent
such behavior from happening."
Despite this commendable
official doctrine, professional military personnel specialists are seeing
a worrying trend in the profusion of stress-related cases in Iraq.
"It's not surprising,"
says Maj. Don Vandergriff, who teaches military science at Georgetown
University. "After six months in an intense environment, units
start to degrade, especially when they are in combat and are likely
getting very little sleep."
Vandergriff is also
fiercely critical of the Army's practice of constantly rotating individuals,
especially commanders, in and out of units. Morale and cohesion of the
Army in Iraq "is deteriorating at four times the rate it did in
Vietnam," he states.
The high command
should be seeking remedial measures, but perhaps the best we can hope
for are the coldly realistic sentiments of the officer who wrote about
the looting.
"I really don't
care for the Iraqi people, I don't care about helping them get back
on their feet," he wrote in his letter. "However, I don't
condone stealing from them, hurting them unnecessarily or threatening
them with violence if it is not needed. We will never win hearts and
minds here, but what these guys are doing is wrong. I am positive that
this isn't happening in my company, and that's all I can really affect."
With any luck, his
superiors are developing the same sense of responsibility. There is
always that stressed-out reservist to worry about.
Andrew M. Cockburn
is the co-author of "Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam
Hussein" (Perennial Press, 2000).
Copyright 2003 Los
Angeles Times