It's
Worse Than You Thought:
Pro-Israel Influence On US Policy
By Ali Abunimah
18 March, 2004
The Electronic Intifada
In
the early weeks of the invasion of Iraq, when the US thrust toward Baghdad
appeared to be meeting more resistance than expected, an awful row broke
out in Washington over the role of pro-Israel groups and individuals
in dragging the country to war. Increasing media examination of the
roles of key neoconservative figures associated with Likudnik groups
gave rise to a backlash that sought to tar anyone who dared raise questions
with anti-Semitism.
Laurence Cohen,
a columnist for the Hartford Courant, rejected criticism of key Iraq
hawks Richard Perle, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and
others, claiming, "It took about four seconds for this clustering
to stir anti-Semitic rumblings to the effect that these crafty, secretive
Jews had come together in the Rose Garden to chant special prayers that
transformed George W. Bush, Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld into anti-Iraqi
warriors, prepared to sacrifice American lives in a subtle defense of
Israel." (13 April 2003) Such claims were echoed by many pro-Israeli
figures, such as Rabbi Marvin Hier, the director of the Simon Wiesenthal
Center who claimed, "It has now become en vogue to blame the war
on Iraq on Jews." (Washington Post, 15 March 2003)
Ironically, the
only times such vicious anti-Semitic caricatures appeared in the US
mainstream media were when commentators like Cohen introduced them.
The effect was to give the entirely false illusion that such characterizations
were rampant, and to seize on a few, rare and misplaced comments about
Jewish officials to silence a legitimate debate about the role of pro-Israeli
activists.
Now, a new firsthand
account of life in the US Defense Department shows just how pro-Israeli
groups exerted their influence from within the government. Karen Kwiatkowski
retired as a lieutenant colonel in the US Air Force after two decades
of distinguished service. Her last posting was at the Near East South
Asia (NESA) directorate at the Pentagon.
In a lengthy article
in the online journal Salon.com, Kwiatkowski writes, "From May
2002 until February 2003, I observed firsthand the formation of the
Pentagon's Office of Special Plans and watched the latter stages of
the neoconservative capture of the policy-intelligence nexus in the
run-up to the invasion of Iraq." The "seizure of the reins
of US Middle East policy," Kwiatkowski recounts, "was directly
visible to many of us working in the Near East South Asia Policy office,
and yet there seemed to be little any of us could do about it."
All this happened
under the watch of Bill Luti, the deputy secretary of defense for NESA,
and went up and down the chain of command.
Some of the specific
incidents Kwiatkowski recalls are illustrative: "Longtime office
director Joe McMillan was reassigned to the National Defense University.
The director's job in the time of transition was to help bring the newly
appointed deputy assistant secretary up to speed, ensure office continuity,
act as a resource relating to regional histories and policies ... Removing
such a critical continuity factor was not only unusual but also seemed
like willful handicapping."
Kwiatkowski said
"the expertise on Mideast policy was not only being removed, but
was also being exchanged for that from various agenda-bearing think
tanks, including the Middle East Media Research Institute, the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, and the Jewish Institute for National
Security Affairs." The main agenda of all these organizations is
advocating closer US-Israel ties. She saw the "replacement of the
civilian head of the Israel, Lebanon and Syria desk office with a young
political appointee from the Washington Institute, David Schenker. Word
was that the former experienced civilian desk officer tended to be evenhanded
toward the policies of Israeli Premier Ariel Sharon of Israel, but there
were complaints and he was gone." As the personnel changed, so
did the atmosphere; Kwiatkowski recalls that a "career civil servant
rather unhappily advised me that if I wanted to be successful here,
I'd better remember not to say anything positive about the Palestinians."
In an official
meeting at which Kwiatkowski was present, Luti openly called Marine
General, former Chief of Central Command, and Middle East envoy Anthony
Zinni, a "traitor" for having reservations about the march
to war, and open contempt and calls for Secretary of State Colin Powell
to resign were common. What she observed until her voluntary early retirement
was nothing less than a full-scale assault on the intelligence and policymaking
apparatus of the United States. She witnessed intelligence and careful
analysis being replaced with propaganda, falsehoods and manipulation
and fed to the Congress and the Executive Office of the President. This
"fear peddling" was, Kwiatkowski writes, "designed to
take Congress and the country into a war of executive choice, a war
based on false pretenses."
What prompted Kwiatkowski
to speak out is the "swiftness of the neoconservatives casting
of blame," for the failures in Iraq, "on the intelligence
community and away from themselves." She is indignant that, "we
are told by our president and neoconservative mouthpieces that our sons
and daughters, husbands and wives are in Iraq fighting for freedom,
for liberty, for justice and American values. This cost is not borne
by the children of Wolfowitz,
Perle, Rumsfeld and Cheney. Bush's daughters do not pay this price."
Many Americans and observers in the Middle East hope that if Bush is
defeated in the November election, it will lead to a reversal of course
in US policy. But realistically, a President John Kerry would not pressure
Israel any more than Bill Clinton did, and in the post-September 11,
2001, environment, probably less. And Kerry, despite his misgivings
about the Iraq war, talks of staying until the "job is done."
But that doesn't
mean there is no difference between Kerry and Bush. Hussein Ibish, communications
director of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee explains
that, "under President Kerry, the neoconservative influence on
US foreign policy would almost certainly be greatly diminished for the
simple reason that almost all the prominent neoconservatives have aligned
themselves with the Republican Party."
US policy would
likely revert to what it was under Clinton, with some adjustments for
the post-September 11 environment. But in the current circumstances,
restoring the professional policymaking and intelligence apparatus of
the US would be a huge improvement. Above all, it would neutralize the
forces that are quietly still pushing for a march from Baghdad to Damascus
in a second Bush term.
Ali Abunimah is a co-founder of The Electronic Intifada. This article
first appeared in The Daily Star