Iran-
Little Chance Of
Nuclear Compromise
By Siddharth Varadarajan
22 August, 2006
The Hindu
In
1983, some 20 years before Iran was accused by the United States and
its allies of having a clandestine nuclear fuel enrichment programme,
Tehran approached the International Atomic Energy Agency with a request
for technical assistance in setting up a pilot plant for the production
of uranium hexafluoride (UF6).
UF6 is the basic feedstock
in the uranium enrichment process, in which the gas is spun through
centrifuge machines in order to produce low enriched uranium for reactors
— or highly enriched uranium for bombs. At the time, Iran was
specifically interested in restarting work begun in the Shah's period
on converting U308 into UO2 pellets and then going on to set up a pilot
facility for UF6 production.
Since the IAEA Statute commits
the agency to provide technical assistance to member states, a team
of experts travelled to Iran to interact with scientists at Entec, the
Iranian atomic establishment set up in 1974 with French assistance to
work on the fuel cycle. According to an account provided by Mark Hibbs
in Nuclear Fuel, one of the most authoritative newsletters of the international
nuclear industry, the IAEA experts recommended that the agency assist
Entec to help their scientists overcome their lack of practical experience.
They also suggested that the IAEA provide expert services in a number
of areas including the fuel cycle.
But the promised IAEA help
never materialised. According to Mr. Hibbs: "Sources said that
when in 1983 the recommendations of an IAEA mission to Iran were passed
on to the IAEA's technical cooperation program, the U.S. government
then `directly intervened' to discourage the IAEA from assisting Iran
in production of UO2 and UF6. `We stopped that in its tracks,' said
a former U.S. official." Rebuffed by the IAEA, Iran signed an agreement
with Argentina, only to have Washington force Buenos Aires to back off
in 1992. Five years later, the Clinton administration got China to abandon
its official assistance to Iran on the fuel cycle.
It is worth recalling this
history because it helps us to understand a core concern at the heart
of the current crisis over Iran's nuclear programme: If Iran's intentions
were peaceful, why did it go about its enrichment programme with so
much secrecy? True, its safeguards agreement did not require it to declare
the enrichment facility it was building at Natanz to the IAEA until
six months before nuclear material was to be introduced into them. But
the "concealed" nature of the facility and the furtiveness
of its acquisitions programme have led some to conclude that Tehran
secretly intended to make bombs. Even if not everyone believes that,
many countries feel Iran should suspend all enrichment activity as a
confidence-building measure until the IAEA concludes that there are
no undeclared nuclear activities in the country.
The Iranian response is one
of bewilderment and even anger. When Iran openly sought to develop the
fuel cycle and the IAEA was willing to help it, the U.S. intervened
to stop this. Whenever Tehran signed a public agreement with an international
partner, Washington worked overtime to kill it.
Given this reality, the only
way to build a fuel cycle programme — even if one's aims were
purely peaceful — would have been to go about it with stealth.
But today, this stealth, which was imposed on Iran at a time when there
was no evidence of non-civilian use, is being cited as evidence of malafide
intention and as the main reason why Iran must agree to suspend enrichment
immediately.
This week, the Iranian Government
is likely to provide a formal response to the package of proposals presented
to it by the European Union and five permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council in June.
Security Council deadline
Though Iran had indicated
its willingness to revert to the EU by August 22, the United States
unnecessarily upped the ante by getting the UNSC to pass Resolution
1696 last month threatening Tehran with sanctions if it did not suspend
all nuclear enrichment activity by August 31. "I can't understand
the logic of the resolution," a senior Western diplomat based in
Tehran told The Hindu earlier this month. "When they are saying
they will give an answer by a certain date, why impose an ultimatum
of this kind?"
"Having trust in each
other is essential," Vice-President Esfandiar Rahim Mashaii told
The Hindu, "but peaceful enrichment is our right and there can
be no compromise." When his attention was drawn to a statement
by Joschka Fischer in Tehran that week that Europe recognised Iran's
rights but wanted trust to be re-established, Dr. Mashaii said the former
Foreign Minister of Germany was not being honest. "When we wanted
to build the Bushehr reactor and Russia agreed to cooperate, they put
pressure on Russia not to do this work ... Why was Germany against this?
They did not give us the right to even use fuel. But now that we have
the ability to produce that fuel, they say, `Don't produce it, we will
give it to you!' Are they telling the truth? Whenever we retreat, they
advance, and when we go forward, they retreat."
According to a prominent
Tehran-based analyst, who spoke to The Hindu on condition of anonymity,
the nuclear question has become a national issue in which "the
right to enrichment is equated with Mossadegh's oil nationalisation
and the same group of imperialist countries is being seen as denying
Iran control over its energy security." The analyst, who has environmental
concerns about Iran going down the nuclear route and is also opposed
to President Ahmadinejad's confrontationist style, says the nuclear
issue is just an excuse for the U.S. "In the Shah's time, Iran
had even more oil per capita than it does now, but there were no objections
to our nuclear programme. Essentially, the nuclear issue is being used
to put pressure on Iran to change its foreign policy, especially towards
Israel and the peace process. For example, the U.S. is not pressing
Pakistan to even slow down its nuclear weapons programme despite the
fact that they are the ones who have had ties to non-state actors."
The analyst believes the
Iranian leadership is not particularly perturbed by the threat of sanctions.
But the U.S. needs to realise pressure will only lead to a hardening
of attitudes. "Even if we had a clandestine programme, as they
claim," he said, "I am certain this did not exist prior to
2000. But post 9/11, the `Axis of Evil' speech and the invasion of Iraq
— all of this has strengthened the hands of those who say Iran
cannot trust the IAEA/U.N. system. In fact, some say the Bush-Blair
policy was to use the IAEA and U.N. to ensure Iraq had no weapons of
mass destruction before they concluded it was `safe' to invade."
There are some in Iran —
notably Hosein Shariatmadari, publisher and editor of Kayhan —
who say the country should quit the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
(NPT) but the broad consensus within the ruling establishment is still
in favour of dialogue and diplomacy. "I think the Iranian leaders
want to resolve this peacefully... but want an honourable outcome which
won't harm Iran's prestige."
For many Iranians, Israel's
attack on Lebanon marked the opening round of an American-led military-political
campaign aimed first, at forcing Tehran to abandon its civilian enrichment
programme, and eventually at bringing about `regime change' there. "The
U.S. and Israel believe Iran is inflexible on the nuclear issue because
it thinks it has the card of Hizbollah which it can play against Israel
if military action is ever taken against its nuclear facilities. And
I think that is why they decided to try and finish off Hizbollah,"
says the analyst.
The irony is that whenever
Iran has sought to reach out to the U.S. and establish the framework
for a `grand bargain,' Washington has responded with silence or contempt.
In 2003, when Mohammad Khatami was President, an approach was made to
the Bush administration via the Swiss embassy in Tehran for a dialogue
aimed at an eventual rapprochement. The letter, which apparently had
the blessings of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, included an
offer to accept the Saudi initiative for a two-state solution to the
Palestinian question. But the White House threw it into the dustbin.
That document, with its formula
of a grand bargain including recognition of Iran's rights and implicit
recognition of Israel, was no flash in the pan. "If they accept
our sovereign rights, we are prepared to make dialogue with any organisation
or any country," Dr. Mashaii told The Hindu. Asked whether that
offer of dialogue included Israel as well, Dr. Mashaii repeated: "If
the United Nations accepts our sovereign rights, we are ready to dialogue
with any organisation or country."
Anybody who knows Iran and
its culture should understand it will never agree to suspend uranium
enrichment under duress. The imposition of sanctions will make no difference
but will only increase the clamour from neocons in the U.S. for airstrikes
and war. What the world needs is a creative political solution that
respects Iran's rights and allays international concerns. The Europeans
presented a package which seeks to bind Tehran to the NPT but which
deliberately refrains from reaffirming Iran's inalienable right to nuclear
energy in conformity with Article IV of that treaty. No doubt Iran will
formulate a response. The international community should seek to build
upon that response and keep the dialogue going.
Sidharth Varadarajan
is the Associate Editor of the The Hindu. His blog is http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com