Iran-US:
Fighting Fire With Fire
By Trita Parsi
03 April, 2007
Inter Press Service
WASHINGTON -
As the dispute over Iran's seizure of British sailors continues to twist
and turn, what may have been an isolated incident at the outset is quickly
developing into yet another move in the geopolitical chess game between
the West and Iran.
The incident took place on
March 23 in a disputed waterway between Iraq and Iran. Fifteen British
sailors and marines were detained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards,
and after a few short days of quiet diplomacy, both the British and
Iranian governments resorted to fighting their cases in public - a move
that significantly reduces the chance of a quick and smooth resolution
to the dispute.
From the outset, the British
authorities have insisted categorically that the sailors were in Iraqi
and not Iranian waters. Last Wednesday, the British produced Global
Positioning System coordinates to support their claim, even though the
coordinates were from a helicopter that London says hovered over the
Indian ship that the sailors had inspected, and not the GPS coordinates
of the sailors themselves.
Iran was quick to produce
its own evidence. The GPS unit of one of the British sailors, confiscated
by the Iranian authorities, showed that the British were not only in
Iranian waters at the time of the incident, but that they had crossed
over into Iranian waters on five earlier occasions as well, according
to Tehran.
Whether the British were
in Iranian waters or not - and whether the Iranians believe the British
were in Iranian waters or not - Tehran seems to be using the incident
to regain leverage over the West in the confrontation over its nuclear
program and its rising power and influence in the Middle East.
Both Iran and the US have
come to recognize that it is becoming increasingly difficult to avoid
some sort of diplomatic confrontation between them. This is particularly
problematic for the administration of US President George W Bush, which
for several years has adamantly opposed the idea of talking to Tehran.
The sudden realization of
the near-impossibility to avoid real diplomacy caused much anxiety in
the Bush administration earlier this year. Washington has no shortage
of contingency war plans with Iran - but no contingency plans for diplomacy,
and consequently no preparation for such negotiations.
So when the Iraq Study Group
(ISG) and Congress pushed the White House to recognize the need for
diplomacy with Iraq's neighbors, including Iran, the administration
balked. It lacked leverage to negotiate with Iran, it said.
"Frankly, right at this
moment there's really nothing the Iranians want from us, and so in any
negotiation right now we would be the supplicant," Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates explained. "The only reason to talk to us
would be to extract a price, and that's not diplomacy, that's extortion."
If the US lacked leverage
over Iran, the answer lay in gaining that leverage. Instead of accepting
the ISG's recommendation to open talks with Iran, the Bush White House
sought to increase the pressure on Iran to gain leverage - in any way
possible.
On December 24, US troops
arrested several Iranian officials in Iraq - of whom at least two were
diplomats. A few weeks later, an office the Iranians say was a consulate
in Iraqi Kurdistan was raided. Another five Iranians were detained there.
They are still held by the US, and Tehran has had no access to them.
In addition, Ali Reza Asgari,
a senior Iranian official who served in the cabinet of former president
Mohammad Khatami, went missing in Turkey in February. His family and
authorities in Tehran say he was kidnapped by the Israelis. The US says
he defected.
Whether the arrested Iranians
were diplomats or not and whether Asgari defected or was kidnapped,
in two short months the detentions of the Iranians, the imposition of
financial sanctions on Iran, and the passing of two United Nations Security
Council Resolutions have seemingly provided the US with the leverage
it was seeking. Washington is suddenly feeling confident and is hinting
a vague willingness to talk to Tehran from its perceived position of
strength.
In this context, Iran's holding
of the British sailors may serve as a signal to Washington that if seizing
personnel from the other side is fair game for the sake of gaining leverage,
then Iran can also play that game.
Rather than an act of desperation
resulting from the onslaught of Western pressure, as some in Washington
have interpreted Iran's actions, the arrest of the British sailors may
have been a calculated measure to fight fire with fire - but without
targeting the US directly (which surely would have caused things to
escalate out of control).
The revelation of what Tehran
says is the second letter by the sole female sailor among the British,
Faye Turney, seems to support this interpretation. The letter concludes
with a call by Turney for British troops to leave Iraq. "Isn't
it time for us to start withdrawing our forces from Iraq and let them
determine their own future?" it said.
The letter's linking of the
seizure of the sailors with the larger political disputes in the region
lends support to the interpretation that Iran is - at least at this
stage of the dispute - seeking to regain the leverage it lost when the
US began targeting Iranian officials in Iraq.
Iran may feel justified in
responding to Washington's pressure tactics by targeting British troops
in the narrow waterway between Iraq and Iran. But it's difficult to
see an end to this duel for leverage. If Iran gets the upper hand, Washington
may further raise the stakes and embark on a new set of provocative
actions. And if Washington regains the edge over Iran, chances are that
Tehran will respond in kind.
As each side increases the
stakes in an effort to gain the upper hand in a potential future negotiation,
tensions in the region increase, as does the risk for an uncontrollable
escalation. Rather than improving their negotiation positions, both
sides are closing the diplomatic window through this risky game of one-upmanship.
Dr Trita Parsi is the author
of Treacherous Alliances: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the
United States (Yale University Press, 2007). He is also president of
the National Iranian American Council (www.niacouncil.org).
(Inter Press Service)
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