Oil, Geopolitics,
And The Coming
War With Iran
By Michael T. Klare
13 April, 2005
TomDispatch
As the United States gears up for an attack
on Iran, one thing is certain: the Bush administration will never mention
oil as a reason for going to war. As in the case of Iraq, weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) will be cited as the principal justification
for an American assault. "We will not tolerate the construction
of a nuclear weapon [by Iran]," is the way President Bush put it
in a much-quoted 2003 statement. But just as the failure to discover
illicit weapons in Iraq undermined the administration's use of WMD as
the paramount reason for its invasion, so its claim that an attack on
Iran would be justified because of its alleged nuclear potential should
invite widespread skepticism. More important, any serious assessment
of Iran's strategic importance to the United States should focus on
its role in the global energy equation.
Before proceeding
further, let me state for the record that I do not claim oil is the
sole driving force behind the Bush administration's apparent determination
to destroy Iranian military capabilities. No doubt there are many national
security professionals in Washington who are truly worried about Iran's
nuclear program, just as there were many professionals who were genuinely
worried about Iraqi weapons capabilities. I respect this. But no war
is ever prompted by one factor alone, and it is evident from the public
record that many considerations, including oil, played a role in the
administration's decision to invade Iraq. Likewise, it is reasonable
to assume that many factors -- again including oil -- are playing a
role in the decision-making now underway over a possible assault on
Iran.
Just exactly how
much weight the oil factor carries in the administration's decision-making
is not something that we can determine with absolute assurance at this
time, but given the importance energy has played in the careers and
thinking of various high officials of this administration, and given
Iran's immense resources, it would be ludicrous not to take the oil
factor into account -- and yet you can rest assured that, as relations
with Iran worsen, American media reports and analysis of the situation
will generally steer a course well clear of the subject (as they did
in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq).
One further caveat:
When talking about oil's importance in American strategic thinking about
Iran, it is important to go beyond the obvious question of Iran's potential
role in satisfying our country's future energy requirements. Because
Iran occupies a strategic location on the north side of the Persian
Gulf, it is in a position to threaten oil fields in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates, which together possess more than
half of the world's known oil reserves. Iran also sits athwart the Strait
of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which, daily, 40% of the world's
oil exports pass. In addition, Iran is becoming a major supplier of
oil and natural gas to China, India, and Japan, thereby giving Tehran
additional clout in world affairs. It is these geopolitical dimensions
of energy, as much as Iran's potential to export significant quantities
of oil to the United States, that undoubtedly govern the administration's
strategic calculations.
Having said this,
let me proceed to an assessment of Iran's future energy potential. According
to the most recent tally by Oil and Gas Journal, Iran houses the second-largest
pool of untapped petroleum in the world, an estimated 125.8 billion
barrels. Only Saudi Arabia, with an estimated 260 billion barrels, possesses
more; Iraq, the third in line, has an estimated 115 billion barrels.
With this much oil -- about one-tenth of the world's estimated total
supply -- Iran is certain to play a key role in the global energy equation,
no matter what else occurs.
It is not, however,
just sheer quantity that matters in Iran's case; no less important is
its future productive capacity. Although Saudi Arabia possesses larger
reserves, it is now producing oil at close to its maximum sustainable
rate (about 10 million barrels per day). It will probably be unable
to raise its output significantly over the next 20 years while global
demand, pushed by significantly higher consumption in the United States,
China, and India, is expected to rise by 50%. Iran, on the other hand,
has considerable growth potential: it is now producing about 4 million
barrels per day, but is thought to be capable of boosting its output
by another 3 million barrels or so. Few, if any, other countries possess
this potential, so Iran's importance as a producer, already significant,
is bound to grow in the years ahead.
And it is not just
oil that Iran possesses in great abundance, but also natural gas. According
to Oil and Gas Journal, Iran has an estimated 940 trillion cubic feet
of gas, or approximately 16% of total world reserves. (Only Russia,
with 1,680 trillion cubic feet, has a larger supply.) As it takes approximately
6,000 cubic feet of gas to equal the energy content of 1 barrel of oil,
Iran's gas reserves represent the equivalent of about 155 billion barrels
of oil. This, in turn, means that its combined hydrocarbon reserves
are the equivalent of some 280 billion barrels of oil, just slightly
behind Saudi Arabia's combined supply. At present, Iran is producing
only a small share of its gas reserves, about 2.7 trillion cubic feet
per year. This means that Iran is one of the few countries capable of
supplying much larger amounts of natural gas in the future.
What all this means
is that Iran will play a critical role in the world's future energy
equation. This is especially true because the global demand for natural
gas is growing faster than that for any other source of energy, including
oil. While the world currently consumes more oil than gas, the supply
of petroleum is expected to contract in the not-too-distant future as
global production approaches its peak sustainable level -- perhaps as
soon as 2010 -- and then begins a gradual but irreversible decline.
The production of natural gas, on the other hand, is not likely to peak
until several decades from now, and so is expected to take up much of
the slack when oil supplies become less abundant. Natural gas is also
considered a more attractive fuel than oil in many applications, especially
because when consumed it releases less carbon dioxide (a major contributor
to the greenhouse effect).
No doubt the major
U.S. energy companies would love to be working with Iran today in developing
these vast oil and gas supplies. At present, however, they are prohibited
from doing so by Executive Order (EO) 12959, signed by President Clinton
in 1995 and renewed by President Bush in March 2004. The United States
has also threatened to punish foreign firms that do business in Iran
(under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996), but this has not deterred
many large companies from seeking access to Iran's reserves. China,
which will need vast amounts of additional oil and gas to fuel its red-hot
economy, is paying particular attention to Iran. According to the Department
of Energy (DoE), Iran supplied 14% of China's oil imports in 2003, and
is expected to provide an even larger share in the future. China is
also expected to rely on Iran for a large share of its liquid natural
gas (LNG) imports. In October 2004, Iran signed a $100 billion, 25-year
contract with Sinopec, a major Chinese energy firm, for joint development
of one of its major gas fields and the subsequent delivery of LNG to
China. If this deal is fully consummated, it will constitute one of
China's biggest overseas investments and represent a major strategic
linkage between the two countries.
India is also keen
to obtain oil and gas from Iran. In January, the Gas Authority of India
Ltd. (GAIL) signed a 30-year deal with the National Iranian Gas Export
Corp. for the transfer of as much as 7.5 million tons of LNG to India
per year. The deal, worth an estimated $50 billion, will also entail
Indian involvement in the development of Iranian gas fields. Even more
noteworthy, Indian and Pakistani officials are discussing the construction
of a $3 billion natural gas pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan
¬ an extraordinary step for two long-term adversaries. If completed,
the pipeline would provide both countries with a substantial supply
of gas and allow Pakistan to reap $200-$500 million per year in transit
fees. "The gas pipeline is a win-win proposition for Iran, India,
and Pakistan," Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz declared in
January.
Despite the pipeline's
obvious attractiveness as an incentive for reconciliation between India
and Pakistan -- nuclear powers that have fought three wars over Kashmir
since 1947 and remain deadlocked over the future status of that troubled
territory -- the project was condemned by Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice during a recent trip to India. "We have communicated to the
Indian government our concerns about the gas pipeline cooperation between
Iran and India," she said on March 16 after meeting with Indian
Foreign Minister Natwar Singh in New Delhi. The administration has,
in fact, proved unwilling to back any project that offers an economic
benefit to Iran. This has not, however, deterred India from proceeding
with the pipeline.
Japan has also broken
ranks with Washington on the issue of energy ties with Iran. In early
2003, a consortium of three Japanese companies acquired a 20% stake
in the development of the Soroush-Nowruz offshore field in the Persian
Gulf, a reservoir thought to hold 1 billion barrels of oil. One year
later, the Iranian Offshore Oil Company awarded a $1.26 billion contract
to Japan's JGC Corporation for the recovery of natural gas and natural
gas liquids from Soroush-Nowruz and other offshore fields.
When considering
Iran's role in the global energy equation, therefore, Bush administration
officials have two key strategic aims: a desire to open up Iranian oil
and gas fields to exploitation by American firms, and concern over Iran's
growing ties to America's competitors in the global energy market. Under
U.S. law, the first of these aims can only be achieved after the President
lifts EO 12959, and this is not likely to occur as long as Iran is controlled
by anti-American mullahs and refuses to abandon its uranium enrichment
activities with potential bomb-making applications. Likewise, the ban
on U.S. involvement in Iranian energy production and export gives Tehran
no choice but to pursue ties with other consuming nations. From the
Bush administration's point of view, there is only one obvious and immediate
way to alter this unappetizing landscape -- by inducing "regime
change" in Iran and replacing the existing leadership with one
far friendlier to U.S. strategic interests.
That the Bush administration
seeks to foster regime change in Iran is not in any doubt. The very
fact that Iran was included with Saddam's Iraq and Kim Jong Il's North
Korea in the "Axis of Evil" in the President's 2002 State
of the Union Address was an unmistakable indicator of this. Bush let
his feelings be known again in June 2003, at a time when there were
anti-government protests by students in Tehran. "This is the beginning
of people expressing themselves toward a free Iran, which I think is
positive," he declared. In a more significant indication of White
House attitudes on the subject, the Department of Defense has failed
to fully disarm the People's Mujaheddin of Iran (or Mujaheddin-e Khalq,
MEK), an anti-government militia now based in Iraq that has conducted
terrorist actions in Iran and is listed on the State Department's roster
of terrorist organizations. In 2003, the Washington Post reported that
some senior administration figures would like to use the MEK as a proxy
force in Iran, in the same manner that the Northern Alliance was employed
against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
The Iranian leadership
is well aware that it faces a serious threat from the Bush administration
and is no doubt taking whatever steps it can to prevent such an attack.
Here, too, oil is a major factor in both Tehran's and Washington's calculations.
To deter a possible American assault, Iran has threatened to close the
Strait of Hormuz and otherwise obstruct oil shipping in the Persian
Gulf area. "An attack on Iran will be tantamount to endangering
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and, in a word, the entire Middle East oil,"
Iranian Expediency Council secretary Mohsen Rezai said on March 1st.
Such threats are
taken very seriously by the U.S. Department of Defense. "We judge
Iran can briefly close the Strait of Hormuz, relying on a layered strategy
using predominantly naval, air, and some ground forces," Vice Admiral
Lowell E. Jacoby, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified
before the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 16th.
Planning for such
attacks is, beyond doubt, a major priority for top Pentagon officials.
In January, veteran investigative reporter Seymour Hersh reported in
the New Yorker magazine that the Department of Defense was conducting
covert reconnaissance raids into Iran, supposedly to identify hidden
Iranian nuclear and missile facilities that could be struck in future
air and missile attacks. "I was repeatedly told that the next strategic
target was Iran," Hersh said of his interviews with senior military
personnel. Shortly thereafter, the Washington Post revealed that the
Pentagon was flying surveillance drones over Iran to verify the location
of weapons sites and to test Iranian air defenses. As noted by the Post,
"Aerial espionage [of this sort] is standard in military preparations
for an eventual air attack." There have also been reports of talks
between U.S. and Israeli officials about a possible Israeli strike on
Iranian weapons facilities, presumably with behind-the-scenes assistance
from the United States.
In reality, much
of Washington's concern about Iran's pursuit of WMD and ballistic missiles
is sparked by fears for the safety of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, other
Persian Gulf oil producers, and Israel rather than by fears of a direct
Iranian assault on the United States. "Tehran has the only military
in the region that can threaten its neighbors and Gulf security,"
Jacoby declared in his February testimony. "Its expanding ballistic
missile inventory presents a potential threat to states in the region."
It is this regional threat that American leaders are most determined
to eliminate.
In this sense, more
than any other, the current planning for an attack on Iran is fundamentally
driven by concern over the safety of U.S. energy supplies, as was the
2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. In the most telling expression of White
House motives for going to war against Iraq, Vice President Dick Cheney
(in an August 2002 address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars) described
the threat from Iraq as follows: "Should all [of Hussein's WMD]
ambitions be realized, the implications would be enormous for the Middle
East and the United States.... Armed with an arsenal of these weapons
of terror and a seat atop 10 percent of the world's oil reserves, Saddam
Hussein could then be expected to seek domination of the entire Middle
East, take control of a great portion of the world's energy supplies,
[and] directly threaten America's friends throughout the region."
This was, of course, unthinkable to Bush's inner circle. And all one
need do is substitute the words "Iranian mullahs" for Saddam
Hussein, and you have a perfect expression of the Bush administration
case for making war on Iran.
So, even while publicly
focusing on Iran's weapons of mass destruction, key administration figures
are certainly thinking in geopolitical terms about Iran's role in the
global energy equation and its capacity to obstruct the global flow
of petroleum. As was the case with Iraq, the White House is determined
to eliminate this threat once and for all. And so, while oil may not
be the administration's sole reason for going to war with Iran, it is
an essential factor in the overall strategic calculation that makes
war likely.
Michael T. Klare
is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College
and the author of Blood
and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Dependency
on Imported Oil (Metropolitan Books).
Copyright 2005 Michael
T. Klare
[This article first
appeared on Tomdispatch.com, a weblog of the Nation Institute, which
offers a steady flow of alternate sources, news, and opinion from Tom
Engelhardt, long time editor in publishing and author of The End of
Victory Culture and The Last Days of Publishing.]