Hiroshima Memories Don't Deter
South Asia's Hawks
By J. Sri Raman
13 August, 2005
Truthout.org
Two messages have gone out to the people of India during the Hiroshima-Nagasaki week, ending today. The first went out from the peace movement, and it pointed to the greater and graver significance of the occasion for the world and South Asia. The second was a loud and clear signal from the rulers of India and Pakistan - that they were united in their resolve not to let the long-past Japanese tragedy affect their nuclear weapons programs at all.
India, in fact, is currently witnessing a campaign by nuclear militarists for a strengthening of the county's nuclear-weapons program.
The peace movement was at pains to tell the people that the 60th anniversary ofHiroshima-Nagasaki bombings was of special significance for two reasons. The anniversary had come at a time when the militarist forces led by the George Bush administration in Washington threatened not only more wars but also a new legitimacy to nuclear weapons. The "window of opportunity" for an advance toward nuclear disarmament, which the overly-optimistic had seen opening after the end of the cold war, has been shut firmly and finally with Washington announcing at various forums its determination to go ahead with plans for "usable" nuclear weapons for "winnable" nuclear wars.
The situation, the movement pointed out in rallies across India, was particularly serious in south Asia, despite the much-vaunted India-Pakistan peace process. It was recalled that this process, which had produced some welcome measures to promote people-to-people relations, had been kept studiously away from the issue of nuclear weapons.
The recent India-US nuclear accord, the movement stressed, did not promise further progress on this front from the process.
Off and on, of course, the subcontinent has been treated to minor spectacles of talks between Indian and Pakistani mandarins on nuclear "CBMs" (confidence-building measures).
Little has come out of the 18-months-long process, however, that can inspire any confidence among sections of the populace not convinced thus far about the claimed peace dividends of the nuke programs.
Only a couple of mice have crawled out of the mountain of peace labor, as pro-official sections of the media have projected the alleged quest for CBMs. One was an agreement on setting up a hotline between the DGMOs (Directorates-General of Military Operations) of the two countries, which has evidently not banished the horror of a nuclear war forever. The other was the idea of a system of pre-notification of each other about missile tests by the nuclear-armed rivals.
Yet another round of talks between Indian and Pakistani experts, held in New Delhi between the Hiroshima and Nagasaki days, made no concrete progress despite the conspicuous "cordiality" of polite smiles and prolonged handshakes. During the talks of August 8, it was decided to upgrade the hotline and set up another between the two foreign secretaries. It has also been announced that the missile notification will be in place, though no details are available about how the reported differences over the notification format were resolved. There seems to be a tacit agreement on withholding information about the trajectory of the tested missile.
The talks have totally avoided, so far, the possibility of de-deployment of nuclear-armed missiles and a de-alerting of nuclear weapons on either side. Even concerted measures for nuclear safety have remained conspicuous by their absence in the agenda before the official experts.
The results of this round have encouraged nuclear hawks in India to step up their campaign for a reinforcement of the country's nuclear arsenal and a promotion of the place of its nuclear-weapon program in its defense policy and practice.
As we have noted before in these columns, the hawks have been as harsh in their criticism of the India-US nuclear deal as the peace activists. An initial point of criticism was that the deal might eventually dictate a "cap" on the program. With the India-Pakistan dialogue now reinforcing
New Delhi's reassurance in this regard, suggestions for a stronger Indian nuclear arsenal have become more specific. Security analyst Bharat Karnad, for example, has urged the government to prove that the deal won't deter India from going for production of thermonuclear weapons.He argues that these weapons "offer far more bang for the buck and, with megaton yield, create disproportionate political leverage and sort of psychological dread that enables deterrence and dissuasion to work even against the most powerful states."
Pro-deal but no less prominent a hawk, C. Raja Mohan argues that their failure to adopt nuclear CBMs may actually spell success in adopting "conventional CBMs." These, he says, can be carried to the extent of a "phased and balanced reduction of forces," as part of a "military modernization." The argument amounts to one, actually, for a central place for nuclear weapons in the defense policies of both India and Pakistan.
The Hiroshima-Nagasaki week has come and gone, leaving India's peace movement preparing to face a tougher challenge over the coming years.
