India, US Open
Can Of
Nuclear Worms
By Praful Bidwai
21 July, 2005
Inter Press Service
More
than 30 years after the United States walked out of a nuclear cooperation
agreement with India, because it conducted an atomic test, the two countries
have agreed to resume collaboration in civilian nuclear energy.
A joint-statement
issued by US President George W. Bush and visiting Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh in Washington on Tuesday said the US would now ''work
with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full
civil nuclear energy and trade with India.''
Essentially, this
means that Washington has now accepted India as a nuclear weapons-state
(NWS) although it is euphemistically referred to as ''a state with advanced
nuclear technology''.
That would entail
a dilution of the global nuclear regime, founded on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), which only recognizes five NWSs. All five crossed the
atomic threshold before 1967 while India became a self-declared NWS
only in 1998.
The US-India agreement
is likely to run into problems on the supply side, in the US and in
the Nuclear Suppliers' Group comprising 44 relatively industrialized
states as well as on the recipient side - India.
Under the agreement
signed between Bush and Singh, the US has promised to sell nuclear materials
and equipment to India and also to involve it in 'advanced' areas of
research.
Interestingly, this
could mean a role for India in the International Thermonuclear Experimental
Reactor (ITER) which will experiment with fusion reactions that release
energy when nuclei are forced together - unlike fission in which nuclei
are split to release energy. In return, India would ''assume the same
responsibilities'' and ''acquire the same benefits and advantages as
other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology'' that could
only be read as nuclear weapon states.
Besides ''working
to prevent the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction'',
India would take a series of steps towards ''identifying and separating
civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs.''
India would also
be required to file a declaration regarding its civilians facilities
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and place them under
its safeguards, continue its ''unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing''
and work with the US for the ''conclusion of a multilateral Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty''.
India would also
''secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export
control legislation'' and through ''adherence to Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) guidelines''
although it is not a member of either grouping.
There are deep divisions
within the US establishment over restructuring the global nuclear order
to accommodate India. For instance, security experts like Ashley J.
Tellis advocate that the US should integrate India into the global non-proliferation
regime by treating it as a de facto nuclear state and transferring nuclear
technology to new facilities, but under safeguards.
Others like George
Perkovich argue that the ''the US and others should not adjust the nuclear
non-proliferation regime to accommodate India's desire for access to
nuclear technology - The costs of breaking faith with non-nuclear weapons
states such as Japan, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Sweden and others
who forswore nuclear weapons [are] too high to warrant accommodating
India's nuclear desires''.
These states are
also NSG members and could put up stiff resistance to Bush's promise
to relax the global non-proliferation regime. The NSG's guidelines are
tougher than many IAEA safeguards.
Resistance is likely
from within the Indian establishment too. ''The first problem with the
agreement is that it misses the point about the extremely limited scope
for meaningful nuclear cooperation between India and US,'' argues A
Gopalakrishnan, a nuclear engineer and former chairman of India's Atomic
Energy Regulatory Board (IAERB).
''The US has no
worthwhile current expertise in the design, construction, operation,
maintenance or safety of any of the type of reactors existing or envisaged
in the Indian nuclear power program,'' Gopalakrishnan said.
India's reactors
include two obsolete US-built enriched uranium-boiling water reactors
more than a dozen reactors which burn natural uranium with heavy water,
and fast-breeder reactors. The US has no commercial natural uranium-based
heavy water reactors, the mainstay of the Indian nuclear power program.
While India could
change its nuclear technology trajectory from natural to enriched uranium
and import US-made reactors this would make it too dependent as India
has not been able to enrich uranium in large enough quantities.
External dependence
is unacceptable to many Indian policy-makers, especially in the Department
of Atomic Energy (DAE), which has had an unpleasant experience with
procuring enriched uranium fuel for two US- built reactors at Tarapur,
near the western port city of Mumbai.
India does need
raw uranium too because its existing mines are rapidly depleting and
there is popular resistance to the opening of new mines. Importing uranium
will need relaxation of NSG guidelines and the US has promised to bring
this about.
''Yet, it is far
from clear that the other 43 members of the NSG will agree,'' says a
high-level DAE source, who requested anonymity. ''In the past, the NSG
failed to reach a consensus on supply of enriched uranium for Tarapur.
The guidelines demand full-scope safeguards under the IAEA. This is
something we in the DAE are unwilling to fall in line with''.
The same source
said it is difficult to isolate India's civilian nuclear facilities
and activities from military ones. Often, the two occur in the same
location or laboratory. So having IAEA inspectors will interfere with
India's ''sovereignty''.
''Besides most DAE
scientists would be loath to subject, say, fast- breeder reactors to
IAEA safeguards. They are the next stage in our energy independence
plans, and will pave the way for the use of thorium, of which India
has an abundance. We in the DAE believe in the doctrine of self-reliance
and independence in matters nuclear,'' the source said.
However, this belief
is not supported by facts. In the past, India has lawfully imported
or clandestinely bought nuclear technology or materials from diverse
sources like the US, China, the former USSR, Russia, France, Norway
and Britain.
But the idea of
nuclear self-reliance remains an article of faith with many DAE officials
and scientists. One of them, A.N. Prasad, a former director of the Bhabha
Atomic Research Center, has been quoted as saying that allowing IAEA
safeguards ''goes against the national interest''.
Thus the Indo-US
deal does not have the full support of the principal Indian agency responsible
for its execution. It is also likely to run into rough weather politically
because there is no broad consensus on the issue of safeguards or conformity
with NSG and MTCR guidelines.
There is the trickier
issue of India agreeing to extend its moratorium on conducting nuclear
weapons tests. In 1995-96, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was vehemently
opposed by a cross-section of political parties but after the 1998 blasts,
India unilaterally declared a moratorium on further tests.
Reiterating that
commitment in a joint declaration with the US is sure to raise fears
about loss of - sovereignty and vulnerability to pressure from
Washington and is fraught with political consequences at home.
The emphasis in
the agreement on promoting nuclear power to meet ''growing global energy
demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner'' is likely to invite
opposition from India's environmentalist movement.
Environmentalists
have pointed to the grave hazards posed by nuclear technology through
its propensity for serious accidents, and the problem of high-level
radioactive wastes which remain menacing for tens of thousands of years.
© 2005 IPS
- Inter Press Service