Sharing Power
In Maharashtra
With Fairness And Justice
By Satinath Choudhary
24 October, 2004
Countercurrents.org
I
would like to congratulate Congress and Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)
for having defeated fascist coalition of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
and Shiva Sena in the assembly elections in the Indian state of Maharashtra.
What puzzles me is that when a pig-headed party like BJP can reach agreement
with other parties even if they have diagonally opposite ideologies
and rule, why can't saner parties learn the art of sharing power from
their enemy? Here is a suggestion for trying something new by the Congress-NCP
in Maharashtra. They could try a Swiss style (seven persons) Executive
Council. First allow me to briefly describe the Swiss system. Thereafter
I will try to present a possible Indian model of the same, with advantages
of trying the new model in India.
In Switzerland they
hold elections using Proportional Representation (PR) system. Under
PR each party gets number of seats in proportion to votes that a party
gets. Members from their four relatively large parties that win a total
of nearly 70% of the seats in the Swiss Parliament, form the Executive
Committee (EC), per what they call "Golden Rule". According
to this rule the largest three parties contribute two members each,
with the seventh member coming from the fourth party. Each of these
parties nominates three or four members for the EC. From among the nominees
a collection of seven is made conforming with the said golden rule of
2+2+2+1 and also making sure that two of the members speak French and
one speaks Italian. Keeping these constraints in mind, the Parliament
votes and approves the seven-member EC. The Committee is elected for
the full term of the Parliament, i.e.,for four years. This insulates
the EC from the Parliament and provides separation of the Executive
from the legislative body. The fixed term also imparts stability to
the Council as well as to the Parliament.
The seven members
of the EC enjoy equal power. They share the responsibility of chairperson
on rotating basis for a year each, on seniority basis. However, the
chair does not have any more power than the other members, even though
he or she does act as the Head of State in welcoming other Heads of
State and for representing Switzerland outside Switzerland.
In Maharashtra they
could ask members of the Congress-NCP coalition and others who want
to join them to form seven different groups of nearly equal size on
whatever basis they feel like. Each of those seven groups could then
nominate two or three persons (say, three, for the sake of definiteness)
for their Executive Council. They could do this nomination from within
each group by using Approval Voting (AV) system. AV system works as
follows. Each person within the group may approve as many people from
within the group as they feel like. The top three persons getting the
largest number of approvals would be the nominees from each of the seven
groups, totaling 21. The 21 must contain at least one person from SC,
ST, LBC (Lower BC), UBC (upper BC), Muslim, UC (Upper Caste), and at
least one who does not fit in any of the categories mentioned above,
The group of 21 nominees must also have at least three women among them.
If it does not, we will have to look back into all approval
votes and pick out three women with largest approvals. They will replace
men from their respective groups with lowest approvals. From the 21
nominees, the ruling coalition will need to form an EC (Executive Council)
composed of at least one from each of the segments SC, ST, LBC, UBC,
Muslim, UC, and at least three women, at least three individuals from
the Congress and NCP, each, and at least one who is from neither of
these two main parties. They could use AV again with the understanding
that first three women with highest approvals would be inducted into
the EC, followed by four more individuals (they could include more women),
scanning through the list of 21 nominees in descending order of approvals
in making selections, and making sure that all of the above mentioned
quotas are filled.
The process indicated
above or some other one similar to it would ensure caste, gender, religion
and party balance and ideological balance from within the winning coalition.
The seven members of the EC would thus be considered elected for the
next five years. It will try to act as joint Chief Minister. They would
try to work in a consensual fashion. Consensus doesn't necessarily mean
unanimity. But it does stipulate an earnest effort towards accommodation
and unanimity as far as possible on each issue, and then moving on.
They may appoint some cabinet members from outside the parliament. To
avoid connection between the Executive Council and the Assembly the
EC would avoid choosing any cabinet members from within the Assembly.
At the Cabinet level also, the EC may like to appoint groups of 3-5
individuals for heading various departments of the government, and try
to ensure caste, gender, religion and party balance in the total composition
of the cabinet. These cabinet members could be given the titles of secretaries.
Advantages of forming
multi-member collective of seven as Executive Council by the above process:
1. We know that
a multi-member bench is supposed to have greater integrity and trust
of the people. That is the reason why in Supreme Courts and High Courts
they form multi-member benches for hearing important court castes. Election
Commission is composed of three Commissioners. Why not borrow this convention
from courts and Election Commission into political arena. It may impart
greatly needed integrity and transparency to the government.
2. The EC collective
and the cabinet would be well balanced in caste, religion, party and
gender representation, in conformity with the tenets of social justice.
3. Since the cabinet
members would be from outside Assembly, a much larger pool of "experts"
would be available to the EC to choose from.
4. Fixed term for
the Council will cause the EC to be independent of the Legislative Assembly.
5. This kind of
setup would be essential, in case we try to experiment with PR system
of election in India. Westminster type of parliamentary government with
PR may tend to be unstable, aside from having too much power because
of mixing of executive and legislative functions. An experiment with
the above described Swiss like EC system would open us up towards trying
new setups.
6. For those curious
about PR system of election, a booklet entitled "Curing Cancer
(RSS/BJP) of India by Ushering Total Democracy with PR-based Primary
Elections", has been uploaded at
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/india-unity/files/.
It describes a PR system of election that would be suitable for India,
and strategies to bring about the needed change.
7. Reduced ministry
size and disconnection of executive and legislative branches would quite
likely contribute towards reducing corruption as well.
8. The new system
will encourage us to study the working of Swiss and other European governments,
which appear to have enormously successful consociational governments
with solid social security systems.
9. Switzerland has
a considerable degree of multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual
complexity, like India, even though not as much as India's. Switzerland's
main linguistic and ethnic groups appear to be enjoying enviable peace,
prosperity and amity. We can learn a lot from their way of thinking,
living, governance and sharing power among all segments.
10. Congress and
NCP have emerged in a markedly equal strength. It would not be fair
to choose one over the other for Chief Ministerial position. Instead
of being source of contention, their balance can become a source of
their strength. Partnerships always require justice and fairness.
Dr. Satinath Choudhary
Retired College professor
115 West 238 Street
Bronx, New York 10463
USA
Phone: 718-548-5249