The Iranian Conundrum: Theocracy,
Martial Law or Democracy?
By Taj Hashmi
22 June, 2009
Countercurrents.org
Drawing parallels is an old art for historians as well as other members of the broad humanities and social science disciplines. Hence the examples of the successful Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the failed Tiananmen Square Fiasco (without being disrespectful to the Chinese aspirants for "democracy", which many of them could not define, as I recall from what I watched on my TV screen in 1989) are being juxtaposed against the recent upheaval in Iran. If we believe analysts and Iran and Islam "experts" – there seems to be too many to name and keep track of what they are churning out every hour – either we are on the threshold of what happened in Iran in 1979 or China in 1989. Some of them even think of re-staging the Russian or East European dramas of 1989-90 in Iran. All of these “experts” cannot be correct at the same time.
I still remember the CIA's predictions about Khomeini made in the wake of his triumphant entry into Tehran in February 1979: "This mullah is not interested in power". It is tempting to cite the foreword of a book, The Future of the Gulf (RIIA, London 1990), which a big wig of the (British) Royal Institute for International Affairs wrote: [to paraphrase him] "The Persian Gulf will remain an abode of peace and tranquility since both Iraq and Iran are tired and exhausted of the eight-year-long bloody war". The book came out in May 1990 and Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August. And Kuwait is very much a "Gulf Country".
I have just given these examples of how “experts” are often proven wrong. Iran is not going to witness another 1979 in the foreseeable future. Most unlikely another Tiananmen episode is going to be repeated again; it seems, whatever was supposed to happen, has happened. One cannot, however, totally rule out a military takeover (if the clergy is really determined to shoot at its feet).
Conversely, this does not mean that the grip of the Ayatollahs and their beneficiaries (mostly corrupt and power-drunk) will remain as firm as it used to be. They have been shaken, not only because the young and restless are on street, but also because not-so-radical Hussein Moussavi, and most importantly Grand Ayatollah Hussein Montazeri, a close associate of Khomeini up to 1989, have also come forward demanding accountability and democracy from the government. Montazeri has publicly ridiculed the election results: "No one in their right mind can believe" the results of the Iranian elections. In his public letter to the “oppressed people of Iran” the Grand Ayatollah asks them “to continue reclaiming their dues calmly”; and then asks the police and armed forces to defy orders and not to “sell their religion” to the regime. So far so good!
In spite of this, we can hardly ignore what President Ahmadinejad represents without setting aside the fact about his immense popularity among rural and urban poor underdogs. He is not the one calling the shots. He merely represents the well-entrenched clergy under the “supreme leader” Ayatollah Khameini, backed by well-armed and loyal three-million-strong Baseej militia and a couple of hundred thousand of Revolutionary Guards (yet to have turned disloyal unlike the Shah’s troops in 1979), thanks to their vested interests and “ideological” commitment to the Islamic Republic.
What very few analysts have so far informed us about the Iranian crisis is – how despite the popular perception outside Iran – Ahmadinejad is “more popular, hence electable” in Iran, than his contenders including former Prime Minister Mir Hussein Moussavi, no liberal democrat and a former protégé of Khomeini. We may partially agree with two leading Iran experts having years of teaching and research experience in the US, including the National Security Council, in this regard. Without denying the fact about election manipulations in Iran, very similar to many other countries, they assert that as the election victories by Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani were “surprising” to many, so is Ahmadinejad’s re-election. They assert that most Iranians consider him the winner, not in the polls but also in the televised debate with Moussavi. Rafsanjani’s widely known corrupt sons and daughter Faezeh Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former member of the Parliament publicly supported Moussavi, which seemed to have negative impact on the latter’s candidature. Moussavi’s willingness to suspend Iran’s uranium enrichment program without getting anything substantial from the West, might have cost him dearly at the polls. In sum, this study also reveals that Ahmadinejad had always been ahead of his rivals in the nation-wide opinion polls conducted by the Washington-based Terror-Free Tomorrow during May 11 and 20, at least by twenty points [Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, “Ahmadinejad won. Get over it”, Politico, June 15, 2009, www.politico.com/news/stories/0609/23745.html].
However, as eye-witness accounts suggest, the situation in Iran has some potential to turn more violent in coming days. There are also signs of political compromise and initiatives are being taken by some leading members of the powerful Council of Guardians run by 86 clerics in this regard. Ayatollah Khameini is the “supreme leader” of the Council, which is again headed by pro-Moussavi Rafsanjani, widely known as father of two corrupt brothers, who are also with Moussavi. We also hear from these accounts that possibly one-third of the Council of clerics are pro-Rafsanjani and about one-quarter is considered loyal to Ahmadinejad. The rest could vote “either way”. In the event of Ahmadinejad’s police brutality further alienating most members of the supreme Council of clerics, both Khameini and his protégé Ahmadinejad would be in trouble. One analyst has already raised the question: “If the clergy become Khameini’s enemy, just think about it”. He is implying that while the Shah could not exist by alienating the clergy, Khameini and Ahmadinejad would not be able to sustain any longer without their support.
Then again, one may reject the analysis as mere wishful thinking. With hindsight we know the Shah lost because the clergy was dead against him, but so were the Bazaari (small traders), middle classes and urban and rural poor. We also know that presently the well-entrenched and extremely privileged clergy (some members, including Rafsanjani, are widely known for corruption and hedonistic life-style) is least likely to rock the boat to the detriment of its collective interest.
We must not lose sight of the fact that the Iranian regime since the Revolution is not only a ruthless theocracy, but it has almost all the ingredients of a proto-fascist military oligarchy. And one should not be that optimistic about the prospect of overthrowing such a regime in days or weeks by Gandhian non-violent Satyagraha or civil-disobedience. Without mass defection of the privileged Baseej militia and Revolutionary Guards for some unexplainable reasons; and without the clergy’s sudden desire to relinquish power and privileges it is enjoying for the last thirty years just for the sake of democracy are the least likely things to happen in Iran in the coming months. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that the grip of the clergy has been weakened; people have become restive and desperate for change, especially the bulk of the urban youth. In the event of a divided clergy’s failure to hold power any longer, a military takeover not people’s power or democracy seems to be the next alternative order in Iran.
Taj Hashmi is Professor, Asia-Pacific Center for Security studies Honolulu, Hawaii, USA
