Countdown
To War On Iran
By Alain Gresh
07 June, 2007
Le Monde Diplomatique
Silently,
stealthily, unseen by cameras, the war on Iran has already begun. Many
sources confirm that the United States, bent on destabilising the Islamic
Republic, has increased its aid to armed movements among the Azeri,
Baluchi, Arab and Kurdish ethnic minorities that make up about 40% of
the Iranian population. ABC News reported in April that the US had secretly
assisted the Baluchi group Jund al-Islam (Soldiers of Islam), responsible
for a recent attack in which some 20 members of the Revolutionary Guard
were killed. According to an American Foundation report (1), US commandos
have operated inside Iran since 2004.
President George Bush categorised
Iran, along with North Korea and Iraq, as the "axis of evil"
in his State of the Union address in January 2002. Then in June 2003
he said the US and its allies should make it clear that they "would
not tolerate" the construction of a nuclear weapon in Iran.
It is worth recalling the
context in which these statements were made. President Mohammed Khatami
had repeatedly called for "dialogue among civilisations".
Tehran had actively supported the US in Afghanistan, providing many
contacts that Washington had used to facilitate the overthrow of the
Taliban regime. At a meeting in Geneva on 2 May 2003 between Javad Zaraf,
the Iranian ambassador, and Zalmay Khalilzad, Bush's special envoy to
Afghanistan, the Tehran government submitted a proposal to the White
House for general negotiations on weapons of mass destruction, terrorism
and security, and economic cooperation (2). The Islamic Republic said
it was ready to support the Arab peace initiative tabled at the Beirut
summit in 2002 and help to transform the Lebanese Hizbullah into a political
party. Tehran signed the Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty on 18 December 2003, which considerably strengthens the supervisory
powers of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) but which only
a few countries have ratified.
The US administration swept
all these overtures aside since its only objective is to overthrow the
mullahs. To create the conditions for military intervention, it constantly
brandishes "the nuclear threat". Year after year US administrations
have produced alarmist reports, always proved wrong. In January 1995
the director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said Iran
could have the bomb by 2003, while the US defence secretary, William
Perry, predicted it would have the bomb by 2000. These forecasts were
repeated by Israel's Shimon Peres a year later. Yet last month, despite
Iran's progress in uranium enrichment, the IAEA considered that it would
be four to six years before Tehran had the capability to produce the
bomb.
What is the truth? Since
the 1960s, long before the Islamic revolution, Iran has sought to develop
nuclear power in preparation for the post-oil era. Technological developments
have made it easier to pass from civil to military applications once
the processes have been mastered. Have Tehran's leaders decided to do
so? There is no evidence that they have. Is there a risk that they may?
Yes, there is, for obvious reasons.
During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq
war, Saddam Hussein's regime, in breach of every international treaty,
used chemical weapons against Iran, but there was no outcry in the US,
or in France, against these weapons of mass destruction, which had a
traumatic effect on the Iranian people. US troops are deployed in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and Iran is surrounded by a network of foreign military
bases. Two neighbouring countries, Pakistan and Israel, have nuclear
weapons. No Iranian political leader could fail to be aware of this
situation.
How to prevent escalation?
So how is Tehran to be prevented
from acquiring nuclear weapons, a move that would start a new arms race
in a region that is already highly unstable and deal a fatal blow to
the non-proliferation treaty? Contrary to common assumptions, the main
obstacle is not Tehran's determination to enrich uranium. Iran has a
right to do so under the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty but it has always
said it was prepared to impose voluntary restrictions on that right
and to agree to increased IAEA inspections to prevent any possible use
of enriched uranium for military purposes.
The Islamic Republic's fundamental
concern lies elsewhere. Witness the agreement signed on 14 November
2004 with France, Britain and Germany, under which Iran agreed to suspend
uranium enrichment temporarily on the understanding that a long-term
agreement would "provide firm commitments on security issues".
Washington refused to give any such commitments and Iran resumed its
enrichment programme.
The European Union chose
not to pursue an independent line but to follow Washington's lead. The
new proposals produced by the five members of the Security Council and
Germany in June 2006 contained no guarantee of non-intervention in Iranian
affairs. In Tehran's reply to the proposals, delivered in August, it
again "suggest[ed] that the western parties who want to participate
in the negotiation team announce on behalf of their own and other European
countries, to set aside the policy of intimidation, pressure and sanctions
against Iran". Only if such a commitment was made could negotiations
be resumed.
If not, escalation is inevitable.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's election as president in June 2005 has not made
dialogue any easier, given his taste for provocative statements, particularly
about the Holocaust and Israel. But Iran is a big country rich in history
and there is more to it than its president. There is much tension within
the government and Ahmadinejad had severe setbacks both in the local
elections and in elections to the Assembly of Experts in December 2006.
There are substantial challenges, economic and social, and forceful
demands for more freedom, especially among women and young people. Iranians
refuse to be regimented and the only strong card the regime has to win
their loyalty is nationalism, a refusal to accept the kind of foreign
interference suffered throughout the 20th century.
Despite the disaster in Iraq,
there is no indication that Bush has given up the idea of attacking
Iran. This is part of his vision of a "third world war" against
"Islamic fascism", an ideological war that can end only in
complete victory. The demonisation of Iran, aggravated by the attitude
of its president, is part of this strategy and may culminate in yet
another military venture. That would be a disaster, not only for Iran
and the Arab world, but for western, especially European, relations
with the Middle East.
Translated by Barbara Wilson
Alain Gresh is editor of
Le Monde diplomatique and a specialist on the Middle East
(1) Sam Gardiner, "The
End of the 'Summer of diplomacy': Assessing US Military Options on Iran"
(in .pdf), Century Foundation Report, Washington, 2006.
(2) See Gareth Porter, "Burnt
Offering", The American Prospect, Washington, June 2006.
This article first appeared
in the excellent monthly Le Monde Diplomatique, whose English language
edition can be found at mondediplo.com The full text appears by agreement
with Le Monde Diplomatique and CounterPunch will feature one or two
articles from LMD every month.
All rights reserved ©
1997-2007 Le Monde diplomatique.
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