Projects
Of Mass Destruction
And Floods In Bangladesh
By Anu Muhammad
31 July, 2004
Countercurrents.org
Three fourth of
Bangladesh is now under water. About 50 million people are thrown from
bad to worse conditions. Not everybody is suffering; there is a small
section of people who feel joy with the rising water. They find their
business (from alu-patal to fund stealing to huge (re)construction potential
to flood control consultancy) booming.
Facing another flood,
another experience of human disaster where should we look at? People
in general are taught and eventually used to take flood sufferings-loss-tragedy
as a curse of fate. The ruling local-global lords are happy to describe
flooding as a natural disaster. I find the flood disaster as a close
associate of the development festival drama. In other words,
the flooding is closely linked to grabbing of water land and filling
them with shopping plazas and multistoried housing, and to big faulty
projects of irrigation and flood control. All these contributed to bringing
a country of free flow water to a water-logged country. This is a big
story full with lies, hypocrisy, cheating, intellectual fraud and all-out
plunder. To make it short I would like to discuss in brief on the water
projects and the role of the World Bank, along with the ADB, who enjoy
the status of friend philosopher and guide of local-foreign
beneficiaries of human suffering in a country like Bangladesh.
A countrywide big
flood in this land occurred in 1954. Thereafter Krug Mission under Mr.
Krug from the US visited the then East Pakistan. Following the report
of that mission Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) was established
in 1959 and several flood control and irrigation projects were conceived.
That was the beginning of a new era of massive intervention-injection-construction
on the water life in Bangladesh. Since then we had plenty of projects
for erecting embankments and other structures, also we experienced increased
intensity of water logging including flood. The time gaps between two
massive floods have been narrowing with increasing projects on flood:
1954 to 1974: 20 years, 1974 to 1987 and 1988: 13-14 years, 1988 to
1998: 10 years, and 1998 to 2004: 6 years. It is a linear progression!
In 1964, a 20-year
master plan for water resources development was initiated. While WAPDA
was established to take care of flood control and irrigation, Bangladesh
Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC) was given the responsibility
of popularizing, distributing and marketing HYV seed, chemical fertilizer
and pesticide. The programmes under both the authorities coincided with
the grand green revolution of 1960s, which was a package
program containing High Yielding Seed, Chemical Fertilizer, Pesticide
and Mechanical Irrigation.
After independence,
the government endorsed this modernization approach quite
uncritically and took steps to carry the program further; no attempt
was made to review this approach. In fact projects conceived in Pakistan
were mostly implemented in Bangladesh. Therefore while around 482 small,
medium and large water and embankment projects were implemented under
the master plan between 1959 and 1993, around 400 of these projects
were implemented after 1971. More than 8,200 kms of embankments were
constructed under these projects. In addition, more than 4,700 kms of
irrigation canals, 3400 kms of drainage channels, more than 9000 hydraulic
structures (such as sluice gates and regulators), 4300 bridges and culverts,
96 pump houses and two barrages were built. Similarly, the agricultural
inputs programs developed rapidly since 1965 and that continued thereafter
with direct initiative and credit from the World Bank.
In 1972 the World
Bank, for some reasons undisclosed, seemed critical about some of the
projects that had been started in the 60s. It termed many of the projects
as poorly conceived and ill-suited to the particular
needs of the country. It categorically named one, the Ganges-Kobadak
irrigation and flood control project as an example of a poorly
selected and prepared project. But by then $132 million had been
spent on that. According to the World Bank, after 16 years of
construction, redesign and reconstruction, the project failed to perform
at even 50 percent of the original design standard . Nevertheless,
the same institution kept itself busy continuing similar old big projects
and formulating similar new ones.
Earlier, the World
Bank carried out extensive studies on the economy of Bangladesh specially
on agriculture in the mid sixties. The Study was published just after
independence and became the working documents of the new government.
It framed the governments approach to agricultural and water resources
issues. However, the reports were kept outside public scrutiny or discussion
since those were labeled as confidential. The marketing
of pesticides, fertilizer, seeds and tube wells became an expanding
economic activity under the initiative of international agencies at
the same time. Another report was published in 1973 following a visit
by a Bank group mission in Bangladesh. The mission reviewed with
Government agencies the requirement for agricultural inputs
as well as potential projects and programs in the agricultural sector.
But since the requirements were already determined by the
earlier studies of the Bank itself, therefore the report easily could
say that their attention along with research programs would be
focused on HYV (High Yielding Variety) rice. It should be mentioned
here that, none of these projects tried to study and improve local varieties,
which might not require investment in chemical fertilizer, pesticide
and groundwater irrigation, which was also being advocated by the Bank.
An integrated rural
development program was also seen as a supporting tool of the above
modernization program. The World Bank report stated that, it would support
three high potential programs of the Ministry of Local Government: the
Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP), Rural Works Program (RWP)
and the Thana Irrigation Program (TIP). The World Bank, however, gave
particular importance on strengthening of engineering input to
the RWP by linking RWP activities with those of the Bangladesh Water
Development Board (BWDB), and increasing the proportion of RWP effort
devoted to construction of small drainage and irrigation systems to
increase agricultural production.
Repeatedly, World
Bank and other development missions have noted the great
potential for using ground water for domestic and agricultural needs
and therefore advocated for its more intensive use. Number of water
projects, such as, Brahmaputra right bank embankment project, Pabna
project, Dakatia and Halda project, Barisal project, Ganges-Kobadak
Kushtia project, Chenchuri and the Barnal, Salinpur-Bashukhali projects
in the Khulna area, Surma-Baulai Haor and the Knowai River projects
in Northeast region, River training, Chandpur riverbed stabilization
project, Chilmari project, Kurigram project came into being.
To name a few, Chalan
Beel, one of the richest wetland areas of Bangladesh, is now almost
ruined by water projects. Due to construction of ill conceived embankments
& regulators, drainage has been impeded and water logging has become
a serious problem in Atrai-Hurasagar drainage basin. In Beel Dakatia
huge area has been waterlogged for more than twenty years as a result
of big water projects. After nearly thirty years of successful
and intensive tapping of groundwater nearly 35 million people in Bangladesh
are now facing deadly threat from Arsenic poisoning. Experts opine that
arsenic in the groundwater has links with indiscriminate use of groundwater.
Now, again, the World Bank has taken the lead in conducting million
dollar projects related to managing the arsenic problem.
Asian Development
Bank (ADB) also played a significant role in formulating and supporting
similar programs. While numerous documents describe the processes leading
to the initiation of flood control, drainage and irrigation (FCDI) projects,
few exist that critique a projects completion or that post-project
evaluation. Both the World Bank and the ADB had been the largest actors
in these FCDI projects. They were involved in both surface water projects
under the Bangladesh Water Development Board and ground water projects
under the Bangladesh Agriculture Development Corporation. The share
of these two institutions of the projects in the sector has been more
than 70 percent.
Alan C. Lindquist,
in UNDP sponsored agriculture sector review, reported that while the
Asian Development Bank prepared project completion reports upon
completion of its projects there was a lack of completion
of ADB projects in Bangladesh, even though some were begun ten years
ago. In fact, he continued ADB-Dhaka was not able to show
me a single project completion report for one of their water projects.
Lindquist, citing another review of Asian Development Bank water projects
in Bangladesh, stated only 3 out of the ADB projects attempted
since 1973 have been completed and on average those took 72 percent
longer to complete than projected.
On the other hand,
Lindquist found World Banks documents to be in comparatively good
shape, although diplomatic language is used in them and controversial
issues are sometimes glossed over and not treated. He also observed
that the economic assessment of the projects and assumptions were sometimes
adjusted to keep the economic rate of return calculation from
going much below 15 per cent.
Consultants, local
and imported, have been the major beneficiaries of these projects. Since
these were all aided projects, appointment of donor
preferred foreign consultants had always been compulsory. Irrespective
of qualification, consultant fees have been a significant share of the
project costs. Another study showed that, foreign consultants
cost 6.8 to 25 times as much as local Bangladesh consultants, and 57
to 73 times as much as their BWDB counterparts. Often aided
water sector projects has been considered by both local and foreign
consultants/ engineers/ bureaucrats/ suppliers as something highly desirable
irrespective of its relevance or even its having harming element.
Hugh Brammer, longtime associated with water sector projects in Bangladesh,
witnessed an incident, wrote in 2002, Where a Chief Engineer simply
crossed out the word not from the recommendation that certain
soils were 'not suitable for irrigation in the draft report on
a detailed soil survey of a proposed irrigation project area. The authority
was successful in obtaining funds from the donor to implement the project-
which was a disaster. He also observed that, Bangladeshi
consultants hired to carry out such surveys (and also project appraisals)
were aware that happiness reports were more likely to ensure
their future business than strictly objective reports on their findings.
All these highly
expensive huge structural measures could not save Bangladesh from another
disastrous floods in 1987 and again in 1988. Nevertheless, the water
resources programs were intensified and pursued with more rigour. World
Bank continued to pursue for similar projects. It went for a comprehensive
program to control flood and water management.
After easy negotiations between local-global partners the World Bank
gave birth to another, we may call in the era of WMD, a big project
of mass destruction(PMD) i.e., Flood Action Plan which would be
the first step in the implementation of a comprehensive long-term program
for flood control and drainage in Bangladesh. According to the
World Bank, embankments must be seen as elements of a comprehensive
water control system planned and designed to modify the water regime
in the interests of more profitable land use in an environmentally sound
manner......it is the above considerations that have led to the compartment
approach.... In 1990 the Bank expressed its satisfaction with
the impressive record of construction, with some 5,000 water control
structures and over 6,000 km of embankment, of the Bangladesh Water
Development Board and its predecessor agency even.
It is easy to find
that the World Bank always advocates structural solutions to the flood
problems that involve huge costs. Expensive projects have always been
preferred, probably because expensive projects ensure a good fortune
to the local-foreign parties involved. However, the Flood Action Plan
was virtually abandoned in the face of criticism from home and abroad.
But it was later replaced by the WARPO, which was basically the same
programme under a new name. In 1998 another massive flood brought huge
material loss and severe human sufferings. Again similar and bigger
projects! And eventually we have now reached to 2004 flood.
A number of studies
have examined the environmental impact of the water management projects.
The beneficial effects were found to be: increased flood- free secured
land for agriculture, livestock, settlement, industry and infrastructure;
all-year accessibility; higher rice yields in both wet and dry season;
expansion of cropping areas and the extension of the cropping period
due to improved drainage; opportunity for fish culture in ponds; and
reduced hazards from extreme floods and tidal surges. These beneficial
effects, however, were often much lower in magnitude than the estimated
benefits shown to justify the projects. Moreover, the benefit in project
area in short term is not seen keeping long term effect in the area
as well as in the area outside the project under consideration. Therefore,
the benefits cost more per capita than shown in project proposals.
There are comparatively
fewer studies to understand the costs and negative impact. Some studies
found detrimental effects of those projects as follows: increased drainage
problems behind embankments; reduced residual moisture in the dry season,
especially on higher ground, hence reducing cropping options; deterioration
of soil physical properties in waterlogged areas; reduction of nutrients
derived from flood-prone sediments; hence reduced availability of soil
nutrients and thus increased dependence on chemical fertilizer inputs;
loss of natural flood-induced pest control; increased dependence on
pesticides; trend to high yield variety (HYV) monoculture, reducing
agricultural diversity; reductions in agro system resilience; as a result
of above, the possibility of decreasing yields; potentially greater
loss of crops under conditions of extreme flooding and embankments failure;
loss of formerly flooded habitats for major capture fishery species;
changes in hydrological regimes of remaining habitats; increased agrochemical
runoff and contamination of surface waters; restriction of water-borne
transportation by physical structures and siltation; increased depth
of flooding, higher flood velocities and erosion of char and other unprotected
active flood plains; loss of livestock grazing areas; increase in the
incidence of diseases, such as cholera and malaria, as a result reduced
flushing of polluted water sources. There is no evidence of the global
institutions who sponsored these projects accepting responsibility for
all these detrimental effects. Not surprising!
Despite all that
has been done to make a country of free flowing abundant water into
one that is water logged, it seems that the water sector becomes an
increasingly more lucrative field for profit making investment of corporate
bodies and beneficiaries. To them projects are not meant to solve the
problems which lead to disaster but to permanent system of monitoring
and studying the phenomenon that give well-connected parties a permanent
way of making wealth. Flood just like Poverty give them immense opportunity
to ensure fatty lives at home and abroad.
The floods today
in 2004, therefore, are both a product of the flood control projects
and also a good excuse to prepare more projects in similar line. With
the money taken from peoples pocket, flow of water is blocked,
rivers are made dying, overflow of water become disastrous, water logging
become permanent, situation become inhuman. On the crying- suffering
millions of people, children and old, men and women the projects of
mass destruction have been moving to build more graveyards.
July 24, 2004
References
Alan C. Lindquist
(1988): Project Aid in Agriculture: Major (Surface Water) Flood Control,
Drainage and Irrigation Projects, UNDP, Bangladesh Agriculture Sector
Review, Dhaka.
Anu Muhammad (2003):
Bangladeshs Integration into Global Capitalist System: Policy
Direction and the Role of Global Institutions in Matiur Rahman
(ed): Globalisation, Environmental Crisis and Social Change in Bangladesh,
UPL, Dhaka
Asian Development
Bank, ADB (1999): Bangladesh Responding to the Challenge of Poverty,
Country Operational Strategy, August.
Halcrow and Mott
MacDonald (1999): Water Resources Planning Organization (Warpo)
Hugh Brammer (2002):
Land Use and Land Use Planning in Bangladesh, UPL.
M. J. Alexander,
M. S. Rashid, S.D. Dhamsuddin, and M. S. Alam (1998): Flood Control,
Drainage and Irrigation Projects in Bangladesh and Their Impact on Soils:
an Empirical Study. Land Degradation & Development, UK.
Philip Gain (ed,
2002): Bangladesh Environment Facing the 21st Century.
World Bank (1990): Flood Control in Bangladesh, A Plan for Action, May.
World Bank (1992): Bangladesh Food Policy Review: Adjusting to the Green
Revolution, ( in two volumes) Volume1: main report, February.