Deprivation Affects Muslims More
By C. Rammanohar Reddy
07 August, 2003
Muslims in India suffer from substantially greater economic deprivation
than Hindus. The divide is far greater in urban India, where a
proportionately larger number of Muslims reside.This is the portrait of India's two main religious groups as revealed in
the results of the 55th round countrywide survey conducted in 1999-2000
by the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO), the autonomous body
of the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.It is the same `official' NSSO surveys which yield usually reliable
estimates of consumption expenditure, employment and other
characteristics that are routinely used as inputs for policy-making by
the Government.Some of the main findings of the survey are:
* The NSSO estimates show that a larger proportion of Muslims than
Hindus suffer from low levels of consumption. The best summary economic
measure is how much a person spends on food, clothing, entertainment and
other items of consumption. Average consumption expenditure by each
member of a family was less than Rs. 300 a month in 29 per cent of rural
Muslims, while the corresponding proportion for rural Hindus was 26 per
cent. (These are people who belong to the bottom 20 per cent, grouped
according to consumption.)The difference is much wider in towns and cities where as many as 40 per
cent of Muslims belong to the bottom 20 per cent, nearly double the 22
per cent figure for Hindus. In other words, poverty must be much higher
among the Muslims. Correspondingly, at the higher end of the economic
scale, the proportion of Hindus belonging to the top 20 per cent of
consumption expenditure was higher than Muslims in the villages, and
thrice as many in the towns. Since more than a third of India's Muslims
live in urban centres, compared to less than a quarter of the Hindus,
the average level of consumption in Muslim households is obviously much
lower than for the Hindus.* If cultivation of land still decides economic status in rural India,
then Muslims remain at a disadvantage. Of the Muslim households with
access to land, 51 per cent cultivate very little or no land while for
Hindu households it was 40 per cent.* If `a regular salaried job' in urban India makes it more likely that a
household will enjoy a better economic position, then here again the
Muslims are at a disadvantage. Only 27 per cent of Muslim households in
the towns and cities had a working member with a regular salaried job
(43 per cent in Hindu homes), 52 per cent were self-employed and 15 per
cent worked as casual labourers.* Unemployment among Muslims was higher in the rural areas but only
marginally more in the towns. Unemployment rates among members of both
sexes in the work force, measured according to the `usual status', were
2.1 per cent and 1.4 per cent for the Muslims and Hindus (rural India),
while the corresponding figures for urban India were 5 and 4.7 per cent.
* Illiteracy rates are also higher among the Muslims. In rural areas, 48
per cent of Muslims above the age of 7 could not read or write, while 44
per cent of the Hindus were in the same situation. In the urban areas,
the gap is much wider: 30 per cent among the Muslims and only 19 per
cent among the Hindus.If the Muslim Indian in 1999-2000 did more poorly in consumption,
education, employment and land holding, the changes over time do not
indicate that the gap between the two main religious groups is closing.=20The NSSO surveys show that during the 1990s the divide was either
constant or growing wider. This is discussed in the next and concluding
article.The Gap Widened During the 90s
The differences in socio-economic development between Hindus and Muslims
did not narrow during the 1990s, in at least one important respect the
Muslim Indian on the average was worse off at the end of the decade than
he was at the beginning.The National Sample Survey Organisation made estimates of a few
indicators in 1987-88 and many more for 1993-94 and 1999-2000. The
results of a comparison across these three time points:* Literacy rates for both Hindus and Muslims improved, albeit slowly,
between 1993-94 and 1999-2000. But the gap between the two religious
groups remained where it was in the rural areas, while it narrowed
marginally in the towns and cities. The illiteracy rate for Hindus in
the rural areas was 50 per cent in 1993-94 (Muslims: 54 per cent) and it
had come down by the end of the decade to 44 per cent (Muslims: 48 per
cent): a difference of 6 percentage points at both time points. But in
urban India, the Muslim illiteracy rate that was as much as 14
percentage points higher in 1993-94 had narrowed a bit to 11 percentage
points by the end of the decade.* In rural India, Muslims seemed to be further marginalised in access to
land during the course of the 1990s. In 1987-88, 40 per cent of rural
Muslim households cultivated little or no land, compared to 34 per cent
among Hindus. By 1999-2000 the proportion of households in both
religious groups in this situation had risen, but the increase was much
faster among the minority community: 51 per cent among Muslims and 40
per cent among the Hindus.* The relative position of the members of the two main religious
groups in employment status followed an unusual trend. In 1987-88, in
the towns and cities, Muslims in the work force experienced lower
unemployment rates than the Hindus (4 per cent versus 5.5 per cent), a
situation that continued in 1993-94, but by 1999-2000, there was a
reversal. Muslims on the average had by the end of the decade a slightly
higher level of unemployment (5 per cent versus 4.7 per cent). This
change was largely but not entirely on account of a deterioration in the
position of working Muslim women. In the villages, however, Muslims who
in 1987-88 suffered from a higher unemployment rate continued to do so
in 1999-2000. The disadvantages that Muslims suffered in work, literacy
and access to land was reflected in the relative levels of monthly per
capita expenditure on items of consumption.Compared to 1993-94, the proportion of both Hindus and Muslims who fell
in the bottom 20 per cent of the population was greater in 1999-2000 in
both rural and urban India.But as the accompanying Table shows, a substantially larger proportion
of Muslims fell in this class by the end of the decade. The
deterioration in status was especially marked in urban India. The NSSO
has made estimates for a number of other indicators (for example, worker
participation and kind of employment) and has also presented information
for individual States and according to gender.But whichever group of indicators one looks at and whatever level of
detail the comparison, the story is the same. The Muslims are on the
average on lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder than the Hindus and
the differences either remained the same or widened during the 1990s.Facts on Appeasement
Official data tell us that during a decade which saw a growing
geographical ghettoisation of the Muslim community, it was also living
in economic ghettos.THE IDEA of "appeasement" is strongly embedded in public debates about
the privileges that India's religious minorities are supposed to be
enjoying. It has become such a powerful political idea that it has
percolated into popular discourse as well. To a lesser extent, this
notion is used also in discussions on caste - appeasement is an
accusatory description of the constitutional system of reservation for
the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the Other Backward Castes.
The political jousting about appeasement on a caste basis is still a
delicate issue. But as Indian society has become increasingly divided on
communal lines, such delicacy does not visit discussions about the
so-called privileges enjoyed by India's Muslim citizens.But does the idea of appeasement have any basis in fact? Like all
powerful but divisive ideas this too belongs to the realm of
imagination. Ever since the Rajiv Gandhi Government cynically modified
Muslim personal law after the Shah Bano judgment in the mid-1980s (which
was equally cynically balanced by the opening of the locks on the Babri
Masjid), the accusations of `reverse' discrimination have been legion.
Article 370 on Jammu and Kashmir, the absence of a common civil code and
the special rights of minority educational institutions are some of the
examples dredged up to fan the communal debate. No mention here, of
course, of the privileges enjoyed by the majority community, the best
example being the tax advantages conferred on Hindu Undivided Families.One way to subject this notion of appeasement to critical examination is
to list the special rights enjoyed by each religious group and assess
the rationale of, or its absence for, each privilege. Another is to ask
if the members of the religious minorities - especially Muslims - now
enjoy a superior social and economic position, as they must be if the
state has been "appeasing" them while discriminating against members of
the religious majority. It only takes a naked eye to observe that
Muslims on the average are not by any standard at an economically higher
level than the Hindus. No reference to the retail outlets and
restaurants that are owned by the Muslims or the remittances that they
receive from relatives working in West Asia or even to refurbished
mosques can distort the picture of a community that as a whole is
disadvantageously placed in comparison to Indians who belong to all
other religions. Of course, prejudices cannot countenance honest
observation.The lies about appeasement could be dispelled if there was information
about the economic conditions of the members of each religious group, in
each State, by gender and by place of residence (rural and urban).
Unfortunately, until recently such socio-economic data was not generated
by Government agencies. This is consistent with the refusal to collect
information on a caste basis. The basic and false premise is that you
can wish away differences by just refusing to measure them. Differences
according to religion and caste simply do not exist then. Just as
unforgivable is the unwillingness of the Indian academic community to
explore these issues in detail, especially at a time when `created'
facts about the majority and minority religious communities are commonly
used in political discourse. The only exceptions are attempts to study
the demographic behaviour of religious groups (itself a subject of
immense falsification and the root of outlandish fears in the public
imagination). Social science researchers have been irresponsible by
refusing to study where the members of India's many religious groups
stand in a variety of social and economic indicators. There has been
some change recently.In 1999, a team of researchers at the National
Council of Applied Economic Research, led by Abusaleh Shariff, published
the results of a nationwide survey of 33,000 households. This study
(India: Human Development Report) collated information according to
socio-economic status, caste - and religion. But what is more remarkable
is that the National Sample Survey Organisation, an autonomous
Government agency, has compiled and published the socio-economic data
according to religion that it collected during the course of its
national surveys of consumption expenditure during the 50th and 55th
rounds in 1993-94 and 1999-2000. (This was done on a smaller scale even
earlier for 1987-88.) It is a measure of how seriously the NSSO takes
its autonomy that even in the communally charged decade of the 1990s it
went ahead and published its estimates of literacy, employment and
consumption expenditure for both rounds.The socio-economic profile that the NSSO estimates paint of the Muslim
Indian is a depressing one. In all major socio-economic indicators, the
members of India's biggest religious minority are, on the average, worse
off than members of the majority community. First, they spend less on
items of daily consumption because they apparently earn less. The
incidence of poverty is therefore likely to be higher among Muslims than
Hindus. Second, literacy rates are substantially higher among the
Hindus. And a Hindu boy or girl who goes to school is more likely to go
on to college than a Muslim. Third, working Muslims are to be found more
in casual labour and seasonal occupations than Hindus. Fourth, among
those with access to land a Hindu household is more likely to be
cultivating larger plots. Fifth, unemployment rates are higher among
Muslims than Hindus. This overall profile is true of both men and women,
in rural and urban India and in all States. Moreover, the disparity
between the majority and minority religious groups in most cases widened
during the 1990s. The only positive feature is that the sex ratio among
Muslims is better than among the Hindus.The story then is that in a poor society, the members of this minority
religion are more likely to be at the bottom of the heap. Their economic
conditions are as remote as possible from living off the fruits of state
"appeasement". The NSS does not provide information on shelter, health,
nutrition and other socio-economic indicators. If such information was
available the larger picture would be in more black and white terms.
Official data tell us that during a decade which saw a growing
geographical ghettoisation of the Muslim community, it was also living
in economic ghettos. (There is also the caste factor that one must
recognise. According to Satish Deshpande of the Institute of Economic
Growth, the same NSSO estimates suggest that 90 per cent of India's poor
are members of the scheduled castes and tribes, the Hindu OBCs and
Muslims.) With such comprehensive information as we now have about the
profile of members of the main religious groups (the NSSO also provides
data on Christians), it is no longer possible to spread canards about
appeasement of Muslims and reverse discrimination of Hindus. Moreover,
with the kind of detailed information that is now available, official
policy can - if the Government wants to - easily identify the groups
most in need of state intervention and support.It is a measure of how poorly the Indian academic community has done its
job that while the NSS reports were published in 1998 (for 1993-94) and
in 2001 (for 1999-2000), no researcher to the best of knowledge of this
writer has even done a cursory analysis of this rich source of
information. (The situation is only slightly different in analysis of
caste data compiled by the NSSO. These were analysed by Dr. Deshpande in
The Hindu on December 6 and 7, 2001.) The generation of more information
on socio-economic information according to religion, caste and economic
status and a detailed analyses by researchers may just clear the common
misconceptions that are excellent fodder for social and political forces
that thrive on creating divisions