Struggle
For Independence
Or A Proxy War?
Dr Shabir Choudhry
26 August, 2007
Countercurrents.org
To me and to thousands of other
Kashmiris it was a struggle for independence. Some of us called it jihad
– meaning struggle for rights and freedom- surely not the kind
of jihad, which is waged in holy name of Islam, where innocent people
are targeted and killed in name of ‘jihad’; and the entire
world seems to be against it.
But it turned out to be some
thing else. With benefit of hindsight many now agree that it was not
the struggle they anticipated. It is not a struggle for independence
nor it is a ‘jihad’ in the sense they visualised. Many now
agree that they were used in name of independence and ‘jihad’.
It was never their struggle; and those who planned it, helped it and
controlled it had a different agenda altogether.
Resentment against India,
especially in the Valley was total, and successive Indian governments
should accept blame for this. It would be wrong to blame ISI or ‘credit’
it with ‘stirring up’ the trouble in Kashmir. No secret
agency can start trouble in another country if the conditions are not
ripe for it.
A government because of its
blunders and mismanagement create a situation that people are annoyed
and frustrated. When their peaceful struggle and protests are ignored
and their frustration reaches a certain level they start looking for
alternatives and seek help from abroad. They get convinced that their
peaceful measure will never bring desired results, and then they rebel
against that government and that system which has denied them self respect
and basic rights.
And who should be blamed
for this, the authorities, ‘rebels’ or the foreign agencies
who seek golden opportunities like this to take revenge from enemy which
has troubled them for so long?
Majority of Kashmiri people
regard Kashmir’s accession to India as ‘provisional’,
which had to be ratified by the people in completely impartial plebiscite.
This proposed plebiscite could not take place because Pakistan refused
to withdraw her forces in accordance with the UNCIP resolutions; and
later India also changed its stance and called Kashmir its ‘integral
part’.
Provisional accession, which
was supposed to save lives, provide security, dignity, and honour to
the Kashmiri people resulted in forced division, occupation and oppression.
This situation coupled with bad management, corruption, unemployment
and proxy politics created that situation which, in view of Pakistani
security analysts, especially those who commanded JIN (Joint Intelligence
North) and JIM (Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous) in the Pakistani security
apparatus as ripe and appropriate for ‘intervention’.
Their assessment was not
wrong, and unlike in 1965, people of Kashmir were ready to go along
with the plan enacted by their ‘friends’ and ‘advocates’
across the border. But unlike in 1965 these ‘friends’ and
‘brothers’ had different game plan this time, and ‘liberation’
or independence of the Kashmiri people didn’t fit in this. But
did we Kashmiris, in 1988, knew this that they were not sincere with
us; and their game plan was to keep ‘India engaged’ and
‘keep India bleeding’ with this proxy war that they don’t
create problems for Pakistan? Answer is no, we thought they were sincere
and serious; and willing to help us; unfortunately despite so many ups
and downs and U turns by Pakistani governments some Kashmiris still
think the same.
Apart from that, ‘Jihad’
in Afghanistan was coming to an end, and those who planned and executed
this massive operation knew its rewards for themselves and for Pakistan.
They had to find alternative battleground that the ‘business of
exporting jihad’ and violence continues. Kashmir they knew was
close to minds and hearts of most Pakistanis, especially those who lived
in Punjab and had links with the armed forces of Pakistan. It was easy
to motivate people and recruit them for ‘jihad’ in Kashmir.
Most Kashmiri organisations
were, at that time considered as pro Pakistan, and they either had no
links on the other side of LOC, or they did not fit in the plan. They
wanted an organisation with some kind of independent credentials. And
due to bad luck of Kashmiri people Amanullah Khan was also at his lowest
ebb with no future as he was only recently expelled from Britain for
conducting ‘undesirable’ activities, and was looking for
a new anchorage or mission.
In view of his close associates
Amanullah Khan had links with the Pakistani secret agencies even before
he joined Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front in 1965, and this relationship
grew stronger with time. People appreciate his hard work but many doubt
if he ever had a clear vision about unification and independence of
Jammu and Kashmir; and had no strategy for liberation of the whole state.
At a time when he was expelled from Britain and had no clear ideas what
to do with his life and JKLF, he became an easy prey of the Pakistani
agencies.
Confused and disillusioned
Amanullah Khan and some other senior JKLF leaders agreed to become a
proxy of Pakistani agencies. They agreed to provide raw material from
across the LOC, which Pakistani experts could prepare as ‘freedom
fighters’ and ‘mujahideen’ to liberate Jammu and Kashmir,
which was under ‘Indian occupation.’ They agreed to play
a subservient role in return for arms, money and publicity, which was
made available to them in abundance.
Amanullah Khan and his colleagues
who made this pact had no plan, nor they were allowed to prepare one
to liberate areas under ‘occupation’ of Pakistan. While
succumbing to pressure of these secret agencies he and his colleagues
forgot that other JKLF leaders rejected a similar plan a few years ago.
They also forgot that plight of people on this side of LOC, especially
in Gilgit and Baltistan was much worse than their counterparts on the
other side. But the temptation was too great to be rejected and they
went along with the plan which had disastrous consequences, especially
for the people of the Valley, who had to face wrath of the Indian troops
in the first instance then militants and renegade militants.
This understanding or agreement
between the JKLF leadership and Pakistani secret agencies resulted in
beginning of militancy in the Valley in 1988. What has happened after
that is history now, but this question still haunt, and will continue
to haunt genuine Kashmiri nationalists and especially those who have
lost their love ones why we haven’t got independence?
Is it because there was no
planning for ‘liberation’ and militancy was used as a ‘proxy’
to ‘bleed India’ that Pakistan can obtain some concessions,
or is it because those who controlled and managed the struggle let us
down? Or is it because the ‘Kashmiri struggle’ was transformed
in to ‘Jihadi struggle’ with which the world community had
no sympathy and wanted to crush it? Or is it because the Kashmiri struggle
became a lucrative business for the people with vested interest, and
they didn’t want a resolution of the Kashmir dispute and wanted
the Kashmir pot to be kept at a certain boiling temperature?
We, people of Jammu and Kashmir
are being forcibly divided and oppressed. Since 1988 we have lost a
generation. No one knows exactly how many people have lost their lives,
how many women have been dishonoured and how many children lost their
childhood. People have made up different figures, which range from 60
thousand to ninety thousand, and these figures are used for political
and financial reasons. Whatever the exact figure, people have endured
a trauma in hope that it will bring them independence, political and
economic stability and better future. But where do they find themselves?
After all the suffering,
pain and destruction, we are back to square one, where we can’t
see light at the end of tunnel, there is no prospect of unification
and independence, political and economic stability and better future.
The question is what went wrong? I salute all those who have lost their
lives, and I salute all those who have suffered in pursuit of independence
and better future; but was our strategy appropriate to achieve independence?
Thousands of people sincerely
took part in this campaign, which was presented to them as a war of
liberation. Sincerity and sacrifices are important for any campaign
to be successful, but these two crucial elements alone cannot bring
victory and desired rewards if the plan and strategy is wrong.
People of Jammu and Kashmir,
especially those in the Valley have made their contribution sincerely
and have paid heavy price for it, believing that one - day they will
become independent, but alas lack of appropriate planning and strategy,
for which they were not responsible has only brought them misery, suffering
and disappointment.
It was never our struggle.
We people of Jammu and Kashmir never had any control or say over it.
Be it talks with India or militancy, control has always been in hands
of Pakistan; and this causes anger and frustration in minds of even
most pro Pakistan Kashmiris. While expressing his anger, the AJK president
complained that ‘Pakistan’s Foreign Office had neither taken
him into confidence nor briefed him about negotiations with India since
his assuming office last year’.
Evidence shows that it was
a proxy war and not a war of liberation; and lesson from history is
that you cannot win a war of liberation by becoming a proxy for another
country, especially when that country also has territorial interest
in that state.
Writer is Chairman Diplomatic
Committee of JKLF, Director Institute of Kashmir Affairs and author
of many books on Kashmir. He could be reached at: [email protected]
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