A Way To End Impasse In Nepal
By Dr. Satinath Choudhary
08 August, 2010
Countercurrents.org
The following has been written with the current impasse in Nepal in mind. However, the same is applicable to Indian union as well as state governments. Particularly when they have a hard time picking an individual to head a government, they should try out governments headed by collective of equals like what they have in Switzerland, as discussed below. It seems that the interest of greater transparency and democratic decision making would be served better if we use flat-top collective of equals for our government rather than pyramidal type led by a Chief Minister or the Prime Minister. Often even within the same party there are more than one individuals vying to be CM. So far the only way of power sharing that have been used in India is for the aspirants to take turns (for the duration of a year or two) in occupying the seat of CM. They should start experimenting with the positions of CM occupied by a collective rather than a single individual – the latter is likely to prove to be much more transparent and democratic.
Current norm of forming a pyramidal government headed by a Prime Minister (PM) or a President in most countries of the world has been derived from our monarchical past. An alternative is a flat-top Executive Committee (EC) like what they have in Switzerland, with equal power vested among each member of a 7-member EC. Such structures exist in other organizations like Election Commission of India, in judicial benches around the world, in various committees working without a formal head and so forth.
According to current norm for formation of a government in India and in many other countries, the President is supposed to invite leader of the largest party to try and form a government. This leader basically tries to cobble a coalition with majority support in the parliament via quid pro quo arrangement in distributing various important cabinet positions among the leaders of other parties. Portfolios of smaller importance are also handed out to the supporters of various party leaders per “negotiations” leading to the agreement on dividing up the “booty” that the governing power represents – it sounds a bit cynical, however, the process described above is not very far from the truth.
Flat-top structure of Swiss government, mentioned above, has been functioning all the way back from 1848. Here is what the Swiss do to form a government (EC): They have a 7-member EC with equal power vested in all its members. The EC does have a position of chair, which is rotated among its members every year. The chair has additional responsibility to receive foreign heads of state and represent Switzerland in international forums; however, during a meeting of the EC the chair has a weight that is no more than that of any other member of the EC. For the last 60 years or so they have had the golden rule of electing two representatives each from the largest three parties and one from the fourth largest. Together the four parties generally account for more than three fourth of the parliament. With a population of 75% German ancestry, 20% French, 4% Italian, and 1% Romansch, they also make sure to elect one Italian representative, two representatives with French mother tongue, and four have German as their mother tongue. The 7-member EC divides up various governmental departments among themselves; however, they meet every week to discuss all important things and try to reach consensus as much as possible.
As for the choice of heads of various governmental departments, the USA appears to have a better way of doing the same. In the US, after a President gets elected, s/he nominates top few layers of his/her bureaucracy after a national search, to be approved by the Senate. This makes people of national reputation available for heading various departments of the government. To allow for a similar process to pull in individuals with nationally reputable standing, we could envision the EC to function as a Presidential collective. Since it is elected by the parliament, it would be more appropriate to call it Prime Ministerial Council [PMC], rather than Presidential Council [PC]. This PMC, instead of distributing various departments among themselves (as is done by the Swiss EC), could pick out individuals with national stature to head various departments. However, the PMC could go a step further in democratizing the departments by nominating collectives of reputable persons to head various departments (to be approved by the parliament), instead of hierarchies consisting of secretaries, deputy secretaries, assistant secretaries, and so forth – flat top structure instead of a pyramidal structure at the top of various departments.
As for the formation of the PMC, one could use a sort of Proportional Representation (PR) election among the MPs. The smaller parties that would not be able to elect one of their own may form coalitions to be able to elect some of their own for positions in the EC. MPs not associated with any of the parties or coalitions will be declared as independent. The MPs would be free to cast as many votes as they like for any of the MPs to elect them to PMC, but each of the recipients will get a fraction of her vote – a recipient’s vote divided by the total number of votes cast by the voter. For example, if an MP_0 is casting two votes for himself, one for MP_1, 3 for MP_2 and 1 for MP_3. MP_0 has cast a total of 8 votes and s/he is essentially casting 2/8th (=1/4) of a vote for himself, 1/8 vote for MP_1, 3/8 vote for MP_2, and 1/8 vote for MP_3. Votes in favor of each of the candidate MPs would be added to their affiliated parties. The number of seats in PMC won by various parties or coalitions would be determined in proportion to votes collected by them via their MPs. Highest vote getters of each party or coalition would fill the PMC-seats won by the parties. If any of the independent candidates gets enough votes to win a seat, s/he would also become a part of PMC.
Unified CPN-Maoist (38.1%), Nepali Congress (19.1%), Communist Party of Nepal (UML) (18%) and Madheshi Janadhikar Forum, Nepal (9%) together account for 84.2% of the total number of seats in the Constituent Assembly (CA). If the CA agrees to form a PMC of about 10 members, the above mentioned four parties would have 4, 2, 2, 1 members respectively in the PMC. If most of the remaining small parties could agree to coalesce together, they could be given the tenth seat; otherwise the CA could leave the PMC as a 9-member body. If the CA would like the PMC membership to be about 15, the said parties would have 6, 3, 3 and 2 members, respectively, with one or two additional seats going to the remaining small parties if most of them could form a coalition. In the interest of reducing the dominance of the largest party/parties, the smallest parties may well decide to form a coalition and get their due share of seat(s) (power) in the executive body.
If the parliament were to elect a (7-15)-member collective of equals (PMC) via secret ballot, as described above, a position in the PMC would depend more upon the “esteem” which various members of parliament command among their peers by virtue of their past performance, ideas and vision, rather than the ability to climb ladders of power they have managed to creep up to in their respective parties by virtue of familial relationship, loyalty, sycophancy to leaders and other such means. In fact, secret ballot may well propel a lower level leader(s) above the existing party leadership. This is because many MPs may not really like the incumbent leadership because of their dictatorial attitude, but are afraid of coming out openly against their current leaders for fear of not getting party ticket in the next election.
While the parliament happens to be a rainbow, with various colors present in it, why must the government derived from the same (and led by a single individual) be monochromatic? A PMC elected in the manner suggested above would preserve rainbow characteristic of the parliament and the people at large in the government. In a rainbow colored government various political colors would tend to minimize the excesses of power at the hands of a monochromatic government in the name of majority. When it comes to policy making, majority will continue to win in the parliament as well as in the executive. It is in the process of implementation of the policies by the executive that the adverse effect of power manifests itself – the presence of opposition in the executive is likely to check the corrupting effects of power. We must remember that power corrupts and absolute power (in the hands of single individuals) corrupts absolutely.
Protagonists of parliamentary government with treasury and opposition parties claim that the opposition presents itself an alternative to the incumbents. The presence of the opposition minority in the executive bodies is likely to give them more rather than less opportunities of presenting their alternatives to the current way of doing things. In fact, they will do so more forcefully when they are present in the executive bodies. Presence of the opposition within the PMC would not entail giving management of a few governmental departments to the opposition. It would simply mean presence of ears and voices of opposition within all deliberations of the PMC as well as collectives heading various departments.
Discourse among “equal” members of a collective can be expected to be more democratic compared to the discussions among cabinet members with a pyramidal structure headed by a single PM or President. A single person in such a position is bound to experience enormous pressures and temptations towards improper use of his/her power compared to the situation wherein everything has to be done with the consent of at least majority (if not by consensus) of a collective of equals. All these seem to suggest that the interest of greater transparency and democratic decision making would be served better, if no position of power is held by a single individual or a pyramidal structure, and all positions of power are handled by collectives of equals.
In a situation when an MP gets to be chosen as a PM and s/he picks other MPs to fill various positions in the cabinet, most MPs are likely to feel “why not me” syndrome – why did I not get a portfolio, else why did I not get a better portfolio? One or more of those not satisfied, may promise others a better position in a new cabinet if the current one is pulled down. This “why not me” syndrome is one of the main factors contributing to instability of incumbent government under this system. On the other hand, MPs not elected to a position in a PMC would not be able to hold any grudge against any one or two individuals for not being selected to be a member of the PMC. They (the members not elected to PMC) were not held in high enough esteem among their peers. More importantly, any individual would not be able to ‘promise’ any of the others a position in a future PMC. Hence there would not be any instability due to “why not me” factor. Persons not elected to an PMC would just have to work harder to improve their esteem index among their peers for a position in a future PMC.
One may ask as to what would happen to the IAS (Indian Administrative Service) officers, or similar other civil service officers, if various governmental departments were to be headed by collectives of reputable people? Well, these efficient people (at least efficient in taking written and oral tests) will have to work under people of reputation picked out by the PMC search team.
For all of the above mentioned reasons and many others, it is apparent that a system in which flat-top PMC that appoints flat-top heads of various departments is far better than current pyramidal system in which a PM or President is elected, who in turn creates a pyramidal cabinet and bureaucratic structures for governance of a country.
As for the impasse over the future of PLA (People’s Liberation Army), the best way to deal with it would be to reach an agreement to dismantle all permanent armed forces. Country’s security should be managed with armed forces conscripted from among people in general for temporary period of time. Permanent volunteer armed forces are nothing but soldiers of fortune (mercenaries) seeking comfortable life or those who can more money by being in the armed forces than they would have made otherwise. Any time one finishes his or her studies, or reaches the age of 21 (whichever is later), s/he should be required (conscripted) to serve the country (in civilian duties, including teaching or in armed forces) for a period of at least three years – and no more than five years in armed forces, though could be longer in civilian duty with appropriate remuneration, if they want to continue their civilian duties, and if they are needed. First year should be spent in training, followed by two years of service for which s/he underwent training.
I wish, UML, which is insisting upon the formation of national consensus government, would demand the formation of a government as described above.
Dr. Satinath Choudhary was a social and political activist almost all through his life, including his student days and while teaching Computer Science and Electrical Engineering in the USA. He took part in various movements for various causes in the USA, including those against Vietnam War, and for Civil Rights, Women’s Rights, nuclear disarmament and conservation of environment. Since 2001, he is spending major part of his time in India and have been involved as a social and political activist in Delhi.He is most keenly interested in improving the transparency as well as method of election; as election system is the foundation upon which democracies are built.He is also keenly interested in fostering development and education for all.
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