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Endgame In Afghanistan

Zahid Hussain Interviewed by Jahanzeb Hussain

02 April, 2012
Collateraldamagemagazine.com

Collateral Damage Magazine had the honor of interviewing Zahid Hussain about the endgame in Afghanistan. The interview was conducted by Jahanzeb Hussain, the editor of the magazine.

Collateral Damage: When did the peace talks between the US and the Taliban begin?

Zahid Hussain: The first contact was made sometime in 2011. The meeting was facilitated by the German intelligence, and this was the first time American officials directly met a representative of Mullah Omer. The representative’s name is Agha Tayyab. These secret talks continued for six or seven months and it resulted in some progress. However, the talks have not yielded any substantive results, but at least initial contacts have been made. It is also because of these talks that the Taliban opened their office in Qatar. There was also a talk on the release and transfer of 4 or 5 Afghan Taliban from Guantanamo to Kandahar, but that has not yet taken place. So the contacts still remain on a very elementary level. There was hope that these talks could lead to some breakthrough, but given the current, turbulent situation in Afghanistan the talks are not going to take off any time soon.

CD: Why are the talks not going to take off?

ZH: This is because of the wave of violence in reaction to the burning of the Quran. The killing of American troops by an Afghan soldier has also imperiled the whole US exit plan because one of the pivots of the whole plan was actually the greater reliance on Afghan security forces and their training, but all that seems to have stopped – at least for the time being. So in this kind of a situation there is little sign or indication that the Taliban will enter into any serious negotiation on the future of Afghanistan.

CD: What is the strategy of the Taliban?

ZH: The Taliban can see that the Americans face a lot of problems in Afghanistan. One of the things that the Americans wanted was to stop the Taliban from a position of strength, but that does not seem to be happening now. The Americans seem to be at their weakest and so the Taliban do not think that the negotiations should be taken anywhere.

CD: When do you think the Taliban can seriously start negotiating with the Americans?

ZH: Well, that all depends on the situation. It depends if the Americans are prepared to give more concessions and incentives for the Taliban to talk to them.

CD: So when are the Americans going to be ready to give more concessions to the Taliban? Is there not a timeframe before the US wants to leave Afghanistan and hand over the country to the Afghan security forces?

ZH: The first problem the US has is the issue with the Karzai government. Karzai is not happy with the American initiative because they wanted the talks to be headed by the Afghans, or that they at least should have been an Afghan initiative. But the Taliban would prefer to talk directly to the Americans instead of the Karzai government.

The second problem is that the Taliban want the US to stop night raids and cease fire, but there is no indication that the Americans will offer that. This is also due to the fact that this is the election year in the US; therefore, the options available to the Obama administration are very limited. Obama will not take any step which will provoke criticism from the Republicans. The Republicans want to take a much tougher position in Afghanistan.

Other than that, in light of the recent violence in Afghanistan which is some of the worse since the occupation of the country in 2001, many are asking the question as to what is the purpose of American presence in Afghanistan. There is a possibility that this could accelerate the US withdrawal, and the Taliban will be watching that very closely.

CD: What has been the strategy of Barack Obama since he took office? He made this war his own war and ordered a massive troop surge. What does he want to achieve?

ZH: Obama wanted to pull out from Iraq, but at the same time he also had to show that the US will now focus on Afghanistan. The troop surge was a part of this strategy. But the big question mark is whether the surge strategy has worked. All the indications reveal that it has not really worked. It has not given the US more control of the country and has not given the US a position of strength. Lately, we have seen, as a result of increased Taliban attacks, that the Taliban are a much more organized and powerful force and they can penetrate the highest security areas. The latest setback came after an Afghan soldier killed American troops. This forced the US to pullout its military advisors from several Afghan ministries, and this has also affected the training of Afghan security forces. The NATO troops are now advised to keep their distance from their Afghan counterparts. So in this atmosphere of distrust, is it possible to meet the objective of pulling out troops after 2014?

The Afghan situation is now much more complicated and there are many new problems for the withdrawal strategy.

CD: So do you think that this American strategy of flexing its muscles, troop surge and the desire to negotiate from a position of strength is a wrong strategy?

ZH: Yes. This strategy is getting the United States more and more into a quagmire.

CD: Is this the reason why the insurgency is not abating and the Taliban are getting stronger and stronger?

ZH: Yes, this is one of the major reasons. Recently the Americans claimed that the night raids have worked and it has allowed them to eliminate a large number of mid-level insurgent commanders, but the constant rise of Taliban attacks show that this strategy, too, has not been affective.

Another thing is that the major problem for the Americans now is the widening gap between the NATO forces and the Afghans counterparts. This is a much greater issue for the US at this point of time because this brings into question the US strategy of building up an Afghan army which can take over from the Americans the responsibility of providing security once NATO leaves.

CD: So the Afghan army that the US is trying to build is not ready to take up that responsibility once the US eventually leaves?

ZH: That is the thing – the Afghan army is not ready. There is so much resentment and animosity between the two that obviously this could not work.

CD: What is likely to happen when the US leaves Afghanistan? Will there be a civil war? Will the insurgents go face to face with the Afghan army that the US is trying to build?

ZH: There is certainly a much greater probability of Afghanistan returning to a civil war if there is no negotiated settlement before the Americans leave the country. There is also a fear that, if a bloody civil war breaks out, the Afghan national army could disintegrate.

CD: Are the Americans aware of this possibility? Do they have the will to prevent such a scenario?

ZH: The only way the US can prevent a civil war is by reaching some sort of a negotiated settlement with the Taliban; allow them to become a part of the transition government, etc. But if this does not happen, and there is no sign of this happening, then the best chance of avoiding a civil war is gone.

CD: Neighboring countries like Pakistan, Iran, China, India and even Russia have an interest in what happens in Afghanistan. What is their position?

ZH: They are not clear about what the US policy is. But the internal Afghan problems are just one of the issues; the overarching solution to the Afghan problem also includes an agreement between these neighboring countries regarding their neutrality and non-interference in Afghan affairs.

CD: What is the possibility that Pakistan and India can come to an understating over what they respectively want in Afghanistan?

ZH: An understanding between the two on this issue will be very useful, but it will only be useful if there is fist a political settlement inside Afghanistan.

Zahid Hussain is an award-winning journalist and writer. He is a correspondent for The Times of London and The Wall Street Journal. He also has covered Pakistan and Afghanistan for several other international publications, including Newsweek, the Associated Press and The Economist. Currently, he is the Pakistan Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Hussain has authored two books: Frontline Pakistan: The struggle with militant Islam (2007) and The scorpion’s Tail: The relentless rise of Islamic militants in Pakistan (2010). The books have won widespread acclaim as seminal texts on the subject.

Jahanzeb Hussain is the editor of Collateral Damage Magazine. He is a 22-year old student based in Vancouver, where he goes to Simon Fraser University. He also represents the Vancouver chapter of Afghans For Peace. His blog can be viewed here.

 



 


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