Militarizing
Mexico:
The New War On Drugs
By Laura Carlsen
17 July, 2007
Fpif.org
President
Richard Nixon invented the phrase “war on drugs” and used
it in a political context similar in many ways to today’s. Bogged
down in an unwinnable war abroad, with a growing deficit and rising
inflation, Nixon declared illegal drugs “public enemy number one”
on June 17, 1971.
Nixon took office promising
to crack down on crime. Due to the characteristics of the problem and
the division of powers that placed crime-fighting largely in the hands
of state and local governments, he soon realized the difficulties of
showing concrete results through a federal program. So Nixon devised
a major, executive-led counternarcotics offensive to increase presidential
powers and galvanize support from conservatives for his presidency and
re-election.
He then created a series
of anti-drug agencies – eventually folded into the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) -- that reported directly to the president, with little
congressional supervision. With the creation of these federal agencies
and the metaphor of “war”, the president transferred responsibility
from state and local governments, where the emphasis was on treatment
of illegal drug use within the framework of a community or health problem,
to federal coordination that addressed treatment but also established
special enforcement agencies directly under the presidential mandate.
Although Nixon fell victim
to his own arrogance and excesses, his anti-drug legacy established
fundamental mechanisms of social control that still pervade U.S. society.
The active criminalization of drug use has led to the imprisonment of
a huge proportion of the African-American and Latino populations. The
focus on decreasing production rather than preventing consumption has
been a way to deflect attention from deep internal problems in U.S.
society. And the zero-tolerance laws have channelled government funds
into fortifying often corrupt and abusive police forces instead of spending
on drug treatment and community prevention programs.
And then there’s the
legacy that the war on drugs has had overseas.
The Question of Sovereignty
The U.S. model not only served to bolster the presidency. It has also
proven useful as a tool for geopolitical control abroad. By elevating
drug trafficking to a matter of national security, the war on drugs
model has led to U.S. intervention in the politics of both drug-producing
and transit nations. It has been used to justify the militarization
of whole regions of foreign nations (Colombia), invasions to oust inconvenient
foreign leaders (Panama), and now the extension of the U.S. security
agenda into a neighboring country (Mexico).
By exporting its “war
on drugs,” the United States has pressured other nations to embrace
U.S. national security interests as their own. This has been true from
the beginning. One of Nixon’s early moves in the war on drugs
was Operation Interception. Operation Interception effectively closed
the U.S.-Mexico border by calling for full inspections of all vehicles
for five days in September of 1969. Customs chief Myles Ambrose called
it “shock treatment” for the Mexican government, stating
that afterward “the Mexican ministers promised everything.”
The binational negotiations were secret and we will never know what
“everything” was, but what’s clear is that the virtual
blockade was a form of international extortion under the guise of the
war on drugs.
Less dramatic but equally
interventionist has been the process of “certification.”
In this periodic review of the level of cooperation in the war on drugs,
the U.S. government evaluates countries like Mexico that are on a list
of the major drug-producing and transit nations. This unilateral program
conditions aid on whether domestic policies are acceptable to the U.S.
Congress, applying criteria that are openly ideological.
The classic case of U.S.
involvement in a foreign country through the use of the “war on
drugs” model is Plan Colombia. Since 2000 when it started, the
United States has sent some $4.3 billion dollars to the Colombian government
supposedly to fight the war on drugs. Three-quarters of that money has
gone to the military. The results are well known: Colombia remains the
primary source of cocaine on the U.S. market, the price has gone down,
and the purity has risen. Despite massive fumigations, the surface area
planted in coca has not been reduced.
In addition to its absolute
failure to restrain drug production, processing, and transit, Plan Colombia
has been used to aid the Colombian right wing in its war against guerrilla
insurgents. Investigative journalist Frank Smyth wrote that by 2001
Colombia had surpassed El Salvador as the largest counterinsurgency
effort of the United States since Vietnam. In August 2002, the U.S.
Congress formally broadened the scope of Plan Colombia to authorize
the use of military aid in counterinsurgency efforts.
With the arrival of arms
and money for armed forces, the violation of human rights, displacement
of entire communities, and assassination of civilians have increased
so much as to be alarming even to supporters of Plan Colombia. In the
recent authorization of new funds for the plan, the House of Representatives
approved a version that reduces military aid, reduces fumigation, and
conditions aid to stricter human rights requirements. The total aid
to Colombia’s government continues to be huge and largely military.
But along with the probable rejection of the Free Trade Agreement with
Colombia due to human rights concerns, these restrictions mark a minimal
recognition that the drug war model in that nation is simply not working
as intended.
From Plan Colombia
to Plan Mexico
Current Mexican President Felipe Calderon has taken a page from Nixon’s
strategy book, with a few pointers from the Bush administration as well.
In launching his own war on drugs, Calderon seeks to expand the powers
of a weak presidency and consolidate an image of a strong leader in
the context of a deeply polarized society. In March, he presented a
list of constitutional reforms that would eliminate the need for a court
order for phone taps, detentions, and searches in the case of organized
crime. Barbara Zamora, a prominent lawyer and human rights defender,
stated that the proposed constitutional reforms “would create
a Patriot Law ala mexicana, where constitutional rights and civil liberties
are annulled.”
Other measures that form
part of the Mexican offensive include military operations that have
resulted in daily deaths both from confrontations between the army and
the drug traffickers, and battles between drug cartels seeking to re-establish
control over territory and leadership. Mandatory drug testing is now
taking place in the schools. Scores of drug traffickers have been extradited
to the United States. In May, Calderon announced the formation of the
Special Corps of Federal Support Forces of the Mexican Army and Air
Force, under the direct command of the presidency.
In May, the chairman of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Silvestre Reyes, stated
at a binational congressional meeting that Mexico needs more support
in its fight against drug trafficking, reportedly saying that it needed
a Plan Mexico along the lines of Plan Colombia. Plan Mexico, he said,
would imply military and police binational cooperation, and the exchange
of information and resources above what’s been slated in the current
budget proposal.
Although it adamantly denied
calling for a “Plan Mexico,” the Mexican government apparently
has requested additional funds from the United States for an anti-narcotics
program, and has already entered into a series of joint security programs
that imply increased militarization of certain regions and more direct
participation of the United States. The U.S. government is now participating
directly in Mexico’s security policies on all three levels: in
the design of national and local security measures; in training of police,
army and intelligence units; and in implementation.
Some of the actions agreed
to in a January meeting between the Mexican and U.S. attorneys general
include the construction of a bilateral system of identification of
smugglers, a sweeping evaluation of the Mexican police, the purchase
of eight specialized aircraft for the detection and interception of
planes carrying drugs, and the participation of DEA agents in drug eradication
efforts. The DEA also announced its expansion into three more border
cities -- Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo and Nogales. This phase of heightened
collaboration has also been linked to the extension of the North American
Free Trade Agreement with the Security and Prosperity Agreement of North
America.
A Plan Mexico would never
be a carbon copy of Plan Colombia given the differences between the
two countries, their relationship with the United States and their different
roles in the international drug trade. But a quick analysis of Plan
Colombia in the Mexican context provides clues to the course of current
policies.
Colombianization
of Mexico
In Colombia and now in Mexico, the army is on the front line of the
counter-narcotics campaign. This increased role of the army in society
has provoked a heated debate in Mexico. On the one hand, there is the
recognition that state and municipal police forces are so inextricably
bound with regional drug traffickers that they cannot be relied on to
effectively and safely fight organized crime. On the other hand is the
concern that now the army will wind up in the same boat. Moreover, the
armed forces are not adequately trained in this type of police and intelligence
work. Finally, the use of the armed forces in domestic issues may well
be unconstitutional.
Even as this debate continues,
the offensive has already begun. Calderon has dispatched 24,000 troops
throughout the country as part of his war on drugs. Like Colombia, this
level of military presence has led to human rights violations as well
as increased violent confrontations with drug traffickers. As arms and
money flowed into the Colombian military, the paramilitary forces found
themselves on the receiving end. Recent scandals concerning the links
between Uribe government officials and paramilitary forces come as no
surprise to experts on the country. In Mexico, the use of paramilitaries
has been largely confined to the low-intensity war against the insurgent
EZLN in Chiapas. Although Mexico is not involved in an internal armed
conflict like Colombia's, it is likely that the current militarization
of Mexican society will lead to an increase in the activity of these
groups.
Another concern that has
arisen fro the Colombian experience is that the “war on drugs”
has a disturbing tendency to morph into a “war on terrorism”
that increases U.S. military reach into foreign lands. Recall the expansion
of Plan Colombia’s anti-narcotics model into counter-terrorism
activities. Since the U.S. government’s definition of “terrorism”
is both broad and ambiguous, this tendency has led to mission creep
and the use of U.S. military aid to attack internal dissidence. For
Mexico, the equation of immigration with terrorist threats to promote
the U.S. strategy of militarizing the northern border provides a case
study in how U.S. counter-terrorism programs lead to militarization,
loss of national sovereignty, and violations of human rights. The new
drug war provides a dangerous stepping stone in that process.
There are important differences
between Mexico and Colombia--Mexico is not at war, nor does it face
the loss of state control over portions of national territory. But another
factor that distinguishes Mexico from Colombia could actually increase
the risks of a U.S.-style drug war on its territory. That is the close
relationship between Mexico and the United States -- the geographical
proximity, the history of intervention, and the economic dependency
that has resulted from 13 years of NAFTA. This factor could make a Plan
Mexico an even greater threat to national sovereignty and peace than
its Colombian cousin.
The Best Solution?
Mexico has gradually changed from a drug transit and marginally producing
state to a major market for illicit drugs. This transformation is having
far-reaching effects on the fabric of daily life. Drug cartels are no
longer just fighting over trade routes but also over exclusive rights
to regional markets. There are more addicts. The use of methamphetamine,
a cheap and readily available drug that is produced in the country,
has been rising.
A shot in the arm in the
form of a huge package of U.S. military aid for a war on drugs will
not stop this transformation. Before putting the army in the streets
-- with all the legal, political, and practical risks that entails --
the dramatic increase in drug use should be treated as a health epidemic
and addressed at once through education, options for young people, and
rehabilitation.
Although it includes construction
of treatment centers, Calderon’s war on drugs focuses on supply
and enforcement. The main result so far has been to unleash violence
in most regions of the country. In March the number of police executed
had risen 50% compared to last year. The more than a thousand drug-related
deaths so far this year put the country on a path to surpass last year´s
2,000. The death, arrest, or extradition of ringleaders has set off
battles for succession and renewed turf wars. Meanwhile, the price and
availability of illegal drugs has not dropped on U.S. or Mexican markets.
Mexico should rethink its
“war on drugs” approach. The practical results of this model
erode democracy and have little to do with the control drug use and
trafficking. First of all, the broadening of presidential powers often
comes at the expense of the balance of powers. In Mexico, barely emerging
from decades of presidential authoritarianism, the strengthening of
executive power without effective counterbalances or transparency, subtracts
powers from other levels of government and restricts citizen rights.
Second, the model of confronting
the trafficking, sale and consumption of drugs with military means increases
violence and weakens democratic institutions. In countries where these
institutions are weak it can delay or reverse a transition to democracy.
This militarization invariably extends into repression of political
opposition, blurring the lines between the campaigns against drugs,
terrorism, and dissidents.
Finally, the war on drugs
model poses a clear threat to national sovereignty. Plan Colombia has
led to a national economy dependent on outside military aid. Mexico,
with a growing network of U.S. anti-narcotics and customs agents and
training units in the country, faces a similar dependency.
Ironically, the one part
of Nixon’s drug policy that actually worked – the expansion
of treatment services -- is the part that has been the least emulated.
Both the United States and Mexico should look closely at any additional
appropriations that place the emphasis on a military solution to their
shared drug problem. The “war on drugs” has proved to be
not only a failure but a serious threat to democracy.
Laura Carlsen
is director of the Americas Program of the Center for International
Policy. The Americas Program is online at http://americas.irc-online.org/.
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