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Nonviolent Action: Minimizing The Risk of Violent Repression

By Robert J. Burrowes

27 November, 2014
Countercurrents.org

In a recent article, full of insight, Professor Bill Quigley identified
ten different illegal actions police often take 'to prevent people from
exercising their constitutional rights' to take nonviolent action to
address a grievance. He noted that these police tactics are commonly
used by law enforcement agencies in big protests across the US. See '10
Illegal Police Actions to Watch for in Ferguson'
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-quigley/ten-illegal-police-action_b_6171964.html

I would like to complement Professor Quigley's fine article by
identifying ways in which the risk of police or military personnel using
illegal and violent tactics can be minimized and, in many cases,
thwarted, wherever in the world the nonviolent action takes place.

If you want a nonviolent action to be maximally effective, there are two
preliminary points to consider. First, spend time developing a carefully
elaborated nonviolent strategy that will guide each and every aspect of
your campaign. For an explanation of nonviolent strategy and a 12 point
strategic framework to guide you, see 'The Strategy of Nonviolent
Defense: A Gandhian Approach'
http://www.sunypress.edu/p-2176-the-strategy-of-nonviolent-defe.aspx And
second, make sure that each nonviolent action that your group undertakes
is governed by its strategic goal, not its political objective. If you
are not clear what this means, see 'The Political Objective and
Strategic Goal of Nonviolent Actions'
http://www.countercurrents.org/burrowes180714.htm

If your nonviolent tactic (demonstration, strike, blockade…) is the
strategically chosen and focused tactic for this stage of your campaign,
and you undertake it with the strategic goal (not political objective)
clearly in mind, then, irrespective of the immediate police response
(including if it is illegal, violent and/or makes use of provocateurs),
your strategic goal will be achieved, your campaign will be advanced and
any violent response by police or the military will be either
politically irrelevant or strategically advantageous to your campaign.

With these preliminary points in mind, let me now identify 20 things you
can do to minimize the risk of police/military attempts to defeat your
nonviolent action by acting illegally, using violence or employing
provocateurs.

Police and military personnel may be violent at nonviolent actions for
various reasons. In my experience, the most important ones are because
they are directed to use violence as a form of political repression and
because they are afraid. There will often be several subtexts to their
fear, such as the fear that underpins racism or religious bigotry for
example. If you want to understand this more clearly, see 'Why
Violence?' http://tinyurl.com/whyviolence and 'Fearless Psychology and
Fearful Psychology: Principles and Practice'
http://anitamckone.wordpress.com/articles-2/fearless-and-fearful-psychology/
Thus, in addition to considering the many other aspects of any
nonviolent strategy, the planning process might consider ways in which
any action can be made less vulnerable to violent repression.

Nonviolent action can be very effective in limiting the use of violence
for three interrelated reasons: its capacity to create a favourable
political atmosphere (because of, for example, the way in which activist
honesty builds trust); its capacity to create a non-threatening physical
environment (because of the nonviolent discipline of the activists); and
its capacity to alter the human psychological conditions (both innate
and learned) which make the use of violence possible in the first place.
This includes its capacity to reduce or eliminate police/military fear
and its capacity to 'humanize' activists in the eyes of both opponents
and their police and military agents.

Consequently, while it is never possible to eliminate the risk of
police/military (or provocateur) violence at a nonviolent action, it is
possible to minimize this risk by identifying the factors which account
for the outcome and by controlling as many of these factors as possible.
Failure to do so increases the risk of undesirable outcomes. In essence,
minimizing the risk of police/military violence requires the meticulous
planning and implementation of any action. This should include all of
the following that are locally relevant.

1. Make a strategic decision that the campaign will be nonviolent, then
make this commitment explicit and widely known. If you want to debate
the precise meaning of 'nonviolent' in your context, you might find the
'Matrix of Nonviolence' a useful tool. See The Strategy of Nonviolent
Defense p. 100-101.

2. Develop a 'Code of Nonviolent Discipline' which reflects this
commitment and, given the political advantages of this code, insist that
any activist who wishes to participate in the nonviolent actions of the
campaign sign it before doing so: If an activist is seriously committed
to your campaign, they will not object to signing (and identifying
provocateurs at any action will then be easier). Based on a study of
many campaigns around the world, a typical code would include the
following points:
* I will speak the truth.
* I will treat each person (including workers, police/military officers
and media personnel) with respect.
* I will harbour no anger or hate. I will suffer the anger and assaults
of my opponents.
* I will protect opponents and police/military personnel from insults
and attack.
* I will act in accordance with the decisions and planned program of the
organising group and will respond promptly to requests from the action
focalisers. In the event of a serious disagreement, I will withdraw from
the action. I will not initiate or participate in any spontaneous
action.
* I will accept responsibility for my actions; I will not use secrecy.
* If my arrest is sought, I will accept it voluntarily; if I am taken
prisoner, I will behave in an exemplary manner.
* I will protect the property of my opponents and police/military
personnel.
* I will not run or use any threatening motions.
* I will not bring or use any drugs or alcohol.

3. Conduct nonviolence education programs so that activists fully
understand what a commitment to nonviolent discipline entails. Within
these education programs, provide opportunities for activists to share
their feelings and fears in relation to any action and to discuss how
the group might organise itself (in affinity groups, for example) so
that each person is adequately supported to behave in a disciplined and
nonviolent manner.

4. Conduct nonviolence education programs specifically designed for
those activists who wish to acquire the knowledge and skills necessary
to be members of nonviolent peacekeeping teams. If there is no local
group that teaches nonviolent peacekeeping in your area, see 'The
Strategy of Nonviolent Defense' pp. 235-238.

5. Write individually to any relevant political leaders (such as the
President/Prime Minister and/or their equivalents at state/local levels,
and their deputies) and to the most senior police and/or military
officers (and their deputies) who will be involved in responding to your
nonviolent action. Inform them of your campaign and its purpose, and
specifically advise them that the campaign and the actions within it
will be explicitly nonviolent. Include a copy of the code of nonviolent
discipline.

6. Identify the military and/or police forces (including the federal,
state, military and/or naval police) as well as any 'special operations'
groups which will respond to your nonviolent actions. Select appropriate
individuals (paying attention to what is locally appropriate in relation
to gender, racial and religious 'balance') to a police/military liaison
team and have them liaise regularly with the senior police/military
officers who will be responsible for the police/military response. See
'How to do Police Liaison'
https://anitamckone.wordpress.com/articles-2/how-to-do-police-liaison/
and 'Nonviolent Activism and the Police' http://dkeenan.com/NvT/37/6.txt
If they offer you a deal or make threats, here's how to respond: 'Police
Deals and Threats: How Should Nonviolent Activists Respond?'
http://dkeenan.com/NvT/41/6.txt

Given that secrecy, like sabotage, is strategically counterproductive –
see 'The Political Objective and Strategic Goal of Nonviolent Actions'
cited above for a full explanation – keep police/military officers fully
informed of all action plan details and give them a personal copy of the
code of nonviolent discipline. Request the opportunity to address all of
the police/military personnel who will be involved in policing any
actions so that you can fully inform them as well. It does not matter if
this is refused, which is likely.

7. Organize members of the police/military liaison team(s) to visit
local police stations/military installations in order to talk
respectfully to individual officers about the campaign and to give them
a personal copy of the code of nonviolent discipline. Listen to their
fears and concerns as well; reflect these, if appropriate, while
remaining clear about the gravity of the issue in your view and your
commitment to taking nonviolent action to address it. This contact is
designed to reduce police/military fears and to counter any ideological
conditioning (such as 'all protesters are bludgers') which has
dehumanized activists in the eyes of the police/military personnel.
Don't worry if this contact is not allowed. Keep asking. As your
campaign unfolds, what wasn't possible before will sometimes become
possible later. As individual officers become aware of your campaign,
your commitment and discipline, some will find ways of helping you
unofficially.

8. Treat individual police and military officers with respect and
courtesy: they have families, concerns and, in their own way, want the
world to be a better place too. Remember that they have far more in
common with us than with the elites whose interests they are paid to
defend. Give them opportunities to realise this. Of course, not every
police and military officer will respond to this. Some are badly
psychologically damaged and have been chosen for these psychological
characteristics to perform a role within their police/military structure
that is violent. But if you choose to treat them all as considerate
human beings, you will get the best response possible in the
circumstances. We are trying to change the world: Give people as much
room as possible to join us.

9. Issue a news release to the relevant corporate media, progressive
media and on social media (and write letters to the editors of local
newspapers if necessary) which briefly explains the issue and draws
attention to the nonviolent commitment of your group, advises that
political leaders and the most senior police and/or military officers
have been informed of this commitment, and includes a copy of the code
of nonviolent discipline.

10. Organize the police/military liaison team (who should not otherwise
participate in the action on the day) to meet the police/military
personnel just prior to any action. If possible, they should speak to
each officer individually and give them a copy of the code of nonviolent
discipline. If this is not possible, one of the focalisers or a member
of the liaison team should remind the police/military (over a public
address system) of the nonviolent commitment of the activists. This
might mitigate the fear of individual police or military personnel who
might have been warned, as has happened often enough, to expect activist
violence.

If you anticipate that authorities might deliberately use
police/military personnel at your action who speak a different language
so that they can thwart your attempts to communicate with them, which
has happened rarely, you will also need at least some activists who can
speak any relevant languages and the code of nonviolent discipline will
need to be printed in all relevant languages.

Are you starting to wonder why I am emphasizing the importance of
advance and ongoing dialogue so much? Time and again throughout history,
military and/or police forces have defied orders to repress nonviolent
activists. The effectiveness of the dialogue between Chinese
pro-democracy activists in Beijing in 1989 and the troops of the
People's Liberation Army was so effective that the Chinese
dictatorship's first attempt to clear Tiananmen Square on 20 May was
completely thwarted. And in 1991, the dialogue between the nonviolent
activists in the 'Living Ring' (who had surrounded the Russian White
House following the Soviet coup) and the Soviet troops led to the
latter's refusal to attack the Russian White House and kill Soviet
civilians. I could go on.

11. If the tactic is strategically chosen, it will be consistent with
the strategy and have a clearly defined strategic goal while nominating
exactly where and when the action will take place, how many activists
will be involved and what level of nonviolence education and experience
they will require in order to be disciplined and effective in the
circumstances. Consider preparing an 'action leaflet' to explain the
main details of any action to relevant audiences on the day.

12. Plan each tactic in complete detail. For example, if the action
involves some form of intervention (such as sitting in front of a
bulldozer or blocking access to a military base or work area) which
increases the risk of confrontation with workers (with whom you should
also liaise in advance) and/or the police/military, make decisions about
such details as whether the activists will stand, sit or lie down;
whether they will face or turn away from the workers and/or
police/military; what posture they will adopt; whether they will sing
(what?), remain silent or do something else; and whether they will be
connected in some very obvious way (tangled in a ball of wool, for
example) which makes removal difficult. This detail is important
because, for example, it is more difficult to violently assault people
who are sitting quietly. In response to a tax resistance protest in Beit
Sahour in Palestine in 1988, Israeli troops besieged the town and
ordered the tax resisters to disperse. However, in an act of defiance
designed to eliminate any excuse for the troops to fire, the activists
sat down in the street and quietly held hands.

It is worth noting at this point that tactics that involve such actions
as 'locking on' to something (with various types of metal locks and
pipes, for example) or damaging equipment (called monkeywrenching in
some contexts) are misconceived. They are based on the fallacious belief
that the political objective of the action is what is important, not its
(obviously undefined) strategic goal. See 'The Political Objective and
Strategic Goal of Nonviolent Actions' cited above.

13. Consider tactics which emphasise dispersion rather than
concentration. The capacity for tactics involving dispersion to minimize
violence has been illustrated in several campaigns. For example, during
the 1930-1931 independence campaign in India, the main type of
repression (imprisonment) used against people throughout India who
manufactured salt was relatively mild compared with the violent beatings
given to the activists who intended to occupy the Dharasana salt works.
Even more effectively, the 1959 potato boycott in South Africa – to
protest the use of Pass offenders being used as 'slave' labour on potato
farms – could not be broken by the government, farmers and merchants
combined and made repression effectively impossible. See Albert Luthuli
'Let My People Go: An Autobiography' London: Collins, 1962. pp. 217-219.

14. If tactics involving concentration are chosen, consider organizing
them in a novel way or investing a traditional practice with new
meaning. For example, in circumstances in which demonstrations are
banned, the action may take the form of a funeral procession or, as has
been frequently the case in Tibet, a religious ceremony.

15. Conduct roleplays so that activists are given the chance to learn
how to deal with various contingencies, such as police intimidation
(with their uniforms, 'protective' gear, weapons and vehicles), kettling
(confining activists to either arrest or move them), painful noise
(administered by a long range acoustic device), and various weapons,
chemical and otherwise (such as pepper spray, tear gas, batons, water
cannons, and rubber/wooden bullets).

It's a tough call, but history clearly shows that activists with the
courage to calmly withstand repression at this level, as many have done
in many countries around the world, make huge gains for their campaign.
For example, at an 'illegal gathering' in Rangoon in Burma in 1989, Aung
San Suu Kyi used some carefully chosen words to maintain crowd
discipline after they were threatened with violent dispersal by the
military; no one moved. (In contrast, the disorganised and undisciplined
crowds at Amritsar, India in 1919 and Sharpeville, South Africa in 1960
were shot as they ran away leaving many people dead.) Activists
protesting against the use of torture in Chile were often sprayed by
water cannons loaded with dirty sewer water or water mixed with
dangerous chemicals and the women of Greenham Common were subjected to
sound, light or electromagnetic zapping technologies. And, of course,
the satyagrahis at Dharasana in India on 21 May 1930 were beaten over
the head with steel-tipped clubs, resulting in 320 injuries, including
many fractured skulls and two deaths. In each of these three cases, the
activists withstood the repression.

Make sure the individuals in your campaign are given maximum personal
support to develop this level of courage. Set up roleplays and then
invite people to develop courageous nonviolent responses to various
violent contingencies: find out what your fellow nonviolent activists
are doing to neutralise the impact of pepper spray and tear gas, for
example. If some people discover they are not ready for this level of
engagement, give them other opportunities for involvement until they are
ready. Rome wasn't built in a day!

16. Have a contingency plan for each tactic which may be subjected to
police/military violence. This plan should be known by all participants
in advance of the action, it may be described in an action leaflet
distributed as people arrive for the action, it should be explained
again by the action focalisers at the beginning of the action, and it
should be capable of implementation in a matter of seconds. If
appropriate, the plan should emphasise the importance of maintaining
lookouts during the action in order to eliminate the possibility that
activists will be caught by surprise. The plan should include the
preparation of simple actions designed to counter the prospect of
violence and it should include simple actions for responding to violence
should it start to occur. For example, at Ixopo in South Africa in 1959,
a group of protesting women was ordered to disperse. But before police
could be ordered to conduct the baton charge, the highly organised women
sank quietly to their knees and began to pray. In response, the police
'hung around helplessly'. See Luthuli p. 196.

17. Ensure that activists have been fully briefed on the risk of arrest
and its legal consequences, and have had adequate opportunity to make an
informed decision about this. The article 'Should I be Arrested?'
http://dkeenan.com/NvT/39/5.txt might be a useful reference. If some
activists are not willing to risk arrest where this is a possibility,
devise other involvements that do not involve this risk (or devise
tactics involving dispersion). These days, in many contexts, it is
unwise to assume that arrests will not occur. If arrests are
anticipated/intended, organise an 'Arrest Support Team' (which will
usefully involve one or more supportive legal people) for your action
and make sure they have a full list of those who are planning to be
arrested, noting whether or not these arrestees intend to accept bail
and who they would like informed of their arrest. Subsequent legal
support will need to be organized.

18. Appoint two action focalisers who are competent to explain and
direct the action on behalf of the organising group. And have sets of
backup focalisers as well in case the first two are arrested by 'snatch
squads' of police targeting leaders. Focalising includes identifying the
strategic goal of the action, indicating its nonviolent nature (and
asking people to respect this discipline or to withdraw from the
action), creating the appropriate mood (for example, one of celebration
or mourning), drawing attention to any action leaflet, outlining any
safety precautions or contingency plan, and facilitating the action
through the stages agreed upon during the planning process. This will
assist people to understand the nature of the action and to resist the
initiatives of individuals or groups with a competing agenda.

19. Organize clearly identified marshals and peacekeeping teams (which
are able to deal effectively with activist, provocateur or worker
violence) to be present at any nonviolent action where violence is a
distinct possibility.

20. Arrange for independent witnesses (such as civil liberties monitors
and legal observers) and the media, progressive and otherwise, to be
present at any action where there is a risk of police/military violence.
Violent repression of disciplined nonviolent activists violates major
cultural and political norms. For this reason, the police and military
would prefer to conduct any violence in secret. Even if the corporate
media doesn't report police/military violence (and/or lies about your
behaviour), progressive and social media are likely to report the truth.

If, despite all of the above, the police and/or military personnel are
still violent, the activists should maintain their discipline so that
police fears about the reaction of activists are quickly dispelled and
so that the inhibitions against the use of violence are brought quickly
into play. Maintaining discipline in this context requires a great deal
of courage. However, by making unnecessary noise, running away or
responding in kind, activists contribute to the chaos which makes a
continuation of the violence more likely. This has been demonstrated
historically on many occasions, including those noted above.

In contrast, a disciplined group which remains motionless (preferably in
a pose of cultural significance, such as one of prayer or meditation)
and which remains silent or perhaps hums or sings (possibly a religious
hymn or a national anthem) is less likely to be attacked, and, if it is
attacked, is less likely to be attacked for any length of time. In the
tactical sense, disciplined action of this nature should minimise the
number of casualties; in the strategic sense, it should generate the
highest level of support for the nonviolent activists and their cause.

It will not always be feasible to undertake all of the above,
particularly for mass demonstrations involving huge numbers of people
from different parts of a country. But if we keep the above points in
mind, and implement those points that we can, we will continue to
progressively improve the effectiveness of our efforts to nonviolently
shape the world we envision and be increasingly better prepared to
thwart elite efforts to stop us.

Finally, if you are inclined to join the worldwide movement to end all
violence, you are welcome to sign the online pledge of 'The People's
Charter to Create a Nonviolent World'
http://thepeoplesnonviolencecharter.wordpress.com

If you are somewhat overwhelmed by the above information, it's only
because you are not used to planning and implementing nonviolent
strategy with the same attention to detail as our military counterparts.
But if we are going to take the necessary risks to save our world, we
might as well do it strategically.

Robert J. Burrowes has a lifetime commitment to understanding
and ending human violence. He has done extensive research since 1966 in
an effort to understand why human beings are violent and has been a
nonviolent activist since 1981. He has been arrested about 30 times. He
is the author of 'Why Violence?' http://tinyurl.com/whyviolence His
email address is [email protected] and his website is at
http://robertjburrowes.wordpress.com

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