Machiavellian
Musharraf
By
Ramzy Baroud
31 December,
2007
Countercurrents.org
The
42-day drama in Pakistan is far from over; the declaration of emergency
and the lifting of emergency are part of a charade, behind which exists
a complex power play between Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, various
camps within the military elite, and the US government. The Pakistani
people are the least relevant to these calculations, although every
player never fails to justify unwarranted actions in their name.
General Musharraf’s
motives for declaring emergency on November 3 are far from enigmatic.
To guarantee his political future, Musharraf acted in the decisive,
uncompromising fashion of a military man: first he brought the country
to a state of suspended animation, then he restructured the government,
judiciary, parliament and constitution to align them with his interests.
Once these changes were enacted, he revoked the 42-day state of emergency,
and even further promised ‘absolutely’ free and transparent
legislative elections on January 8 next year.
The Bush
administration’s placatory response to Musharraf’s actions
(not going further than carefully-worded, benign condemnations) is not
the only thing that makes it hard to substantiate the claim that Musharraf
acted independently of the US or at the behest of some elements in the
Pakistani military alone. Following September 11, 2001, and the invasion
of Afghanistan soon after, Musharraf has become one of America’s
most faithful allies in the region. US aid to Pakistan multiplied and
spent with little accountability. According to Jeffrey D Sachs, a Professor
of Economics at Columbia University, “75 per cent of the $10 billion
in US aid has gone to the Pakistani military, ostensibly to reimburse
Pakistan for its contribution to the ‘war on terror’, and
to help it buy F-16s and other weapons systems. Another 16 per cent
went straight to the Pakistani budget, no questions asked. That left
less than 10 per cent for development and humanitarian assistance.”
The Pakistani
president is Machiavellian part and parcel. Contrary to appearances,
he knows his limits and plays by the unwritten rules of power. When
he declared emergency, he cited two objectives with underlying messages.
The first
was aimed at his detractors who he claimed had mounted a ‘conspiracy’
to destabilise the country and his rule; as this conspiracy allegedly
involved the judiciary, it justified his purge campaign.
The second
message cleverly transcended all of that to reel in the US and its ‘war
on terror’. Indeed, according to this logic, Musharraf needed
a state of emergency to combat a Taleban-inspired insurgency stemming
from the tribal areas in the North West Frontier Province. With the
US and NATO fighting their own Taleban and Taleban-inspired insurgency
in Afghanistan, Musharraf’s actions in Islamabad were meant to
supplement the incessant efforts at curbing the terrorist resurgence
in the entire region.
It is hardly
news that countries which to utilise ‘war on terror’ reasoning
to justify violating human rights and democracy in their own countries
are often — if not always — American allies or clients.
Musharraf
must have understood that his failure to cooperate with US military
plans would invite US wrath and hasten his exit (violent or otherwise).
While his ‘cooperation’ was hardly optional, it also had
its rewards. One of these was a free hand to alter internal political
structures, so long as they didn’t in any way interfere with US
interests. Musharraf tested this unspoken understanding, and the Bush
administration kept true to its word — until the US Congress decided
to interfere.
At the same
time that Musharraf began decrying the Taleban-inspired insurgency in
the tribal areas, US officials began highlighting — if not manipulating
— intelligence that exaggerated the same threat.
For example,
US Defence Secretary Robert M Gates said in a media briefing on December
21 that Al Qaeda insurgents are shifting focus to Pakistan, threatening
the country and its ‘people’. Gates dismissed the Taleban’s
violent return to Afghanistan, even mocking the over-publicised spring
offensive. “The spring offensive we expected from the Taleban
became NATO's spring offensive," he told journalists in Washington.
Why this sudden change of priorities, and why did they coincide so well
with Musharraf’s own changes?
The shift
— which has made Pakistan the primary battleground, as opposed
to its previous position as a less important frontier than Afghanistan
— could mean a major strategic change in US military policy toward
Pakistan in the future. It also emphasises the importance of the role
played by Musharraf and his regime.
Musharraf’s
validation is urgently needed by the Bush administration now that Congress
has passed the spending bill, putting limits on $300 million of US military
aid to Pakistan. A sum of $250 million is be used strictly for counter-terrorism
operation, and the delivery of the rest hinges on Pakistan’s success
— or failure — in living up to the Congress’ strict
conditions. This deviation, if not contained quickly, might cause a
rift and future difficulties for the US in Pakistan, especially among
disgruntled military figures competing for power, privilege and contracts.
For now, the White House has gone on crisis management mode, touting
the January 8 elections and paying lip service to democracy, free media
access and so forth.
One of those
involved in defending Musharraf’s record is US Assistant Secretary
of State Richard Boucher, who, on December 20, said that Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice should be able to report that Pakistan is on
its way toward full restoration of democracy. "We're trying to
keep moving toward elections that are as fair and as free as possible.
We do think there are (additional) steps that can be taken and will
be taken," Boucher said.
The US administration
and Congress are likely to clash over the best ways to control Pakistan,
or — to put it mildly — to ensure Pakistan’s continuous
cooperation in the US ‘war on terror’. However the clash
manifests, the resulting US foreign policy posture is likely to affect
changes – substantial or otherwise – in US policy toward
Pakistan, resulting in further interference in the country’s internal
affairs, deepening the discord and fuelling more violence. Indeed, it
may endanger the future of genuine democracy in Pakistan for years to
come.
Ramzy
Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net)
is an author and editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is
The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People's Struggle
(Pluto Press, London)
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