Afghanistan: The Limits Of Military Power
By Mir Adnan Aziz
28 June, 2010
Countercurrents.org
"Bear in mind the truth of the old saying that the end is not obvious at the beginning."
Artabanus to Xerxes as quoted by Herodotus.
In 5B.C. King Xerxes of Persia, the most powerful nation on earth, held a grudge. The free Greek city of Athens had aided rebellions against Persian rule by Greek communities on the coast of present-day Turkey. These rebellions were were thwarted by King Darius, Xerxes' father. The advisors surrounding Xerxes urged retaliation. "You ought to march against Greece. It will enhance your reputation and make people think twice in the future before attacking your territory." Mardonius said: "Who is going to oppose you? When it comes to military matters there is no one in the world to match us."
Xerxes also had saner advisors. Artabanus, his uncle, counseled a caution borne of painful experience. Artabanus warned: "Complex affairs inevitably require further thought." Herodotus, a Greek historian also known as father of history chronicled the twenty year war between the Greeks and Persians. Ironically, George W. Bush, of “history is for losers" belief, majored in history. He took over where his father left in Iraq and invaded Afghanistan for good measure.
Nine years on, the Afghan War is a lost cause. A Newsweek poll finds 46 percent of respondents think America is losing the Afghan war with only 26 percent saying the military is winning. A similar plurality think the US is losing the broader war on terrorism with 43 percent versus 29 percent. On assuming the Afghan command, Senator Lindsey Graham termed Gen.Petraeus as “our only hope. If he can't pull it off, nobody can.” That is a world apart from the Mardonius statements when initiating the war.
The inability to name a war is a sign of absence of logic. This war has created its own self-perpetuating dynamics. The culture of fear created by politicians, neocons, government agencies and various interests groups seem a feeding frenzy of sensationalist competition and a desperate effort to make this war appear as an antidote to an impending global disaster.
Michael Hasting wrote a memoir called "I Lost My Love in Baghdad: A Modern War Story" about his fiancé’s death while working as an aid worker in Iraq. What made him hit the headlines was his scoop in the Rolling Stone revealing the disarray in the Obama presidency, Washington DC and the Afghan War. It is now said of Gen. McChrystal, “The guy who was promoting and leading the counterinsurgency strategy has shown by his actions that even he doesn’t believe in it”. It holds true for the American administration, the military and its allies.
The Taliban will rightly count Gen McChrystal as a war casualty. They belittled Gen. McChrystal's heavily publicized takeover of Marjah in Afghanistan. When US ambassador, Karl Eikenberry and envoy, Richard Holbrook, both maligned by Gen. McChrystal in the Rolling Stone article, visited Marjah a few days after the “takeover” their helicopter was shot at and suicide bombers blew themselves up. With the Taliban’s own counter-surge resulting in greater loss of life for coalition forces, they are on a roll with the coalition strategy in disarray and incoherent as never before.
Sacked US General Stanley McChrystal issued a scathingly critical assessment of the war against a "resilient and growing insurgency" just days before being forced out. He pinpointed an "ineffective or discredited" Afghan government, waning political support and "divergence of coalition expectations and campaign timelines".
Gen.Petraeus, has argued "that we need to get the upper hand militarily, regain the military initiative and then negotiate from a position of strength". Nine years of war effort, costing $7billion a month, has only five Afghan areas out of 122 classed as being under the "full authority" of the government with governance rated as non-existent, dysfunctional or unproductive in 89 areas. Less than a third of the military and only 12 per cent of police forces were rated as "effective". Short of waving a magic wand, which the general does not have, how that position of strength shall be achieved is incomprehensible.
Gen.McChrystal's presentation to Nato defense ministers and ISAF representatives provided an uncompromising obstacle to President Obama's plan to bring troops home in 2011 and give him a shot at a second term. The general was judged to be "off message" in his warning to ministers not to expect quick results because they were facing a "resilient and growing insurgency". According to some within the US military, Gen.McChrystal's candour about the reality of the situation was an obstacle to President Obama's search for an "early, face-saving exit" to help his chances in the 2012 presidential elections. Its all about the Oval Office, stupid.
Political expediency, as we saw when this war was initiated, prevents sensible debate about the fundamental irrationalities of US policies in Afghanistan. Bizarrely, false beliefs that dub those who call for negotiations “terrorist sympathizers” prevent it from being handled by any other but military means only (true for Pakistan too). Gen.Petraeus is presently the U.S. military's biggest star. President Obama's domestic advisers view him with suspicion thinking he could become a formidable Republican candidate for the nation's highest office. The need for change of military command in Afghanistan should be cause for rethinking the entire policy by understanding the limits of military power.
