Kiss
Of Death
By Uri Avnery
07 January, 2007
Gush
Shalom
Since
Judas Iscariot embraced Jesus, Jerusalem has not seen such a kiss.
After being boycotted by
Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert for years, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was
invited to the official residence of the Prime Minister of Israel two
weeks ago. There, in front of the cameras, Olmert embraced him and kissed
him warmly on both cheeks. Abbas looked stunned, and froze.
Somehow the scene was reminiscent of another incident of politically-inspired
physical contact: the embarassing occurrence at the Camp David meeting,
when Prime Minister Ehud Barak pushed Yasser Arafat forcefully into
the room where Bill Clinton stood waiting.
In both instances it was
a gesture that was intended to look like paying respect to the Palestinian
leader, but both were actually acts of violence that - seemingly - testified
to ignorance of the customs of the other people and of their delicate
situation. Actually, the aim was quite different.
ACCORDING TO the New Testament,
Judas Iscariot kissed Jesus in order to point him out to those who had
come to arrest him.
In appearance - an act of
love and friendship. In effect - a death sentence.
On the face of it, Olmert
was out to do Abbas a favor. He paid him respect, introduced him to
his wife and honored him with the title "Mr. President".
That should not be underestimated.
At Oslo, titanic battles were fought over this title. The Palestinians
insisted that the head of the future Palestinian Authority should be
called "President". The Israelis rejected this out of hand,
because this title could indicate something like a state. In the end,
it was agreed that the (binding) English version would carry the Arabic
title "Ra'is", since that language uses the same word for
both President and Chairman. Abbas, who signed the document for the
Palestinian side, probably did not envisage that he himself would be
the first to be addressed by an Israeli Prime Minister as "President".
But enough trivia. More important
is the outcome of this event. After the imposed kiss, Abbas needed a
big Israeli gesture to justify the meeting in the eyes of his people.
And indeed, why shouldn't Olmert do something resounding? For example,
to release on the spot a thousand prisoners, remove all the hundreds
of checkpoints scattered across the West Bank, open the passage between
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?
Nothing of the sort happened.
Olmert did not release a single prisoner - no woman, no child, no old
man, no sick person. He did indeed announce (for the umpteenth time)
that the roadblocks would be "eased", but the Palestinians
report that they have not felt any change. Perhaps, here and there,
the endless queue at some of the roadblocks has become a little shorter.
Also, Olmert gave back a fifth of the Palestinian tax money withheld
(or embezzled) by the Israeli government.
To the Palestinians, this
looked like another shameful failure for their President: he went to
Canossa and received meaningless promises that were not kept.
WHY DID Olmert go through
all these motions?
The naïve explanation
is political. President Bush wanted some movement in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, which would look like an American achievement. Condoleezza
Rice transmitted the order to Olmert. Olmert agreed to meet Abbas at
long last. There was a meeting. A kiss was effected. Promises were made
and immediately forgotten. Americans, as is well known, have short memories.
Even shorter (if that is possible) than ours.
But there is also a more
cynical explanation. If one humiliates Abbas, one strengthens Hamas.
Palestinian support for Abbas depends on one single factor: his ability
to get from the US and Israel things Hamas cannot. The Americans and
the Israelis love him, so - the argument goes - they will give him what
is needed: the mass release of prisoners, an end to the targeted killings,
the removal of the monstrous roadblocks, the opening of the passage
between the West Bank and Gaza, the start of serious negotiations for
peace. But if Abbas cannot deliver any of these - what remains but the
methods of Hamas?
The business of the prisoners
provides a good example. Nothing troubles the Palestinians more than
this: almost every Palestinian clan has people in prison. Every family
is affected: a father, a brother, a son, sometimes a daughter. Every
night, the Israeli army "arrests" another dozen or so. How
to get them free?
Hamas has a proven remedy:
to capture Israelis (in the Israeli and international media, Israelis
are "kidnapped" while Palestinians are "arrested").
For the return of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, Olmert will release
many prisoners. Israelis, according to Palestinian experience, understand
only the language of force.
Some of Olmert's advisors
had a brilliant idea: to give Abbas hundreds of prisoners as a gift,
just for nothing. That would reinforce the position of the Palestinian
president and prove to the Palestinians that they can get more from
us this way than by violence. It would deal a sharp blow to the Hamas
government, whose overthrow is a prime aim of the governments both of
Israel and the USA.
Out of the question, cried
another group of Olmert's spin doctors. How will the Israeli media react
if prisoners are released before Shalit comes home?
The trouble is that Shalit
is held by Hamas and its allies, and not by Abbas. If it is forbidden
to release prisoners before the return of Shalit, then all the cards
are in the hands of Hamas. In that case, perhaps it makes sense to speak
with Hamas? Unthinkable!
The result: no strengthening
of Abbas, no dialogue with Hamas, no nothing.
THAT IS an old Israeli tradition:
when there are two alternatives, we choose the third: not to do anything.
For me, the classic example
is the Jericho affair. In the middle 70s, King Hussein made an offer
to Henry Kissinger: Israel should withdraw from Jericho and turn the
town over to the king. The Jordanian army would hoist the Jordanian
flag there, announcing symbolically that Jordan is the decisive Arab
presence in the West Bank.
Kissinger liked the idea
and called Yigal Allon, the Israeli foreign minister. Allon informed
the Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin. All the top political echelon - Rabin,
Allon, the Defense Minister Shimon Peres - were already enthusiastic
supporters of the "Jordanian Option", as were their predecessors,
Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan and Abba Eban. My friends and I, who, on the
contrary, advocated the "Palestinian Option", were a marginal
minority.
But Rabin rejected the offer
categorically. Golda had publicly promised to hold a referendum or elections
before giving back even one square inch of occupied territory. "I
will not call an election because of Jericho!" Rabin declared.
No Jordanian Option. No Palestinian
Option. No nothing.
NOW THE same is happening
vis-à-vis Syria.
Again there are two alternatives.
The first: to start negotiations with Bashar al-Assad, who is making
public overtures. That means being ready to give back the Golan Heights
and allow the 60 thousand Syrian refugees to return home. In return,
Sunni Syria could well cut itself loose from Iran and Hizbullah and
join the front of Sunni states. Since Syria is both Sunni and secular-nationalist,
that may also have a positive effect on the Palestinians.
Olmert has demanded that
Assad cut himself off from Iran and stop helping Hizbullah before any
negotiations. That is a ridiculous demand, obviously intended to serve
as an alibi for refusing to start talking. After all, Assad uses Hizbullah
in order to put pressure on Israel to return the Golan. His alliance
with Iran also serves the same purpose. How can he give up in advance
the few cards he holds and still hope to achieve anything in the negotiations?
The opposite alternative
suggested by some senior army commanders: to invade Syria and do the
same there as the Americans have done in Iraq. That would create anarchy
throughout the Arab world, a situation that would be good for Israel.
That would also renovate the image of the Israeli army that was damaged
in Lebanon and restore its "deterrence power".
So what will Olmert do? Give
the Golan back? God forbid! Does he need trouble with the 16 thousand
vociferous settlers there? What then, will he start a war with Syria?
No! Hasn't he had enough military setbacks? So he will go for the third
alternative: to do nothing.
Bashar Assad has at least
one consolation: He does not run the risk of being kissed by Olmert.
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