Israel’s
‘True War’ In Gaza Played
To The Hamas-Fatah Equation
By
Dr Marwan Asmar
28 December,
2007
Countercurrents.org
Israel
is fighting a “true war” in Gaza according to its Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert. Such a chilling term emphasizes the point Gaza
has indeed become Israel’s military backyard to do what it will
with this piece of Palestinian geography that is at the butt end of
daily missiles and aerial bombardment.
Israel is
out to get what it calls Palestinian military groups rocketing nearby
Israeli towns and settlements. But such retaliation is out of proportion
because the missile strikes are hitting civilian targets and ranging
in the deaths of between from four, and 10 to14 persons daily, of men,
women, children run.
These have
become common occurrences as the Israeli military and government plead
the dangers of the armed groups from Hamas and Al Jihad Al Islami. Israeli
phantom jets fly over as near possible euphemistically using technology
aimed at neat surgical strikes and taking whole parts, ramshackled,
civilian structures in the process.
It’s
like Israel has never left Gaza in 2005; today, Israel maintains total
control over its air space and border points creating a hostage population
that can’t move in or out of the Strip without the army knowing
of it.
Today Gaza
has become a killing field, it is here where Islamic supporters are
picked off one by one opposed to Israel and its dominance in the Palestinian
territories. For Israel however Gaza has become a valuable opportunity
in other ways for it has become the stronghold for other groups like
Hamas.
Hamas has
reverted to Gaza as a traditional basis of support after Palestinian
President Mahmood Abbas dismissed it in mid-2007 after failing to produce
a workable government based on coalition with the other Palestinian
factions and ending the economic sanctions and the cutting of aid imposed
on the Palestinians by the international community after it won the
Legislative Elections of January 2006.
Such sanctions
tightened the screws on the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza because
it brought the economic situation to a standstill and hilted any economic
activity signified by the fact that the 165,000 civil servants working
under the National Authority stopped being paid, and therefore ceased
spending, a situation that lasted for 18 months and created much recession.
It was the
1.5 million inhabitants of the Gaza Strip that took some of the worst
blows where average daily wages was no more than $2 according to World
Bank statistics. The situation has been worsened by an Israeli blockade
of Palestinian migrant workers into Israel and the interplay of inter-Palestinian
factional violence and rivalry between Hamas and Fatah. The Strip become
the ground for settling political disputes and political murder by members
of opposing forces, Islamists and nationalists who pointed their guns
at each other while Israeli and the international community watched
on.
The background
to this was simple enough. Fatah felt particularly sour at Hamas after
it won 74 of the 132-seat Parliamentary elections in the January 2006
while Fatah only received 45 seats. It was a humiliating defeat particularly
since the Fatah movement controlled the previous 80-member legislative
chamber of which 68 seats were held by Fatah and had agreed to expand
the Council on the understanding that it would continue to be the key
player in Palestinian politics.
Clearly it
was a mistake. Fatah received a sobering shock and that’s why
it took months of haggling and recriminations over joining a government-led
by Hamas. While they continued to talk to the Islamic movement over
the possibility of forming a coalition after January 2006, it never
actually materialized with the sticking points being over who gets what
in the ministerial posts and portfolios. Negotiations between the politicians
were paralleled with frequent fightings between the military wings of
Hamas and Fatah bloodily spelt out on the streets of Gaza.
It became
a source of delight for the Israelis who refused and still refuses to
deal with Hamas, regarding them as a terrorist group that should continually
be flushed out as in the near past it targeted and assassinated a large
number of its leaders because the Islamist organization does not recognize
the state of Israel and call for its toppling.
Israel also
has always recognized, rather cynically, if different Palestinian factions
keep at each others throats, the prospects of them annihilating each
other would be that much greater and would be to its best advantage
regardless of the doddering peace process and despite the fact that
one party maybe more amenable to negotiations rather than another. Come
what may and in the final analysis Israel wants to be in a strong position
to impose a political settlement on the Palestinians.
Being the
stronger party in the region and certainly the Palestinians, Israel
can already impose deals as quickly as it can undo them, it can play
one faction against another, and can dictate how much it wants to give
if any and can play off one against each other and can alternate as
was the case in the 1980s and 1990s when Israel was reportedly adopting
strategies, tactics and point of views with regard to turning a blind
eye to the armory of one group as opposed another, and attempting to
create divisions and schisms within the Palestinian national and religious
movements.
Instead of
continually fighting, and being involved in recriminatory stances as
they are doing now on the streets if Gaza, the Palestinian factions
and their leaderships must recognize Israel has short-, medium and long-term
aims to split the different factions and movement that are certainly
not only Fatah and Hamas but Al Jihad Al Islami which also have a strong
presence in Gaza, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and many others.
Israel continually
wants to develop and change new thought out perspectives, rules, regulations
and horizons to add to Palestinian weakness and fragmentation of what
can be called cold war tactics and divide-and-rule strategies imposed
to deal with an already tense situation in the West Bank and Gaza in
a powder-keg state of eruption;
It is never
afraid of using the army when their leaders talk about “true war”
on Gaza; what today might be a source of war is that Israel might re-occupy
the territory as it did in the past. However, analysts argue that Israel’s
military is already doing what it will to Gaza, and occupation will
only lead to its further embroilment and a military quagmire that it
does not want to do at the present time, since the military job is being
done.
For Israel there are no long-term solutions despite the peace options
that have been on the table since the 1990s which is to give the Palestinians
their rightful national determination and statehood. Other than the
use of violent “iron-fist” policies and practices developed
by the late Yitzhak Rabin in the early 1980s to attempt to placate,
it has consistently refused to deal with the Palestinians on an equal
level as people who have been wronged. Even peaceniks like Shimon Peres,
the current Israeli president, and a long advocate of a negotiated settlement,
have been weary to give real, forceful commitments that would satisfy
the Palestinians. The end result was signified by Intifada I in December
1987 and Intifada II in the year 2000.
For Israel
the barrel of the gun continues to serve as an objective in itself despite
paying lip service to the peace process which began in Madrid in 1991
and continued hobbling forward in the 1990s. Israel’s iron fist
may have directly contributed to the raise in support of the Islamic
resistance movement in Gaza Strip. It has become very clear since the
1980s and 1990s and increased after the 2nd Palestinian Intifada on
29 September, 2000, the surge of Hamas support and the other Islamic
movement, although to a lesser degree, vastly increased in the street
because of the Islamic fever of their massage as well it programs and
policies to the people of Gaza.
During those
years as well Hamas leaders, politicians, activists and those that belonged
to their military wings were cultivating, building and nurturing a strong
body of support among the Palestinians who were living in poverty, squalor
and under the constant gun-ships of the Israelis.
Being a resistance-political
movement Hamas worked on the local scene, getting involved in local
politics, mundane every-day issues and which made political Islam a
force to be reckoned with and popular among the masses who were becoming
fed up with mainstream politics and politicians who do not deliver on
their promises.
It was a
system based on participatory politics, and in Palestine the Hamas movement
became active, reactive and answered the needs of Palestinians in Gaza.
This may have been missing in the actions and literature of other Palestinian
political parties like Fatah which relied on its popular strength as
a nationalist movement and may have in the end underplayed the strength
of lower and middle classes in their programs because they were already
at the apex of political power.
Israel, always
being in favor of short-term ‘iron-fist’ solutions may have
also overlooked the growing social power of Hamas in the Palestinian
street and continued to back, or at the very least to trade with the
wrong horse despite the fact that the peace process was at an effective
standstill after the year 2000.
Fatah realized
what was happening only after they badly lost the 2006 Legislative Elections
when it was too late and when it should have paid greater heed to the
Palestinian street and should have had better ground organizations rather
than continually being accused of mal-practice, graft and nepotism—the
no Mr Clean administration.
With final
power being in the hand of the Palestinian president Mahmood Abbass,
he dismissed the Hamas government of Mr Ismael Hanya while its leadership
went back to traditional base on Gaza.
As a result
international sanctions on the Palestinians were lifted almost immediately,
the 165,000 civil servants under the Palestinian Authority have been
paid, the peace process cut off out of action since the year 2000 went
back into revitalization as a result of the Annapolis meeting despite
the fact nobody is quite sure what will happen on that front, and the
new good news is that the donors meeting in Paris in mid-December 2007,
pledged $7.5 billion to the Palestinians over the next five years.
All this
is making Hamas appear in a negative limelight. Their retreat to Gaza
began last June, while the Legislative Council deputies meet in Ramallah
on the West Bank may yet fuel added tension between them and the present
Fatah leadership which has once again taken the reigns of power in the
West Bank through a Palestinian government that appears to be gain respectability
in the eyes of the international community.
But in a
sense also, there is a continuing stalemate as the Hamas leadership
and ousted government to go back to Gaza unable to rule but yet fully
in control of their stretched out province which can’t be doing
any political good to the Palestinian cause, nor to itself as a movement
standing in the firing line of Israeli phantom jets.
But for Fatah
and Abu Mazen, now is not the time to isolate and allow them to dig
their heels in one particular area, there should now be a process of
healing and an attempt to bring Hamas out of their ideological shell
which has always been religiously and ideological connected to its refusal
to recognize the state of Israel and deal with it.
It has been
said time and again if Hamas wants to play the game of politics and
have a say in the democratic process, it has to submit to the new political
realities which means categorically renouncing terrorism and recognizing
Israel which Fatah has done through the signing of different peace agreements
and treaties, beginning with Madrid and the 1993 Oslo peaces process.
At the moment
Hamas refuses to give outright recognition to Israel and relies on its
popular support. Is it enough to put their eggs in one basket and rely
on a Palestinian street that is under effective Israeli military occupation,
and shouldn’t the movement be looking to rally support from the
different Palestinian institutions as well as those built since the
Palestinian National Authority was established on different parts of
the Palestinian territories in the early 1990s.
Hamas still
has its deputies that form the majority of the Palestinian Legislative
Council and it will likely try and create major in-roads since for the
time being political power has fallen back in the hands of Fatah. However,
this new ruling government will now have to be much more careful in
the way it conducts itself in the street because it knows that it is
on shaky grounds.
Israel for
the time being is happy with the Fatah peace partners it can continue
to negotiate with at its own pace, while the world community as represented
by the international quartet of the UN, US, Russia, and Europe is in
a better mood because Fatah, and Mahmood Abbas are certainly not Hamas,
and realize there are international conventions they have to stick to
and play along with.
While for
Israel one part of its strategy in dealing with the Palestinians is
starting to be fixed, another part is still at lose ends. Since their
government leaders regard their military bombardment of Gaza as a “true
war”, then Israel will surely continue to strike at Hamas and
other groups as it sees fit.
The author
is the Responsible Chief Editor of the Amman-based Jo Magazine, a monthly
that deals in Jordanian affairs.
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