The
Making Of Another Iraq
By Abukar Arman
09 January, 2007
Foreign Policy In
Focus
A
new front in the “global war on terror” has emerged with
its center in war-torn Somalia. The target of the new front, the Islamic
Courts Union (ICU), both brought back normalcy to seemingly untamable
southern Somalia and anxiously legislated morality to the point of social
suffocation. According to the U.S. State Department, its greatest sin
was its purported link to al-Qaida.
The military action to crush
these “Islamic extremists” is already underway. Washington-supported
Ethiopian troops carried out a preemptive attack against Somalia at
the end of December. Ethiopian tanks roared all the way to the capital
Mogadishu and then on to Kismayo near the Kenyan border. The invasion
proved easier than expected. The comparatively more powerful Ethiopian
army teamed up with a militia loyal to the Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) to achieve their objective of regime change with an ease ominously
reminiscent of the entry into Baghdad of the “coalition of the
willing.”
With Ethiopian troops now
in charge of Mogadishu, the political situation in Somalia has escalated
dangerously. Militias are once again lining up according to clan loyalties.
Ruthless warlords are resuming their pre-ICU roles, already setting
up the infamous roadblocks, returning to banditry, and even carrying
out vindictive assassinations. “My suspicion is that this is just
another face of the conflict—clan versus clan; warlords versus
warlords; ICU versus TFG—and the final chapter is not written
yet,” says Abdi Kusow, one of the leading Somali intellectuals
in the diaspora.
The presence of foreign troops
has profoundly changed the political dynamics in Somalia. A grassroots-driven,
wrathful nationalism will intensify, with ramifications beyond the Somali
geographical boundaries. Indeed, unless the current trend is immediately
reversed, the conflict will likely set the entire Horn of Africa on
fire, spark an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, and widen the divide
between the West and the Islamic world.
A Flawed Resolution
Until recently, the Islamic Courts controlled all but a small area of
Somalia. The federal government, with the support of the Ethiopian troops,
maintained control over the southwestern town of Baidoa. Then, in early
December, Washington pushed a controversial resolution through the UN
Security Council. The resolution authorized military intervention and
the partial lifting of the arms embargo imposed on Somalia before the
largest humanitarian mission in modern history (Operation Restore Hope)
was undertaken 14 years ago. Many of Washington's closest allies, including
Britain, refused to cosponsor the resolution for its partiality and
polarizing nature. The decision was also poorly timed, since the Khartoum
peace talks between Somalia's two major contending forces, the ICU and
the TFG, was scheduled to resume the following week.
The ICU claimed that the
resolution essentially ushered in Ethiopia through the back door by,
among other things, failing to address the Ethiopian troops already
present in the country since they first intervened in July.
The UN resolution opened
up the flow of arms and money to the regime of Ethiopian Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi, who perpetuated Somalia's political hemorrhage for the
past sixteen years through the financing, training, and arming of one
faction against another. The resolution not only gave the estimated
8,000 troops who had been operating in Somalia the legitimacy to continue
arming and “protecting” one side of the parties in conflict
(TFG) but to take action against any group that “threatens the
stability of the region,” a phrase euphemistically understood
to mean “Islamists.” After the passage of the resolution,
Ethiopia used Washington's preemptive war doctrine to widen its intervention.
This intervention into Somali internal affairs also discredited the
moderates for whom such foreign preconditions were a kiss of death.
By taking on the ICU in order
to find a handful of suspected terrorists in its midst, Washington was
imprudently “looking to use a sledgehammer to crack a nut,”
as an unnamed Western diplomat aptly put it. The same diplomat added
that “even if they do get their six or so ‘high-value' terror
targets they will pay for it in frankly hundreds of people being converted
to the cause.” Similarly, U.S. intervention in Iraq, presented
as a way to combat terrorism, actually served as a recruitment opportunity
for al-Qaida.
“I think the U.S. government
panicked. They saw Islamic group; they said, Taliban is coming,”
says Herman Cohen, former assistant secretary of State for African affairs.
As with Iraq, Washington fell for politicized intelligence, probably
from Ethiopia, which was eager to enlist U.S. assistance to deal with
a potential security threat of its own. By giving tacit support to Ethiopia
and because of its ill-advised preference for military solutions over
diplomatic negotiations, Washington is helping to remake Somali in the
image of Iraq.
Building the Case
How did such a one-sided and potentially dangerous UN resolution pass
with a unanimous vote in the Security Council? Again, the parallels
with Iraq are disturbing.
This time around, no secretary
of state was needed to deliver a “smoking gun” speech and
no prime minister was needed to unveil a “dossier” of death
and destruction. That pretext was conveniently provided by an 86-page
report prepared by the Monitoring Group (MG) made up of four experts
who have been almost entirely dependent on the United States and Ethiopia
for intelligence. The report included almost all the sensationalized
elements that made the Iraq War possible.
First, there were the “demons.”
Some individual members of the ICU in towns such as Bulo Burte recklessly
issued extreme fatwas that force their constituents (those within their
area of control) to practice Islam according to their ill-informed interpretation.
More alarmingly, the courts threatened to call for a worldwide jihad
against any invading troops.
Furthermore, the MG report
concluded that the ICU was a religio-political entity in the business
of exporting terror. According to the report, the ICU sent 720 of its
army (the radical wing Al Shabaab or “The Youth”) to help
Hezbollah against Israel. The report claims that the legendary leader
of Al Shabaab actually “handpicked” them. The report, however,
does not explain why the ICU would send one-fourth of its estimated
3,000 Al Shabaab militia to help the Hezbollah at a time when they themselves
were struggling for survival against the warlords.
The final sensationalistic
charge is an even more direct echo of the case for the Iraq War. According
to the MG report, the ICU brought in two Iranian scientists to explore
for uranium in Dhusa Mareb. The alleged link to potential weapons of
mass destruction recalls the Bush administration's attempt to link Saddam
Hussein with al-Qaida and the infamous “yellow cake” story
involving a fictitious Iraqi attempt to buy nuclear material from Niger.
The State Department, again
in a reprise of earlier arguments, concluded that diplomatic engagement
with the “extremists” of the ICU was an exercise in futility.
According to the State Department's top diplomat for Africa, Jendayi
Frazer, “The Council of Islamic Courts is now controlled by al-Qaida
cell individuals, East Africa Al-Qaida cell individuals,” and
“(the) top layer of the courts are extremist to the core.”
“We need to treat many
of these claims with caution until we see firm evidence,” says
Matt Bryden, a consultant with the International Crisis Group (ICG).
Ken Menkhaus, a political scientist and Somalia expert, agrees adding
that “Somalis, whether secular or Islamist, are parochial, and
have never been animated about distant causes.”
Relying on this politicized
intelligence, Washington gave Ethiopia the green light to widen the
conflict.
A Viable Alternative
Instead of increasing the
volatility of the Somali issue, Washington should use Somalia as a springboard
for reestablishing good relations with the Islamic world. First, it
must be remembered that the ICU has had overwhelming support within
Somalia. In the eyes of the majority of Somalis, the ICU brought law
and order to the country. And, on the other hand, the wounds caused
by Operation Dung Beetle—the covert action fiasco of last summer
that brought the United States into an unholy alliance with the most
despised warlords against the ICU—are still raw. Needless to say,
only goodwill diplomacy and substantive fence mending can heal that.
All Islamists must not be
lumped together. Such un-nuanced analysis clearly alienates the majority
of Muslims who practice a religion the Koran refers to as diin al wasata,
or “the middle ground religion,” and who consider seeking
the moderate position in all affairs to be an Islamic obligation. The
ICU in particular includes representation from almost all shades of
Islam.
In terms of immediate actions,
Washington should pressure Ethiopia to recall its troops and should
push for the resumption of the Khartoum peace process. Also, the European
Union must have a seat at the table. The EU has both the credibility
and the willingness to support and fund sustainable peace and nation-building.
It is deeply ironic that
the UN resolution authorizing the use of force in Somalia was approved
on the same day that the bipartisan Iraq Study Group issued its report.
By ignoring the lessons of the Iraq War, and favoring force over diplomacy,
Washington has made the same mistakes once again. If it acts quickly
to rein in Ethiopia and reach out to the supporters of the ICU, however,
the United States might still avoid the worst-case scenario.
FPIF contributor Abukar Arman is a freelance writer and a council member
of the Interfaith Association of Central Ohio.
Leave
A Comment
&
Share Your Insights