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Jihad After Bin Laden: A Response To Lawrence Wright

By D. Nath Aldalala'a

11 August, 2011
Countercurrents.org

On Spiegel Online dated 5 August 2011 , Lawrence Wright predicted the diminishing of al-Qaeda. His reasons behind that claim were that the death of Bin Laden came during a period of peaceful uprisings across the Arab World. This in turn overshadowed the dramatic impact of his death and also downplayed the future role of al-Qaeda in any fundamental changes that will shape the Arab world. Wright's remarks that al-Qaeda has no role in the ongoing Arab Spring is valid and it is particularly significant that al-Qaeda has no role in that. Any change on such a scale without Islamist movements at the helm is essentially promising. Wright's observation that peaceful means of protest can bring about the changes that years of jihad have failed to accomplish is true enough. I also agree with his argument that the killing of Bin Laden at this juncture, “at a moment when al-Qaida is under terrific pressure to demonstrate its relevance -- places the terror group in a much more difficult position.”

My concern regarding his article is that its validity invokes only a Western interpretation of events. Wright seems to fall into the old traps of Orientalism and a belief in a monolithic Arab culture, which in turn produces a simplistic understanding of a range of complex and differing circumstances and situations. Wright also seems caught up in identifying binary oppositions of violence versus non-violence, as if that was the key difference between the Arab Spring and al-Qaeda. While there are some overlaps in the aims of these two dissident groups, i.e both setting out to bring about particular changes in their respective society – is it not the case that one (al-Qaeda) is more about being in opposition to Western capitalist dominance, its neo-colonialism and secular modernity and foreign policies, while the other is a more introspective challenge within its own specific national structures. Wright's celebratory mood is welcome and to some extent valid, but it is also simplistic, it does not recognise the complexities, and pluralities, and it also misses the point by collapsing various concepts into each other such as depicting Mubarak and the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood as dinosaurs. Both still have ground in Egypt .

However, I wish to offer the key points in Write's article with which I disagree: Wright stated that Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood are more open to democracy and modernism as the younger generation are now taking over the leadership in these movements; the youth movement inside the Muslim Brotherhood did go into Tahrir Square in January; the youth movement is the new alliance in the Arab World. These are sweeping statements and lack currency. Hamas lacked an open mind to democracy for a very simple reason: it has, along with the Fatah movement in the West Bank , failed miserably to form a simple, a very straight forward, self rule within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These two factions, and principally Hamas, were unresponsive to the basic needs of the Palestinians and the very essentials of any civil society. They fought bitter battles on the West Bank and the streets of Gaza , and all attempts at reconciliation by the Arab World have been unable to bring them together in a democratic spirit that could ease the Palestinian plight. The younger generation in these movements have no voice at all. The individuals that govern Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood have been the same names for generations. Some of the old names leading Hamas have disappeared only because they were dead or because they were liquidated by Israel . The next point by Wright is that the youth movement inside the Muslim Brotherhood went into Tahrir Square in January: the youth certainly led the protests, but their action was undertaken in the spirit of the revolution itself. The Muslim Brotherhood merely seized on an opportunity to rebel, rather than serve as its catalyst. The Brotherhood was banned in Egypt during Mubarak years, and once the chance arose, they found a window of opportunity for revenge. Consequently, after the success of the revolution, the role of this movement became rather ambiguous. It was reported that o n 8th April the army launched a violent attack on the protesters, killing at least two. The Muslim Brotherhood has described the people protesting against the military as ‘zealots', and refused to support their demonstrations: On 8th July, the Brotherhood supported hundreds of thousands protesting in Tahrir Square, but made a pointed exit at 6pm, defying the calls for a sit-in and then levelled criticism at the political parties and groups who remained in the square. The Brotherhood subsequently launched attacks against the continuing protest via its website, Ikhwan Online, which on 11th July claimed the sit-in had been infiltrated by “remnants of the dissolved National Democratic Party, the state security apparatus and their Zionist allies”. With regard to the revolution itself, the youth element of the Muslim Brotherhood are in effect identifiable with the wider youth movement of Egypt rather than of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Furthermore, Youth movements across the Arab world do not have the capacity or the ground on which to play the role of alliance. Arab countries differ from one another in many ways but share one thing: it is always the older generation, or the elder, who is in charge. The role of the youth comes to an end when revolutions or uprisings are over. And then the time-honoured mechanism of governing the Arab world will be resumed by those veterans of boredom.

Al-Qaeda over the last few years has been diminishing as a vital and relevant organisation, as a brand-name. What remained of al-Qaeda is a deadly environment that will haunt Muslims around the world for years to come. In the post-9/11 Zeitgeist there did not seem to be much differentiation between an al-Qaeda member and an ordinary Muslim. I can understand that Mr. Wright views al-Qaeda purely in terms of the threat it poses to the West and to the United States in particular. I can also understand that Mr. Wright's boasts about how the CIA approached him for solutions may encourage an authoritative tone in his writing. But the issue at stake is not that of al-Qaeda versus Europe and the United States : the difference al-Qaeda created is that it helped to carve out an overall global environment whereby conflict became inevitable. After 9/11 there were more submissions and erosions of freedom in the Arab world in the name of the fight against terror. The hatred for Bin Laden grew over the years not only because of his terrorist activities against Muslims in Muslim countries such as those in Istanbul, Casablanca, Bali, Khobar, Sharm Al_Shaikh, Amman, and the countless insurgencies in Baghdad, but also because of the extreme anxiety endured by Muslims everywhere in name of the war on terror. Thus, the hatred for Bin Laden became personal at some point. When an ordinary Muslim man with his family of young boys and girls were routinely interrogated at airports – as part of the war on Terror – then Bin Laden's name becomes etched in the memory. When governments cracked down on freedoms in the Arab world, it also was done in the name of the war on terror. The overdue Arab Spring, if it will be concluded with true freedom and dignity for the masses, was delayed to 2011 merely because of the war on terror. Not many would have dared to march on the streets of Cairo or Tunis in 2002. The protestors would have been branded as terrorists and the state would have had a free hand in cracking down on them. The salfi's in Jordan, admirers of Bin Laden, would not march in Zarqa city in Jordan with knives and swords back in 2003. Al-Qaeda created a global war on terror where Muslims around the world were singled out as demons and/or as being different. Therefore, the environment of frenzy that currently dictates the formation of world political maps is because of al-Qaeda.

Furthermore, the majority of protestors who participated in the so called “Arab Spring” were not necessarily hungry, jobless, or hopeless crowds. On the contrary, they were educated but suppressed people who saw their governments utilising the frenzy of the war on terror to curtail the basics of human rights and common dignity. Bin Laden was hiding in Pakistan, a place in which a time bomb is waiting to explode, a place which was left adrift between the failure of the West in Afghanistan and the future of a bloody Iran. The focus on Bin Laden's death as ‘closure', as Mr. Wright puts it, simplifies terrorism and narrows it down to a particular personality. Where and how Bin Laden was caught and killed does in fact demonstrate how marginalised and weak he had become. But that does not affirm his legacy as an influential figure or as the most famous man in history. It is ‘the' historical epoch that we witness that will be remembered, for a global conflict that has polarised the world into two: Muslims v. the rest of the world.

The future of jihad is then simple to read: Arab regimes curtailed the freedom of religion and created an environment of surveillance and espionage, which led to an atmosphere of mistrust amongst sections of the populace in the Arab world. Iraq was an example; Libya and Syria are further illustrations. With the removal of the machinery of authoritarian regimes, and their replacement with an expected, and sometimes illusionary, spring for all, religion will definitely dominate the future debate. However, this need not necessarily be religion with radical or terrorist inclinations, but the simple practice of faith whereby people have the freedom of expression and the space for theological dialogue. It is this point that will make the difference: within the overall frame of the war on terror as religion has already been politicised to a state of ‘no-return'. The mistrust between Muslims and Western countries is now clearly evident. Any perusal of the comments in response to the numerous articles in Arab Media about the attacks on Libya reveals how angry and frustrated Arabs and Muslims have become. They make many comparisons between the nights in Tripoli and those of Baghdad in 2003. The ground is not fertile for what the Americans envisage as democratic change in the Arab world. Afghanistan has indeed become a symbol of the continuing Jihad . Note the latest shooting down of the U.S helicopter, killing 30 American servicemen; the almost daily basis on which European soldiers and UK service personnel in particular, are being killed there. Somalia and Yemen are the hubs of Jihad. Perhaps al-Qaeda has diminished as an organisation, but it has survived as a model for conducting the business of terrorism. However there has been a dense normalisation of the name al-Qaeda - it stands as a synonym for certain boasts, knowledge and prestige. I recall Abd Al-Barri Atwan- the editor of the Al-Quds Arabic newspaper who, hundreds of times on TV mentioned that while interviewing Bin Laden he had been told of this and that. Those who met Bin Laden or interviewed him for an hour or two eagerly assume the role of experts in international affairs, specialists on Jihad and, of course, claim authority on Islam and Muslim affairs. The normalisation of al-Qaeda seems to have become a fashionable, journalistic mode of expression. For example, Mr Wright boasts that “ Indeed, some of my al-Qaida contacts are even on Facebook now, and it makes me always laugh that we are now Facebook friends.”

Bin Laden himself was not as much relevant in the the Arab media as he was of supreme importance to the United States , and to Western media. In effect, there was much more obsession with Bin Laden in Western Media than in the Arab and Muslim world. There is no legacy for Bin Laden but that of terror and this is evident in the continuing rift between the intentions of the war on terror and its outcomes. Mr. Wright celebrates the death of Bin Laden as the end of Jihad , while in the same article he predicts turmoil in Libya and in Yemen , stating “if I were in al-Qaeda's shoes, I would want to go to these countries.” That seems contradictory and assumes a continuing of Jihad rather than its demise. Mr. Wright “suspects that al-Qaeda's leaders are already concentrating their attention on these two countries”!

What remains deeply troubling in much of the writing about the Muslim world is the lack of specificity evident in the writer's interests or knowledge. The lack of familiarity and insight with regard to Islam which is coupled with an ignorance of social and cultural structures and the particular historical moment fosters a superficial theorising of the situation. Journalists such as Wright are obviously concerned and well intentioned in their writing about the Arab world and international affairs, but such blanket interpretations of events tend to weaken the purpose of reading their articles.

Dr. Nath Aldalala'a , School of English Literature, Language and Linguistics
Percy Building, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne
NE1 7RU, United Kingdom.
mailto:[email protected]

 



 


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