All
In The Timing
By
Pranjal Tiwari
Znet
27 May, 2003
Timing is everything, as they say. The day before East Timor celebrated
the anniversary of its independence from Indonesia, the Jakarta government
launched an all-out attack on another independence movement, this time
in Aceh, a northern Sumatran province rich in oil and natural gas. The
30-50,000 Indonesian troops, covered by warships and fighter jets, constitute
the largest military operation since, yes, the invasion of East Timor
in 1975. Their overarching mission has been clearly defined by General
Endriartono Sutarto: "You must chase and wipe out GAM [the Free
Aceh Movement]...you are trained to kill, so wipe them out." (1)
The attack on Aceh coincides
not only with the independence day of East Timor, but other internal
and international situations, whose influence is evident in the timing
and details of the operation.
"Last Refuge of the
Scoundrel
President Megawati Sukarnoputris
government is currently facing an internal crisis, and severe pressure
from political opposition and disaffected groups, particularly over
the effects of its neoliberal economic policies. These extremely unpopular
policies, which included the removal of various subsidies, led to instability
and diminution in the market prices for such commodities as sugar, tobacco,
and rice, and widespread suffering among farmers and ordinary Indonesians.
Privatisation was also a feature of government policy, a factor that
led to extensive job-losses, particularly in the manufacturing sector.
Just this year, in January 2003, massive opposition to neoliberal policies
forced the government to do a U-turn and partially restore subsidies
for fuel, electricity, and phone tariffs. (2)
More recently, on May 20th
2003, thousands across the country participated in demonstrations to
mark the anniversary of former dictator Suhartos downfall in 1998
(3). The demonstrations explicitly targeted the current government,
demanding that Megawati resign, and that the political reform promised
after Suhartos reign be instituted. According to some reports,
polls have recorded some 80% of people expressing general discontent
with the government and political parties. Max Lane, writing in Australias
Green Left Weekly notes that the demonstrations have involved
the broadest political support of any wave of demonstrations since 1997-98.(4)
The Aceh attack, which early
indications show has enjoyed a high level of popular support in Indonesia,
could certainly give a nationalist boost to a government in crisis.
Though the success of this move is yet to be seen, with the May 20 popular
protests coming after attack on Aceh began, the Megawati government
may have attempted to find some refuge in the fog of war.
Right time for war
Internationally, one can
clearly see the influence of the recent US invasion of Iraq, in having
provided both legitimacy and even specific planning ideas for the Aceh
attack.
In terms of legitimacy, cracking
down on insurgencies, internal dissent, and political opposition by
governments across the world had already become increasingly popular
with the declaration of Bushs war on terror.
As Dr. Andrew Tan, an expert
on regional insurgencies at Singapore's Institute for Defense and Strategic
Studies told the Christian Science Monitor recently: This is the
right time to go back to war. In the context of the war against terrorism,
there are few, if any, diplomatic costs to seeking a military solution."
(5)
For an all-out military assault
rather than low-intensity counter-insurgency warfare, however,
there could be no better provider of legitimacy than the US war
in Iraq: an illegal act of aggression carried out despite massive international
civil & political outcry. The fact that the US government was able
to successfully initiate and conclude such a blatant display of unprovoked
force against significantly weaker opposition, with few political or
military consequences, seems to have been taken by governments in Asia
and around the world as a carte blanche, a chance to finally settle
their problems of insurgencies and independence movements.
The Philippine government
of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for example, has taken the opportunity to
redouble its attacks against the insurgency in the southern region of
Mindanao. Much has also been written about the Israeli governments
escalation of violence against the Palestinians during and after the
war on Iraq.
Similarly, the Indonesian
government seems to have taken the opportunity to annihilate the insurgency
in Aceh. Recent media reports have certainly cited Indonesian generals
references to the US war on Iraq as justification for the
operation. Moreover, the Indonesian governments offer at the last
minute peace talks held in Tokyo prior to the attack was a non-starter,
with a core condition being the rejection of independence as a demand-
clearly something the Free Aceh Movement would never accept. Dan Murphy
of the Christian Science Monitor compared the offer to Israel
demanding the Palestinian Liberation Organization renounce designs on
statehood as a precondition for peace talks. (5) A 'military solution
was always the desired outcome.
Embedded in Aceh
More specifically, certain
features of the Indonesian operation in Aceh seem to have been designed
directly from blueprints of the US attack on Iraq. The Jakarta Post,
for example, reported that the Indonesian military was to use its own
embedded journalists as an experiment for possible wider
use in future missions. The newspaper reported that 60 journalists were
to be given training by the TNI, after which they would
receive a license to report on military operations. Moreover,
the training was closed to non-Indonesian journalists.
Quoted in the Post, TNI spokesperson
Major-General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin talked about refusal to allow foreign
journalists to cover military operations: I don't know whether
there are any political considerations from the Foreign Ministry, but
for me it is clear that we do not want any disturbance during the operation."
(6)
Guarding against internal
media disturbances also seems to have been a consideration,
as overt repression of independent press reporting within Aceh has also
been documented in the wake of the attack. In its 2003 survey, Reporters
Without Borders labeled Asia as possibly the worst region of the world
in terms of censorship and threats against journalists. Unfortunately
true to form, then, was the recent statement by Major General Endang
Suwarya, Indonesias military governor of Aceh, in which he explicitly
outlined his intention to silence the spokesmen of GAM.
I want all news published
to uphold the spirit of nationalism, he said. Put the interests
of the unitary state of Indonesia first. Don't give statements from
GAM any credence." (7)
The targets of Suwaryas
criticisms have included Aceh based private TV stations and newspapers,
such as Serambi Indonesia and Metro TV. The Jakarta Post recently quoted
a Metro TV reporter describing an encounter with the TNI after the station
aired footage that military central command considered to be subversive.
The officer spent almost
two hours laying into us and threatened to expel us from Aceh if we
continued airing such footage, the reporter explained. Of course,
preventing disturbances is one side of information control:
presenting the desired message of military operations is
the other.
In the case of Aceh, the
desired message of the first days military maneuvers was well-interpreted
by Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group: I can't imagine
any reason they'd be bringing this type of force to bear other than
trying to generate a 'shock and awe' effect. (5)
The military seemed to concur:
We just wanted to give some shock therapy to GAM, to make them
mentally and psychologically afraid of what the future holds,
explained the TNIs Lieutenant Colonel Firdaus Kormano. (8)
Embedded journalists were
certainly on hand to record the beginning of the massive operation,
and properly convey its message of shock and awe. On May
20, the front pages of many Indonesian and Asian newspapers carried
action shots of hundreds of Indonesian paratroopers descending on Aceh,
or landing on the coast line in boats.
If one lesson from Iraq employed
in Aceh has been the use of overwhelming force to deliver shock
and awe to the enemy population, another has been
effective marshalling of journalists as prominent tools in the creation
of this effect.
Hawks with a capital H
The more direct military
and political links between the governments that carried out the invasion
of Iraq and the Indonesian state, a relationship made infamous during
the genocide in East Timor were also fairly evident during the attack
on Aceh. Though the US, UK, and Australian governments have voiced their
concerns at the possibility of human rights violations,
the operation itself has not been openly criticized. Neighbouring regional
power Australia has even confirmed its commitment to the territorial
integrity of Indonesia" (9), affirming, albeit cautiously, the
right of the Indonesian state to mount the operation.
Concrete Western links to
Aceh include investment in the region, most prominently by Exxon-Mobil.
Moreover, American OV-10F Bronco and British Hawk fighter jets, used
by the Indonesian military in the invasion and occupation of East Timor
were in action again last week, flying missions into Aceh, with reports
of airstrikes in areas of the province. The British government took
the revelation extremely seriously, the UKs ambassador
to Indonesia telling the Guardian: The [Indonesian] Defence Minister
confirmed that the Hawks would not be used in a ground-attack role."
(10)
This extremely serious
concern is based on the continued (and ridiculous) public assertion
by the UK government that Hawk aircraft are training jets,
sold with the understanding that they are not to be used for offensive
purposes. It is somewhat curious that this claim continues to be thrown
about, as leading figures in the British government have themselves
highlighted its emptiness in no uncertain terms. John Pilger, for example,
brought up the issue of Hawk jets during his classic interview with
former British Minister of Defence Alan Clark.
Pilger asked Clark if the
Hawks did indeed live up to the reputation of being merely training
jets as was being claimed at the time. Clarks reply was
that Hawks were dual use with a capital D.
When asked whether the guarantees
on the part of the Indonesian regime were worth anything, Clark was
surprisingly blunt: A guarantee is worthless from any government
as far as Im concerned!" (11)
Nightmare Scenario
The TNI has been wary of
international scrutiny, and the importance of paying lip-service to
human rights, having tried to present the attack as a clean, surgical
operation. The Jakarta Post quoted General Sutarto telling his troops,
What you are doing here now is being broadcast all over the world
If there are soldiers who do violate (the order) and cause suffering
to people in the field, then just shoot them in the head.
Human Rights Watch, however,
warned that the Indonesian attack sets the stage for gross human
rights violations(12) among the people of Aceh, particularly given
the TNIs history of abuses in the region. A recent statement from
the Asian Students Association reported that while armed
skirmishes between the TNI and GAM are being reported daily, with casualties
on both sides, there have been far more casualties in civil society."
(13) Indeed, even from the first day of the attack, journalists such
as Orlando de Guzman of the BBC reported on the aftermath of the TNIs
missions, describing the targeting of civilians, summary executions,
and general climate of fear. (14) Roundups of activists and NGO staff
have also been reported. Another critical issue is that of internal
refugees, or Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), of which Health Minister
Achmad Sujudi estimates there will be 300,000. Camps have been set up
by the Indonesian state around Aceh, North Sumatra and Medan, to hold
around 100,000 refugees of the attack.
The current situation is
a nightmare for people in Aceh and all over Indonesia.
May 22nd, the fourth day
of the attack, was also the day that the 11th defendant in the trial
of Indonesian generals-- for crimes against humanity in East Timor in
1999-- was acquitted. Brigadier General Tono Suratman thanked the Jakarta
court for a fair trial, and the Chief Judge proclaimed that
the Generals dignity and position
should be restored
to him after the decision (15). The timing of this verdict, coinciding
with the assault on Aceh, gives a frightening cumulative picture of
the continuing power and impunity enjoyed by the military in Indonesia,
and the symbiotic relationship it still shares with other state &
civil institutions.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) 'Indonesian troops told to "exterminate" Aceh rebels,
spare civilians AFP. May 20, 2003
(2) 'Dangerous political
football Bloomberg. January 28, 2003
(3)Celebrations of
1998 reform turn violent Jakarta Post. May 20, 2003.
(4)Protests call for
ousting of Megawati Green Left Weekly. Jan 22, 2003.
(5) Murphy, Dan. SE
Asia tries Shock and Awe Christian Science Monitor.
(6)Embedded journalists
to cover military operations Jakarta Post. May 11, 2003
(7) 'Truth becomes casualty
of war as military restricts media Jakarta Post
(8)Indonesia uses UK
jets in Aceh offensive The Guardian. May 20, 2003
(9)Australia defends
use of force in Aceh Asia Pacific Programs. May 21, 2003
(10)Military chief
defends use of Hawk jets The Guardian. May 22, 2003
(11) Pilger, John. Death
of a Nation: The Timor Conspiracy 1994. (View clips at http://pilger.carlton.com/timor)
(12)Indonesia: Martial
Law, Bombing in Aceh Human Rights Watch May 20, 2003
(13)The situation in
Aceh, Indonesia Asian Students Association. May 26, 2003.
(14)They killed
them one by one BBC News Online. May 21, 2003
(15)Indonesian army
chief acquitted BBC News Online. May 22, 2003