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Assessing The Iranian Framework Deal

By Dr. Rizwana Abbasi

05 April, 2015
Countercurrents.org

Most of the discussions between P5+1 (US, Russia, UK, France, China and Germany) and Iran over the last weeks have been focused on quantifiable variables such as the number and range of the centrifuges, the amount of low-enrichment uranium (LEU), the length of the deal and its implementation under intrusive monitoring system of the IAEA and access to the Iranian facilities.

It is important to note that the framework deal is not a treaty but a voluntary arrangement between the P5+1 and Iran. The voluntary arrangements are in the form of agreed guidelines that participants accept or chooseto disregard, as they deem appropriate. Thus, this agreement holds no legal legitimacy or backing.

What are the two sides' agreed guidelines (which are not released yet in form of a document) under the framework agreement? First, Iran will reduce the number of its centrifuges from 19000 to 5,060, [1] which are used to enrich uranium. Additionally,excess centrifuges would be disassembled and placed under monitored storage.  Iran would also consider limiting its stockpile of LEU from 10,000 kilograms to 300 kilograms(insufficientamount for a nuclear weapon) for 15 years. [2] Thisis indeed a tremendous breakthrough and significant arrangement. Iran has also agreed not to build any enrichment facilities for 15 years and will keep the enrich uranium level not above 3.7 percent –the level justified for commercial power plants. This is immensely an encouraging development and productive outcome which invalidates hard-liners' criticism. 

Secondly, the two sides have agreed thatthe design of Iran's heavy-water reactor placed at Arak facility will be modified thereby keeping it from producing plutonium, a weapons-usable fuel.Iran agreed that it will significantly limit its plutonium output and that it will not develop any capability to separate plutonium from spent fuel for nuclear weapons development.  Iran has indeed made pretty tough choices thereby displaying a decisive and measured approach.Iran will not develop a reprocessing capability (the back end of fuel cycle – a vital component in developing a plutonium bomb) and Iran will not build a new heavy – water reactor for 15 years.

Thirdly, Iran would allow stringent International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA)'s inspection under the Additional Protocol (AP) which Iran stopped adhering to and now agrees to follow it again. The APreinforces unannounced inspection of the IAEA. This would mitigate mistrust between Iran and the IAEA. Thus, inspectors now could get access to the supply Chain through which Iran obtains material for its nuclear programme. Inspection would last for 25 years, indeed longer than the implementation period of the agreement itself. In addition, Iran would institute transparency and accountability measures. Undeniably the enhanced and intrusive monitoring would help promptly detect any possible future clandestine nuclear weapons activities or material diversionin the Iranian facilities.

Fourthly, the Iranian Fordow nuclear facility will cease enriching any uranium and will be  transformedinto a research centre.Furthermore, Natanz facility will be the focus of all the enrichment activities. There it will use only its first generation centrifuges (IR-1)to enrich uranium for ten years. The additional advanced IR – 2m centrifuges will be stored for that period of ten years under the IAEA monitoring system. In fact advanced centrifuges models the IR-2, IR-4, IR-6 and IR-8 will not be used for enrichment for ten years and will be placed under the IAEA's inspection. [3]

More so, it is agreed that Iran will implement modified code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements, which requires Iran to give early notification when itconstructs new nuclear facilities. Iran will take further measures to address concerns over the possible military dimension (PMD) of its programme. [4]

Fifthly, in response Iran would receive sanction relief that have sharply hit and reduced its sale of oil and impeded access to the international market and crippled its economic progress.The US and EU proliferation related sanction will be lifted after the IAEA verifies that the agreed steps have been practically implemented on transparent ground.  All the UNSC resolution focused on Iran will be lifted concurrently. Additionally, transparent procurement channel will be initiated thereby permittingIran get what it needs for civilian nuclear development thus, giving assurances to the opposite side that the material will not be diverted for military purposes.

Sixthly, the tough decisions and demands were attached to research and development issues and finally, the Iranians procured the right to research and development, but not to use more modern technologies for production for the next 10 years.

 What is the US perspective?American high profile officials are of the view that even if Iran breaks the deal, it would not be able to develop sufficient critical material for a nuclear weapon at least for a year, giving the international community time to respond. President Obama pronounced and lauded that the deal “cuts off every pathway” for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon.“If Iran cheats,” he said, “the world will know it.” Indeed the practical manifestation of the above agreed guidelines will prevent suspicions and minimize uncertainties.

 

What is the Iranian perspective: Indeed Iran has resisted pressure, sanction and isolation for so long. There was huge pressureinside Iran for an end to Western sanctions on the oil and banking sectors. There was strong realization in Iran that engagement is better than isolation, thus, they were willing to come out of isolation. Thus, this deal has increased their profile in the comity of nations. The deal will indeed help incentivize Iran to develop cooperation with the IAEA and international community.

 

Hassan Rouhani said, “the deal would lead to a new page” of cooperation with the international community and insisted that his country would abide by obligations. “we will live up to the promises provided the opposite side abides by as well”. [5] Iran might ask for the immediate lifting of sanction nevertheless, it would be a gradual process until the IAEA ensures that Iran abides by the rules and implements the agreement on transparent ground.

 

However, Iran yet has a long way to go. The Iranian negotiators will have to address significant political objections from hard-liners, the military and scientific community. Further public support and possible reaction will be seen in the next weeks and month.

  How important is the deal for regional stability?  Though, this deal is not in any way linked to the existing regional crisis and unsettled ongoing political process in the Middle East. A nuclear Iran would have had domino effect in the region. Thus, the deal appears to have far reaching and stabilizing impact on the region. Though, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israelhighlighted on 3 April that a deal with Iran poses a grave danger to the region and the world. Along with this many leaders in Arab countries also criticized the deal, which comes amid tensions over Iran's possible involvement in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. In this context, President Obama has called King Salman of Saudi Arabia [6] on 3 April to reassure that he remains deeply concerned about “Iran's destabilizing activities in the region,” and invited the King and other Gulf leaders to Camp David in this spring to address the Middle Eastern crisis.

How important is the framework deal for the nuclear non-proliferation Regime? Will it increase or decrease the proliferation trends?The Iranian nuclear behavior until recent past seemed to have marginalizing the potential and legitimacy of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.Nevertheless, Iran's changed behavior in the shape of this framework deal and agreement has certainly increased the profile of the regime, its legitimacy and the IAEA's effectiveness and efficacy. It has revived the spirit of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as well.

The Stumbling Block:  The US Congress, Republican lawmakers and the hardliners who complain that the deal falls short of their expectations are the major stumbling block in the finalization of this framework agreement. Some may demand permanent limits on Iran's nuclear activities. The hardliners think that sanctions would coerce Iran to dismantle its nuclear infrastructure. It would be great that the Congress should support not oppose the vital diplomatic and political efforts to address this complex issue.  Indeed, it goes without saying that the deal has very strong backing and support from the P5+1 and it is a difficult task for the congress to scuttle the deal at this stage.

Conclusion: the deal is a spectacular outcome and great victory for all the players involved. The agreement covers considerable details andtougher arrangementsfar beyond our expectations. Arguably, any deal with Iran with resulting relief in sanctions indicates a cautious and measured approach in which the responses will be graduated.  Thus, normalization of relations, lifting of sanctions would further bridge gaps and difference between the IAEA and Iran.  However, coming months would add a great deal of legal and political wrangling indeed and the practical decision would be tougher than this agreement which we have to wait and see.  The months and year ahead are significantly difficult and all the players have to take a measured approach with careful moves to reach a final agreement with subsequent implementation.

Dr. Rizwana Abbasi (Ph.D., University of Leicester, UK) is assistant professor in the Department of Strategic and Nuclear Studies at the National Defense University, Islamabad. Her research   interests have focused on international security and nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear Strategy and Policy.

[1] http://www.armscontrol.org/files/Parameters-for-a-Joint-Comprehensive-Plan-of-Action-regarding-the-Islamic-Republic-of-Irans-Nuclear-Program-2015-04-02.pdf

[2] http://www.armscontrol.org/files/Parameters-for-a-Joint-Comprehensive-Plan-of-Action-regarding-the-Islamic-Republic-of-Irans-Nuclear-Program-2015-04-02.pdf





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